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Abstract 
This thesis presents a critical study of the administrative court of Saudi Arabia 
(Board of Grievances). Its aim is to evaluate the modem Board of Grievances. 
The study also investigates the nature of the Board of Grievances, that is, the 
extent to which its role is entirely administrative according to the Act of 1982, or 
also contains aspects of an appeal, review, or investigatory court. 
The study explores the legal nature and jurisdiction of the Board, the 
appointment, qualifications, and training of its members and processes for their 
removal or retirement, transfer, promotion, and discipline. It is argued that the 
Board's membership, jurisdiction and procedures all reflect historical, legal and 
constitutional factors; and that these influences affect the efficiency of the Board 
as a mechanism for the legal control of administration and of grievances against 
the government. The thesis seeks to identify major changes which would 
enhance the Board's role and strengthen its contribution to the rule of law in 
Saudi Arabia. 
The first part of the thesis consists of two chapters dealing with the historical, 
constitutional and legal framework within which the Board operates. Chapter 1 
examines the law and constitutional background of Saudi Arabia. The main 
thrust of this chapter is to place the Board of Grievances within the constitutional 
and legal environment in which it operates, in other words within the history of 
the growth of the state itself. 
Chapter 2 examines the historical development of the Board of Grievances in 
Islam. The chapter also briefly compares the Islamic Board of Grievances with 
an institution that has interesting similarities, the Court of Chancery in English 
legal history. 
The four chapters of the second part examine the modern Board of Grievances, 
tracing its development since 1924, and its present jurisdiction, practice, and 
procedures. Chapter 3 discusses the modem development of the Board of 
Grievances in Saudi Arabia. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the various 
stages of the development of the Board of Grievances as established in Saudi 
Arabia. Chapter 4 examines the composition and structure of the modern Board 
of Grievances. This chapter also discusses the status of the Board members as 
administrative judicial officers. 
Chapter 5 highlights the scope and limits of jurisdiction of the Board of. 
Grievances. Chapter 6 examines the rules of procedure of the Board of 
Grievances and its working practices. 
The concluding Chapter 7 refers to issues arising from the study in order to 
suggest some reforms necessary to improve the performance of the Board and to 
satisfy the expectation of the people. 
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INTRODUCTION Board of Grievances 
1.1 Introduction 
The term "Grievances" in Arabic is Madhalim, plural of madhlamah. Madhalim 
means to exceed the defined limits, as well as injustice and oppression. Diwan is 
the place where grievances are dealt with. ' The modern Saudi Board of 
Grievances, or Diwan Al-Madhalim, retains the name of an ancient Islamic 
institution, which had its origins in early Islamic jurisprudence. 
After the founding of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in [1932], efforts were made 
by Saudi rulers to establish an effective mechanism to deal with complaints 
brought by individuals over decisions made by the administrative organs of the 
state. In 1953 the modern Board of Grievances was formally established. It was 
not entirely without precedent, being derived from the much earlier initiative. 
The Saudi Board of Grievances needs to be evaluated. Twelve years ago, after 
several years of negotiation, the Saudi government joined the World Trade 
Organisation. Most issues that will arise as a result of this joining, such as 
protection of intellectual property rights, will be dealt with by the Board of 
Grievances. The Board of Grievances plays a major role in Saudi public 
administration. It is the only body which has the power to review and annul 
government decisions and order government departments to award compensation 
for damage resulting from either their unlawful decisions or their public 
activities. It is a right at the disposal of both citizens and foreigners who work in 
the Kingdom to complain against the government. However, although the Board 
1 Ulian, S. "Qada al-Madhlimfi al-Islam", 2°d edition, Riyadh, Dar al-Rasheed Linasher wa al- 
tawze'a, 1980. p. 49. 
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emerged to protect grievance rights, questions remain about whether the Board 
does really respond to the expectation of the grievances. There are two very 
important questions with respect to the Board of Grievances, regarding the full 
independence of judicial decision-making and its clear evolution into an 
administrative court. These questions will be explored in this study. The study 
will also investigate the nature of the Board of Grievances, that is, the extent to 
which its role is fully administrative according to the Act of 1982, or also 
contains aspects of an appeal, review, or investigatory court. Furthermore, this 
study will explore the legal nature and jurisdiction of the Board, and the 
appointment, qualifications, and training of the members and their removal or 
retirement, transfer, promotion, and discipline. The study also seeks to identify 
any major changes which would enhance the Board's role and strengthen its 
contribution to the rule of law in Saudi Arabia. 
The scope of this thesis necessarily extends beyond a study of the Board of 
Grievances to include the Islamic model from which it derives. Further, any 
examination of the history of the Saudi Board must raise the question of whether 
it may be classified at all as a judicial body. The Board lacks a central 
characteristic, namely independence from the executive: its Chairman is directly 
appointed and removable by the King, and its personnel are appointed by the 
King on the recommendation of the Committee of Administrative Affairs of the 
Board Members. In order to examine the Board's relationship to the executive 
power of state, and the extent to which it can effectively review acts and 
decisions of state administration, it is essential to include a basic study of the 
constitutional and legal order in Saudi Arabia. Such an inquiry is complicated by 
3 
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the fact that, as in the case of Britain, there is no written constitution in Saudi 
Arabia. However, in the case of the UK, even though there has been an absence 
of a written constitution, British political and legal language over the centuries 
has been wealthy in its argument of the principle of the 'ancient constitution'. 
The British constitution has a very long and proud history. However, it is a 
matter of dispute as to whether Saudi Arabia has any constitution at all, a topic 
that is also examined in this thesis. Such an inquiry necessitates some 
examination of the political and legal history of the country. 
On 1S`. March 1992, three new laws were promulgated which reorganised the 
system of government. The Basic Law of Government, which came into force 
on 2 March 1992, contains an article on human rights, and also sets out the 
principles, powers, and institutional arrangements of government, as well as the 
form of the state. This departure from established legal norms is particularly 
relevant to the debate as to whether Saudi Arabia has or has not a constitution, a 
subject explored in Chapter One. The law which gave rebirth to the Consultative 
Council, a body of sixty people appointed to advise the government, is also 
addressed in Chapter One. The third Law, of 1 March 1992, concerns the 
establishment of regional authorities. The effects envisaged in the governmental 
structure as a result of this Act, which has not yet come into force, are also 
briefly discussed in the first Chapter. However, although touching on subjects 
lying at the heart of its role, none of the laws of March 1992 changed the core 
subject of this thesis, the institution of the Board of Grievances. 
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Government, its administrative agencies and departments, represents the most 
visible source of power in Saudi Arabia, which touches potentially every citizen 
and resident in the country. The Board of Grievances exists to answer 
complaints against that power. This study argues that the Board faces 
considerable challenges in fulfilling that role. It suggests that constitutional, 
legal and historical factors have created uncertainties about the Board's 
jurisdiction, membership, and procedures. Such uncertainties must give rise to 
doubts as to both its effective power to redress grievances and complaints against 
the state, and its character as a tribunal of law within the judicial system of Saudi 
Arabia defending citizens' rights and entitlements. 
The research for this thesis took place early in 2007, at the time of a discussion 
of the Majlis Ash Shura (Consultative Council) to re-evaluate the Act that 
founded the Board and its system. In addition, the Consultative Council is going 
to re-examine and evaluate a wide range of state regulations, in order to repair 
systems, such as the laws governing the judiciary and labour. 
This study is divided into two parts. The first part consists of two chapters 
dealing with the historical, constitutional and legal framework within which the 
Board operates. 
Chapter 1 examines the law and constitutional background of Saudi Arabia. The 
emergence of Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the 20th. century is examined, as 
well as constitutional developments 'and the modern government and judicial 
systems. The main thrust of this chapter is to place the Board of Grievances 
5 
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within the constitutional and legal environment in which it operates, in other 
words within the history of the growth of the state itself. 
Chapter 2 examines the historical development of the Board of Grievances in 
Islam. It explores this historical source of the Board through a discussion of the 
judiciary in Islamic history. The chapter also briefly compares the Islamic Board 
of Grievances with an institution that has interesting similarities, the court of 
Chancery in English legal history. 
The second part, consisting of four chapters, examines the modern Board of 
Grievances, tracing its development since 1924, and its present jurisdiction, 
practice, and procedures. 
Chapter 3 discusses the modern development of the Board of Grievances in 
Saudi Arabia. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the various stages of the 
development of the Board of Grievances as established in Saudi Arabia. It 
concentrates on the basis of the Board prior to the 1982 Act. It thus seeks to 
provide the historical formation of the modern Board as an introduction to an 
examination of the present functioning of the institution in the country. 
Chapter 4 examines the composition and structure of the modern Board of 
Grievances. This chapter also discusses the status of the Board members as 
administrative judicial officers. 
INTRODUCTION Board of Grievances 
Chapter 5 in this second part highlights the scope and limits of jurisdiction of the 
Board of Grievances. It aims to throw light on the areas of jurisdiction 
prescribed by the Board of Grievances Act, in order to define the tasks and role 
of the Board. It deals also with the power of the Board, when it can intervene 
and exercise its power, and when it must refrain. 
Chapter 6 examines the rules of procedure of the Board of Grievances and its 
working practices. It is intended to provide a critical examination of the 
procedures of the Board, in particular the way in which the Board deals with 
administrative cases. This examination combines both analyses of the rules that 
govern the actions of the Board and of information gathered through interviews 
with members of the Board and lawyers practising before it. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion, which presents some necessary reforms, based on 
the issues raised by discussion in the previous chapters, to improve the 
performance of the Board and meet the expectation of the people. 
Attention is paid in this study to both the Gregorian and Islamic calendars. As is 
well known, the Gregorian calendar starts with the birth of Jesus Christ, and this 
calendar is the primary use within the text of this study. The Islamic calendar, 
however, starts with the Prophet Mohammed's migration from Makkah to 
Madina, and is referenced in brackets as years AH. 
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1.2 Methodology and sources of the study 
The main sources used in the research for this study were local legal materials, 
including official regulations and statute law, Government papers, and decisions 
of the Chairman of the Board of Grievances. The writer was offered the 
opportunity to consult a large number of unpublished decisions of the Board for 
the period 1983 to 1990. These decisions are filed at headquarters in Riyadh and 
access was granted by permission of the Deputy Chairman of the Board. The 
writer also had the opportunity to examine the Board of Grievances case records 
for the year 1982 to 1998. Secondary written sources include unpublished 
research completed for degrees in several countries and articles in academic 
journals. Statistical data relevant to the subject was also collected and used. 
The writer had the opportunity to carry out certain interviews. These were 
informal and unsystematic, and are intended only to serve as background to this 
thesis. On this basis, interviews took place with M. Al-Amen, the Chairman of 
the Board, M. Al-Essa, the Deputy Chairman of the Board, and more than ten 
Board members. Lawyers, legal experts, and government officials were also 
interviewed. Interviews with academics were conducted at the University of 
King Abdul Azez, King Saud University and King Fasel University. These 
interviews were conducted during a three month study visit to Saudi Arabia. 
It should be pointed out that under the 1982 Act there is a duty on the Chairman 
to arrange for the classification, printing, and publication of the Board's 
judgments on an annual basis. However to date no judgments have been printed 
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or published. The official explanation is that publication is in process. The 
opportunity to examine the unpublished judgments for this dissertation was, 
therefore, all the more important for the study. 
Attention is drawn to the fact that reference to cases used in the study are made 
by giving the case number. The name and details of parties are not included. 
This is because access was granted to the case records of the Board of 
Grievances on the basis that no such particulars would be published. 
1.3 Limits of the study 
At different points in this study it is admitted that information is lacking on 
certain issues discussed. Even with the opportunity to interview and observe the 
Board directly, detailed information was sometimes difficult to obtain. 
Nevertheless, sufficient information was obtained from all the sources to offer a 
reasonably detailed and balanced critique of the organization and functioning of 
the Board. 
The study does not deal in detail with the substantive features of the Board's 
jurisdiction of judicial review with the panel cases which fall under its 
jurisdiction. The study is essentially concerned with the Board as an institution. 
The research was not designed to be primarily comparative. However, where 
appropriate, brief comparisons are drawn with comparable institutions in France, 
the United Kingdom and Egypt. 
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1.1 Introduction. 
Present day Saudi Arabia dates as a state from 1932. It is a monarchy and an 
Islamic state with a population of 16.5 million. As a country Saudi Arabia has at 
least two grounds for claiming regional and global importance. For the Muslim 
world it is the site of the holiest Islamic shrines. Saudi Arabia has also the largest 
oil reserves in the world ensuring its crucial importance to the developed 
economies. 
Before 1963 the system of government and administration was extremely 
simple. ' The King was the dominant figure, and directly ruled the kingdom with 
his advisers. In 1953 the latter were formalised in a Council of Ministers, gaining 
further authority over subsequent years. In the early nineteen sixties the country 
turned to outside advice for assistance with establishing a more modern 
administration. 2 As a result some ministries and a civil service system were 
established. A Board was established for the civil service and an institute of 
public administration created. As the country began to produce oil it established 
a ministry of Finance and National Economy which reflected the eagerness of the 
government to use the oil revenues to bring about a high standard of welfare and 
education and a modern state administration. The system of law in the country is 
Islamic but there has also been direct influence from Egyptian law and procedure 
which in turn was influenced by French law. 
See Al-Mutairy, T. Asasiyat al-Idarh fi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-sa'udiah. Riyadh: Dar Al- 
Lewa, 1987, pp. 26-28. 
2 See Al-Mutairy, Ibid. p. 28 
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While this study is concerned with one aspect of the current system of 
administration, the Board of Grievances, it is necessary to locate that institution 
within the history of the growth of the state itself. The Board's emergence and 
development cannot be understood without understanding the constitutional and 
legal environment. It was, in the first place, part of the administrative system, 
and a department in the Council of Ministers. Therefore it is necessary for the 
political history and the origins of the constitution to be examined. This chapter 
is concerned with that history with a focus on the political and constitutional 
origins of the country. 
1.2 Origins of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia was created from the consolidation of four long established regions 
in the Arabian Peninsula. The region of Hijaz along the coast of the Red Sea is 
renowned as the site of the holy places for Muslims, Makkah and Madina, and is 
the region from which the modern state developed. Najd region, located in the 
centre of the peninsula, is the modem centre of the state with its capital Riyadh. 
It is mainly a desert area with some oases in the north. To the east, Al-ahsa is 
situated along the coast of the Gulf and finally the southern region, Asir, lies 
along the border with Yemen. 
The modem history of the Arabian Peninsula can be traced to the Ottoman 
period. Hyaz was governed by the Ottoman Empire from 1517. In 1552, the 
12 
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same Empire took over the Eastern part of Arabia. 3 The Najd region remained 
outside the control of powers in the Arabian Peninsula such as the Ottoman 
Empire and later the British. 4 The region consisted of small emirates. For the 
people of the cities as well as the countrymen and villagers, this meant a family 
in power by heritage or by succession from father to son or from brother 
assassination. 5 
The nomads, or desert people, invested power in those members who were well 
known for generosity and strength, in short, those people who had leader 
personality. 
The political history of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia can be considered as falling 
into two main periods as follows: 
1.2.1 The emergence of the Saudi state 1738-1901. 
This period began with an alliance between two persons: Mohammed bin Saud, 
the father of the Saud family, who was the governor of Dera'yah, one of the 
cities of Najd, and Mohammed Bin Abdulwahab, who called for purification of 
Islam and for the reformation of the Muslim society of the day. 6 This political 
and religious alliance was the basis on which the first Saudi state came to be 
established. 
3 See Ibn Uthimeen, S. A, Buhuth wa ta'ligat fi Tarikh al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-sa'udiah. 
1984, pp. 12-15. 
a Ibid 
5 Ibid, p. 16 
6 Ibn Uthimeen, S. Tarikh al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. 1984, vol. 1, p. 96. 
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The consolidation of the various regions of the Arabian Peninsula under one 
single power took about forty years. That task was undertaken by the sons of 
Mohammed Bin Saud. 
The creation of a new state in the Arabian Peninsula alarmed and threatened he 
leaders of the Ottoman Empire as well as the British interest in the Gulf. As 
result, the Ottoman sultan encouraged the government of Egypt (at that time 
Mohammed Ali Pasha) to invade the Arabian Peninsula and to destroy the new 
state. 7 The new state was defeated and its ruler, Abdullah, was captured and 
taken to Cairo from where he was sent to the central government in Turkey, 
8 where he was beheaded in 1818, marking the end of the first Saudi state. 
The important results of that invasion were firstly, the defeat of the first Saudi 
state, secondly, that the Ottoman Empire again became dominant over the 
Arabian Peninsula, and particularly among those Emirates which had been allied 
to the Saudi state. Britain made more treaties with the Gulf Emirates to ensure its 
control over that region. 9 
After a period of political peace in the Arabian peninsula, particularly from the 
Al-Saud family after its defeat by Mohammed Ali Pasha, the second Saudi era 
began when one of the last ruler's sons, Turky, returned to central Arabia. He 
attained the rule of Al-Saud in the Arabian Peninsula again. He was, however, 
assassinated, and was succeeded by his son Faisal who remained as ruler for 
7 Al-Ghamdi, M., The Arab Gulf Countries in Egyptian strategy: A study of Muhammed Ali's 
Ambitions and British responses: 1818-1840. Ph. D. thesis, Essex university, 1990, pp. 52-80. 
8 Ibid., p. 63. 
9 Ibn Uthimeen, op. cit., note No. 6, p. 166. 
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about thirty years. After Faisal's death, a struggle erupted between his sons. It 
led eventually to the collapse of the second Saudi state and the escape to Kuwait 
in 1888 of Abdurhman Bin Faisal, one of Faisal's sons. The family of Al-Saud 
was succeeded in the rule of Najd by another family, Al-Rashid, which remained 
in power until the beginning of this century. 10 
1.2.2 The modern Saudi state: 1901 to the present day 
The revival of Al-Saud in the Arabian Peninsula at the beginning of this century 
was the work of Abdulaziz Bin Abdulrahman, the founder of the present 
Kingdom. He launched an attack on Riyadh in 1901 and seized power from the 
governor. He then took over the other cities of the Najd region, defeated the 
Ottoman Empire and captured the Al-Ahsa region, now called the Eastern 
Province. 11 
Abdulaziz defeated his opponent, al-Rashid, in the North of the Peninsula and 
proclaimed himself the Sultan of Najd and its Provinces. Sharif Hussainj, 
governor of Hijaz, proclaimed himself King of Hijaz and then Caliph of Muslims 
in 1924. Abdulaziz launched an attack on HUaz (Makkah) and seized it in 1926.12 
He was then proclaimed King of HUaz and Sultan of Najd and its Provinces. In 
1932 the present Kingdom emerged after the consolidation of Hijaz, Najd, 
Eastern province and Asir, the southern province. 
10 Ibid., pp. 150-201. 
Ibn Uhimeen. Op. cit., note No. 6, p. 166. 12 Mahmassani, S., Al-Andhimah al-Qanuniahfi al-Duval al-A'rabiah: Al-Hader wa al- 
Mustaqbal, 1957. p. 316-318. 
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1.3 Sources of Law. 
Within the Saudi Arabian legal system, the government as well as individuals 
must respect the law and regulations in force. In other words, they share an 
obligation to observe the rule of law. There are two sources of law in the Saudi 
Arabian legal system: the rules of Islamic Shari'a and the laws enacted by the 
legislative power of the state 
1.3.1 The rules of Islamic Shari'a. 
The rules of Islamic Shari'a are the primary law of the state and the legal 
foundation of every other Saudi law. Of the different jurisprudence sects within 
Islamic Shari 'a, the state has adopted the Hanbali. Early reference to the fact that 
the Islamic Shari'a is the law of Saudi Arabia may be found in the Organic 
Instruction of the Hijazi Kingdom, 1926. Article 5 reads 
The administration of the Hijazi Kingdom is in the hands of His Majesty King 
Abdulaziz the first B. Abd Al-Rahman Al-Faisl Al-Saud and his Majesty [is 
bound to submit to ... 
J the rules of the Shari'a. 
Article 6 also confirms this point: 
Legal judgements shall always be in accordance with the book of God, the 
Sunnah of his Prophet and with that which the companions and the pious 
patriarchs have agreed upon. 
I 
i 
I 
i 
16 
Chapter One Law & Constitution of Saudi Arabia 
The Council of Ministers Act 1958 which repealed the Organic Instructions does 
not mention Islamic Shari 'a. However, according to Al-Dughaither, this does not 
mean that Islamic Shari'a is not a source of law. On the contrary, it is still 
considered to be the source of all laws, and is not subject to repeal. 13 
The new Basic Law of Government promulgated on 'I March 1992, states this 
very clearly; it also established a hierarchy of law. Article 48 reads 
The courts will apply the rules of the Islamic Shari'a in cases brought 
before them, in accordance with that which is indicated in the Book [the 
Quran] and Sunnah, and the statutes decreed by the ruler, which do not 
contradict the Book or the Sunnah. 
Article 55 provides that the King must carry out the affairs of the nation 
according to the rules and prescriptions of Islam. Moreover, according to the 
Basic Law of Government 1992, the King has also to oversee the implementation 
of the Islamic Shari'a. 14 
Consequently, the sources of Islamic Shari 'a (Quran, Sunnah, Ijma and others) 
in accordance with the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence are the sources 
of law in Saudi Arabia. These rules are both the foundation and pinnacle of the 
Saudi legal system and they may not be contradicted. ' 5 
Al-Dughaither, F, Durusfi al-Qada al-Idari al-Saudi Unpublished paper, p. 9 14 Article 55 of the Basic Law 1992. 
's Al-Dughaither op. cit., p. 17, and Shaibt Al-Hamd, M., Al-Wilaya al-Qadaiya li Diwan al- 
Madhalim fil Mamlakh al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. PhD dissertation, University of Imam 
Mohammed Bin Saud, 1989, p. 104. 
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It should be noted here that according to Islamic Shari 'a, new legislation is 
possible in order to meet new legal issues. Ijtihad or independent reasoning and 
the fundamental jurisprudential rule that `everything is permissible unless there 
is proof that it is prohibited' are the criteria for finding answers to these legal 
issues. 16 
1.3.2 Law and Regulations. 
Legislation is the second source of law in Saudi Arabia. These laws (Andhimah) 
may not contradict the rules of Islamic Shari'a. 
Legislative power in the Saudi Arabian system rests with the King and the 
Council of Ministers. Article 18 of The Council of Ministers Act 1985 states that 
The Council of Ministers shall lay down the policy of the State... It possesses the 
regulatory authority [legislative], executive authority and administrative 
authority... 
This source of authority to make law is repeated in Article 67 of the new Basic 
Law of Government 1992. It reads as follows 
The regulatory authority [the legislature] lays down regulations and motions to 
meet the interests of the state or to remove what is objectionable in accordance 
with the Islamic Shari'a. This authority exercises its functions in accordance 
16 See Seaman, B. Islamic Law and Modem Government: Saudi Arabia Supplements the Shari'a 
to Regulate Development in Columbia Journal ofTransnational law. No. 18, p. 443,1979. 
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with this law and the laws pertaining to the Council of Ministers and the 
Consultative Council. 
1.3.2.1 Legislative Procedure. 
The first of four stages which a bill must pass through before becoming law is 
the preparation state, when a minister can suggest and prepare a bill relating to 
matters that come within his ambit. '? When this stage is passed he can then 
submit the bill to the Council of Ministers where it will be referred to the 
General Committee. Here it will be examined by the ministers of the General 
Committee who will prepare a report for the Council. 
The second stage is the voting stage, when the report and the bill are submitted to 
the Council where they will be discussed thoroughly, and the vote on the bill will 
be taken. 18 If a bill is rejected, the bill cannot be presented again to the Council. 19 
If the Council passes the bill, the Council will issue a decision of approval. After 
the Council of Ministers has approved it, the bill will be referred to the King for 
Approval. A Royal Decree (Marsum Malaki) will be issued. The bill then 
becomes law. If the King rejects the bill, he, the King, will return it to the 
Council of Ministers with reasons for its rejection. 20 The final stage is that of 
promulgation, or the `issue' stage, when the law is published. The new law will 
not be valid unless it is published. 21 
17 Article 22 of the Council of Ministers Act 1958. 
IS Ibid., Article 21. 
19 Ibid., Article 22, the Act adds "... unless there is necessity". 
20 Article 24 of the Council of Ministers Act 1958. 
21 Ibid. 
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1.3.3 By-Laws. 
In addition to the laws (Andhimah) issued by Royal Decree (Marsum Malaki), 
the Council of Ministers may also by resolutions, make by-laws (lwaih). 22 
Moreover ministers, by ministerial resolutions, also can make by-laws and issue 
circulars in accordance with the laws. Such resolutions, decisions or circulars are 
subordinate in the hierarchy to Royal Decrees. 
Amendment of legislation and laws cannot be made by resolution or by a 
decision of the Council of Ministers or by any other means, except by the same 
instruments and procedures by which the law is introduced. 
1.4 The modern government and administration of Saudi Arabia. 
This section will give a general survey of the present system of government and 
administration including the judicial system, within which the Board of 
Grievances operates. It will first discuss the different sources of power and the 
applicability of the office of the king as head of state and as president of the 
council of Ministers. The institution of the Council of Ministers, the role of 
public bodies and local government structures will also be considered. 
22A1-Dughither, op. cit., p. 195, Seaman, op. cit., p. 445. 
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1.4.1 The categories of state power. 
Modern constitutional theory typically recognizes three organs of government: 
the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The relationship between these 
organs varies in accordance with the type of government considered; for 
example, the parliamentary or presidential system of government. In this sense, 
and according to the Saudi Constitution, the state has three divisions. According 
to the council of Ministers Act 1958, these are: Legislative, Executive 
(Administrative) and Judicial power. 23 The first two are linked in the Council of 
Ministers with the king as head. 
Legislative competence, as already discussed, is subject to the Islamic Shari'a. 
Neither the state as such nor the king and the Council of Ministers can act 
outside that which is laid down in Shari'a. However, Islamic Shari'a does not 
purport to cover all aspects of human life. The ruler (Wali Alamer), Muslim 
scholars and jurists can legislate for themselves, provided that such legislation 
does not encroach on Shari'a. 
In the early days of the foundation of Saudi Arabia, there was a separate 
legislative body known as the Shura Council. 24 Legislative power was vested in 
that Council. Moreover it could question the annual budget and had power to call 
the government's attention to any injustices in the application of laws or 
regulations. 25 
23 Article, 18. 
24 Um Al-Qura, 12 July 1928. The Act of Council of Consultation 1928. 
25 See Dahlan, op. cit., p. 9, and Al-Solaim, op. cit., pp. 29-31. 
21 
Chapter One Law & Constitution of Saudi Arabia 
The Shura council passed many Acts before it was superseded by the Council of 
Ministers Acts 1958. The latter took over all legislative functions as well as other 
functions from the Shura Council. 26 
Executive (administrative) power is also vested in the Council of Ministers. The 
Council has power to direct and control the implementation of all laws and 
regulations. The Council has full powers to administer the affairs of state. 
The judiciary is the only division of state power not linked to the Council of 
Ministers. It is independent from the rest of the government system. In the Saudi 
context, however, judicial independence is not absolute. Rather, judicial 
competence is subject to the Islamic Shari'a and regulations in force. Thus the 
first section of the Judicature Act 1975 provides that "the judges are independent 
and there is no dominant power over them in their work whatsoever but for 
Islamic Shari'a and the regulations in force. No one has the right to interfere in 
the judiciary". 27 This is further confirmed in Article Forty-six of the Basic Law 
promulgated on the first of March 1992.28 
The full doctrine of the separation of power is not part of the governmental 
system of Saudi Arabia, particularly with regard to legislative and executive 
powers. The king as the head of state, at the same time the president of the 
council of Ministers, and the Council of the Ministers, are dominant over both 
legislative and executive authority. The only limits to the Council are the 
26 The Council of Ministers Act 1958, articles Nos. 18-24. 
27 See, Jeerah, A, Nidham al-Oadafi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. 1988, pp. 64-65. 28 Bulloch, J. Reforms of the Saudi Arabian Constitution. 1992, p. 46. 
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teachings of the Islamic Shari'a. As one of the sources of the constitution, 
Islamic Shari'a should be respected and should not be infringed. However, there 
is no body to control the legislative function of the Council in order to see 
whether the law which is promulgated is according to the Constitution or not; 
there is no system, judicial or otherwise, of constitutional control. In his article, 
"the Saudi policy system" (1982) Al-Amri says "checks and balances in the Saudi 
system are provided, as is usual, by the judiciary branch of the government. , 29 
He argues that Saudi Arabia knows only two organs of government: the 
Executive and the Judiciary. The latter controls the former. This view is 
inaccurate for two reasons. Firstly, there are not only two organs of government 
as Al-Amri has argued, but three, as could be deduced from the Council of 
Ministers Act which establishes another branch, the Legislature. This has 
recently been made clear in Article Forty-four of the Basic Law of March 1992.30 
It can be argued that the judiciary has the right to control the Council of 
Ministers' legislative power by refusing to apply whatever law has not been 
enacted according to the Constitutional requirements, in particular Shari'a. 
However, the response to attempts by the judiciary, Shari'a court and the Chief 
Qadi, to control legislation in this way in the sixties, has led to interference in the 
judicial role, specifically through the establishment of alternative judicial 
channels such as the Board of Grievances. It is one of the hypotheses of this 
29 See Al-Amry, B. 0. "The Saudi Policy System" in Journal of Economics and administration. 
No. 15 Aug. 1982, p. 12. Al-Amri is an associate professor in political sciences in king Abdulaziz 
University - Saudi Arabia. 30 Bulloch, op. cit., p. 46. 
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study that the creation of the Board of Grievances has contributed to an erosion 
of the independence and importance of judiciary as a whole. 
1.4.2 The King. 
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy. It is ruled by a king who exercises supreme 
authority over all the affairs of his Kingdom. The king usually chooses his 
successor during his lifetime. After his death his successor becomes king by 
approval of Ulama (Muslim scholars) and the people. This approval is performed 
by giving Biah or allegiance. 31 
The king is the paramount figure in the country. All powers, more or less, are 
maintained in his hands. His power is limited by Islamic Shari'a. 
There is no separation of functions between the position of the head of state and 
the position of the president of Council of Ministers: the king holds both. He is 
therefore dominating over the state powers, legislative and executive. The king 
as the head of state in other countries and in international organizations accredits 
and receives diplomatic representatives, confers honours and titles. 32 
31 See Knauerhase, R. The Saudi Arabian Economy. New York: Praeger Publisher, 1975. P. 3 1. 
Biah means: Inauguration, or fealty, which means that a person who gives Biah to some one 
should obey and support him within the Islamic Shari'a rules. 
32 See Al-Juhani, op. cit., p. 98. 
24 
Chapter One Law & Constitution of Saudi Arabia 
As president of the Council of Ministers, he appoints ministers on his own 
initiative, terminates their offices, and accepts their resignations. 33 He is assisted 
by two deputies, one of whom is the Crown Prince. 
The king has legislative power. Firstly, as the president of the Council of 
Ministers, he contributes to making law in the council where the latter has that 
power. When a Bill is approved by the Council, it is still a Bill until it is 
countersigned by the king as the Head of State. 34 
Article 44 of the Council of Minister 1958 explains the function of the president 
of the Council of Ministers: 
The president of the council is to direct the general policy of the state. He shall 
ensure the (proper) direction and coordination of and cooperation between the 
various ministries, and shall ensure continuity and unity in the activities of the 
Council of Ministers. He shall receive Royal directives from His Majesty the 
King and act upon them. He is to sign the decisions of the Council and to order 
their transmission to the various (Government) departments. He shall supervise 
the Council of Ministers, the Ministers, and the public departments; and he is to 
oversee the execution of the regulations and decisions issued by the council of 
Ministers. 
From the foregoing survey of the role of king in the Saudi Arabian monarchy, it 
is clear that the king is the most powerful person in the state. There is no limit to 
royal power apart from his adherence to Islamic Shari'a. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 101. 
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1.4.3 The Council of Ministers. 
As pointed out earlier, the Council of Ministers has both legislative and 
executive powers. It is presided over by the king. It consists of the president, two 
deputies (who are from the royal family), ministers without portfolio, and the 
king's advisers. All are appointed by Royal order and dismissed also by Royal 
order. Only Saudi citizens are entitled to be members of the Council. 35 
Ministers are individually responsible to the president of the Council for the 
discharge of the duties in their respective ministries. 36 Thus the Council of 
Ministers, with the King at its head, has complete control of and supervision over 
all government departments. 
A minister exercises power according to the terms of the Council of Ministers 
Act 1958 and, according to the internal regulations that have been adopted by his 
ministry. 37 A minister proposes Bills in relation to his ministry, and presents 
them to the Council for discussion and approval. He appoints, dismisses, and 
promotes civil servants who work under his authority. He may take any decision 
or action that ensures the implementation of the plans and works of the ministry, 
provided that they are taken according to the law. 38 
35 Al-Mutairy, p. 41. 
36 See in this respect Article 18 of the Council of Ministers Act (Decree No 38-1958). 
37 See Al-Juhani, op. cit., p. 149. 
38 Al-Mutairy. op, cit., pp. 38-39. 
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1.4.4 Public Corporations. 
By the term "public corporations" is meant those organizations which are formed 
in order to run some of the public services or utilities which are different from 
those run by the Ministers. 39 According to Assaf, in Saudi Arabia there is no 
general regulation to control such corporations. Rather, every organization has its 
own regulations. 40 Yet those corporations are not independent; they are 
controlled and supervised by the council of Ministers. Each corporation is 
administered by a Board of Directors which is appointed by the Council of 
Ministers. 
Public corporations in Saudi Arabia are classified into five categories. Firstly, 
corporations that deals with administrative affairs, such as the Institute of Public 
Administration responsible to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
(MFNE). Secondly, corporations dealing with economic matters, such as Saudi 
Arabia Airlines responsible to the Ministry of Defence and Aviation. Thirdly, 
corporations which deal with educational matters, such as the universities. 
Fourthly, social corporations, such as the Social Insurance Establishment, and 
fifthly, corporations which are concerned with financial matters, such as the 
Saudi Monetary Establishment, controlled by the MFNE. 41 
39 Assaf, A. Mabadifi al-Idara al-A'ama wa tabiqatehafi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. 
1990,13.186. 
40 Ibid., op. cit., pp 190-192. 
41 See Al-Hawaty, B, "Dirasafi al-Nidham al-Idarifi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah" 
Dirasat Sa'udiah, Institute of Diplomatic Studies. 1986, pp. 70-72. 
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1.4.5 Local administration. 
Local administration in the context of Saudi Arabia means those authorities 
which deal with the local affairs of the various regions and towns. In the early 
days of modern Saudi Arabia, there were local councils such as the 1924 local 
42 
council in Makkah. The members of such councils were elected. 
In 1938 (1357) the Municipal Act abolished elected local councils. 43 In 1940 
(1359) the Governors Act was enacted. It divided Saudi Arabia into several 
regions, each of which was presided over by a governor (emir) who was assisted 
by an administrative Council. This was followed, in 1963 (1383), by the 
Provinces Act. Saudi Arabia was divided again into provinces, each ruled by a 
Governor appointed by Royal order on the advice of the Council of Ministers. In 
1977 (1379) a further reorganization was undertaken: the Municipal and Rural 
Areas Act. This Act aims to meet local needs and fulfil local interests. 44 it 
defines the functions of the municipality, its powers, the municipal council and 
its membership, and other matters such as the financial affairs of the municipality 
and rural affairs. 45 
In March 1992 the Regions Act was introduced on the establishment of the 
regional authorities. 46 This Act aims, as stated in Article 1, to improve the 
42 See Chapman, R., "Administrative reform in Saudi Arabia" Journal ofAdministration 
Overseas. 1974, p. 335. Ibid., pp. 66. 
43 Sadeq, op. cit., p. 187. 
44 See Al-Hawaty, op. cit., p. 64 
45 Dahlan, op. cit., pp. 250-261. 
46 Royal Decree No. 1/92 on 1/March 1992, (27/8/1412), see the translation of this Act in 
Bulloch, op. cit., pp. 62-70. 
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administrative work as well as the development of the regions. It also aims at 
maintaining law and security, and safeguarding the right and freedom of the 
people. Article 7 defines the duties of the Governor which reflect also the 
subordination of the regional authority to the central authority. It provides that 
the "... Emir (Governor) will assume the administration of the region in 
accordance with the general policy of the state... " and specifies his duties. He 
has, for instances, to maintain law and order, implement the judicial decisions, 
and guarantee the right of the people and in particular he is enjoined not to 
interfere in their rights by any measure unless in accordance with the law. These 
responsibilities stated in the Regions Act of 1992 are more or less identical to 
those set out in Article 8 of the Province Act of 1963. The Regions Act 1992 
further provides that there will be a council for each region, all the members of 
which are appointed by an order from the president of the Council of Ministers. 47 
The Act is due to come into force within a year of its publication in the official 
paper. 
Despite the series of reorganisation sketched here, in reality local administration 
today is merely part of central administration. Ministers devolve power to the 
regional authorities. There are fourteen provinces (Emirates) which are all 
responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. Each Emirate is headed by a Governor 
who is appointed by the king on the advice of the Interior Minister. 48 Under each 
governor there are several towns which are also governed by appointed rulers. 
There are various emirates. For instance, they are responsible for maintaining 
47 Article No. 16 of the Act. 
48 See Al-Muhawas, M. & Khashigjy, H.; Mabadi al-Idara al-A'ama wa al-Tandhim al-Idari fr 
al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. 1987, p. 159. 
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law and order within their boundaries and for implementing the judicial 
judgements. 49 
In summary the central government has full control over all aspects of local 
administration as well as municipal authorities, none of which are elected. All 
are appointed by the central authorities. 
1.5 The Judicial System. 
The judiciary is one of the pillars upon which a modern state is founded. Its main 
function is to guarantee the rule of law - to ensure that law is maintained and 
applied to all members of the state, the citizens and the leaders, the government 
as well as the governed. In order that individuals put their trust in it to uphold 
these principles it is essential that the judiciary has certain features which enable 
it to work independently and freely without any pressure or influence from 
anyone. Courts may then fulfil their duties and responsibilities towards society. 
In Saudi Arabia the details of the current judicial system are to be found in the 
Judicature Act of 1975. This Act provides for the independence of the judiciary, 
the organisation of the courts and their different jurisdictions, the appointment of 
judges, their qualifications, and immunities. 
49 Ibid. 
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Figure 1-1 
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1.5.1 Organisation of Courts. 
The judicial system has undergone change since the establishment of Saudi 
Arabia. The first legislation on the judicial system was passed in 1927.50 It 
organised the courts, their competence, and the judges. Replacing the previous 
Act, a new Act was promulgated in 1938 and amended in 1952, which set out the 
50 Um AI-Qura No. 140,19/8/1927 (21-2-1346). 
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detailed system of the judiciary. 51 In 1975 the Judicature Act, the current 
legislation, replaced earlier laws. 52 
A notable characteristic of judicial organisation in Saudi Arabia is the existence 
of many administrative committees which have judicial powers that normally fall 
under the power of Shari 'a courts. These committees are examined below. 
1.5.1.1 Shari'a Courts. 
As a rule the Shari 'a Court, with which the Judicature Act is mainly concerned, 
has general jurisdiction over all disputes whether civil or criminal. 53 The 
hierarchy of the courts can be divided into three: the Supreme Judicial Council 
(SJC), The Cassation Court or Tameez court and the courts of first instance. 
A- The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) 
This Council consists of eleven members. Five are permanent judges and 
constitute the Permanent Board of the Council. Each permanent member must 
have the rank of Cassation Court President and all are appointed by a Royal 
Order. The remaining five are the President of the Cassation Court or his Deputy, 
the Deputy of the Ministry of Justice, and three senior judges drawn from the 
51 This Act was called Nidham Tarkiz Mas'ulyyat al-Qada al-Shara'I (Allocation of the 
Responsibilities of the Shari'a Courts Act 1938,1952. there was another Act which was 
promulgated in 1967 (1387) regarding the hierarchy of the judges, conditions of appointment and 
promotion.. it was called kader al-Qudah (Judges Cadre), see Jeerah, op. cit., p. 34. 2 Royal Decree No. 64 in 1975. 
53Musa, A. K. "Al-Nidham al-Qadai wa al-Itejahat al-Mua'serah"; Al-Idara Al-A'amah. 1981, pp. 
5-27. 
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first instance courts. Those members and the permanent judges form the General 
Committee of the Council which is presided over by the President of the 
Supreme Judicial Council. He represents the eleventh member in the Council and 
is appointed by a Royal Order. 54 
The SJC is empowered to control the administration of justice and supervise the 
work of the courts. The Council has the authority to review some judgements, 
particularly sentences of capital punishment and mutilation. The judges are 
appointed, promoted and dismissed by the king after a recommendation from the 
Council. 
The independence of the SJC is affirmed in the first article of the Judicature Act 
1975. It states that the judges are independent and are not to be subject to any 
influence except that of the established laws of the state. 
The King, as the head of state, appoints the members of the SJC, although his 
power to select and appoint is restricted to some extent. The permanent member 
must hold the qualification of the post of President of the Cassation Court, 
Tameez Court. 55 
The Judicature Act 1975, however, omits to say who has the right to dismiss the 
members of the SJC and particularly a permanent member, and what the criteria 
for their removal are. It would seem, however, that the permanent members are 
54 See Jeerah, op. cit. 
55 Article 6(a) of the Judicature Act 1975. 
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not removable. Article 2 of the Act states that judges are not removable except in 
the circumstances stated in this Act. This, in effect, gives greater independence to 
the SJC and to the judiciary. 
B- Court of Cassation Tameez Court 
This consists of the president and several judges, the number of whom is not 
determined according to the Act. The Court has three panels: namely, a panel 
which has jurisdiction over criminal cases, a panel for personal matters, and the 
third for all other cases. 56 This court hears appeals from individuals against 
judgements issued by the courts of first instance. 
Judgements of this court are issued by three judges except for cases involving 
execution or mutilation which must be determined by five judges. 57 
C- Courts of First Instance 
These courts are divided into a General Court which consists of one judge or 
more according to the type of the case, and Summary Courts. The former courts 
are empowered to hear criminal, civil and family cases. Judgement is taken in 
this court by a single judge except in cases involving execution or mutilation 
s$ which must be taken by three judges. 
56 Ibid., and see also Musa op. cit. there are two Cassation Court in Saudi Arabia, one in Riyadh 
and on in Makkah. 
57 Judicature Act 1975, article 23. 
58 Al-Duraib, Al-Tandhim AI-Qadai fi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. 1984, p. 170. 
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Summary Courts59 have power to try minor cases which do not exceed 8000 
Saudi Rials, and also misdemeanour cases. 60 
1.5.1.2 Judicial hierarchy. 
As in other countries the judiciary is divided by seniority, experience and 
functions which is reflected in various levels or ranks of appointment. At the 
highest level is the President of the Supreme Judicial Council. The other levels of 
judiciary are discussed in Appendix 6. 
1.5.1.3 Judicial Committees. 
In addition to the Shari'a court there are committees which exercise judicial 
power. These committees have emerged principally to fill a gap caused by the 
position of the Shari'a court on secular legislation, that is the laws emanating 
from the Council of Ministers. The Shari 'a Court, concerned that such 
legislation might conflict with Shari'a law and principles, has not been in favour 
of adjudicating on them. 61 When the Shari 'a Courts objected to the promulgation 
of the Labour and Labourers Act 1969, the Chief Qadi issued the following 
statement: 
We have been informed that some judges (Qadis) refer some cases to Labour 
and Labourers offices or to other panels on the grounds that they come 
59 See Truck, N., "Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia" in The International Lawyer. 1988, vol. 
22, No. 2, p. 418. 
60 See the Order of the President of the Council of Ministers No. 4/z1384 on 6/1/1397 
H (1979). 
61 Jeerah, op. cit, p. 198. 
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within the jurisdiction of these other departments. It is evident that the 
Shari'a Law has the jurisdiction to intervene in the reform of all areas of 
humanity, whether material or other, and its jurisdiction is adequate to 
satisfy all disputes and to explain all situations. Referring cases to these 
committees is recognition of their authority and the law applied by them is 
not in accordance with the rules of the pure Shari 'a. 
As a result of this circular, the Shari'a court refused to enforce such laws and 
this consequently gave rise to the creation of quasi-judicial committees. Three 
major judicial committees are: the Committee for the Settlement of Labour 
Disputes, the commercial paper Committee (1968) which applies the rules of the 
Commercial Papers Act 1964, and the Customs Committee (1952), which applies 
the rules of the Customs Act 1952. in addition to these major committees, there 
are other committees which deal with the trials of ministers, and committees 
which deal with military and security personnel. 62 
1.5.1.4 The new "Judiciary", The Board of Grievances. 
The Board of Grievances, the "Board", has undergone different stages of 
development since 1954. In 1982 a new Act was promulgated which organized 
the Board as an independent, judicial body which is concerned, as the first article 
states, with administrative cases. This Act gives the Board new jurisdiction as 
well as a new legal status. This Board is different from the ordinary courts or 
Shari'a court, which has general jurisdiction all over disputes. The Board has 
62 For a study of the system of these committees see Bhader, M. A., Al-Lijan al-Idaria thatil 
Ikhtisas al-Qadaifi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Saudiah. Unpublished diploma dissertation 
Institute of public Administration, 1990, and Al-Duraib, op. cit., pp. 180-200. 
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been invested with judicial power to try cases involving the Administration. As a 
result such cases have been excluded from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. 
The development of the Board of Grievances will be the subject of this study. 
1.5.2 Conflict of Jurisdiction. 
As noted earlier, there are various other judicial bodies in the Saudi Arabian 
legal system apart from the Shari 'a court, and this can result in a conflict of 
jurisdiction between these various judicial bodies. 
The Judicature Act of 1975 which organizes the Shari'a Court attempted to solve 
this conflict between jurisdictions. Article 29 reads: 
If a particular case is brought before a court controlled by this Act [Shari'a 
Court] and is at the same time brought before another judicial body which has 
jurisdiction to settle particular cases, and each court either insists on hearing 
the case or rejects it, an application should be made to the Conflict of 
Jurisdiction Committee to determine which jurisdictional body should hear the 
case. This Committee consists of three members, two of whom are selected from 
the [permanent] members of the SJC. The senior member of the two will be the 
President of the SJ committee. The third member is the President, or Deputy 
President, of the other judicial body. This committee also has the jurisdiction to 
settle disputes which arise as a result of enforcement of two final contradictory 
judgements, one of which has been issued by a court which is controlled by this 
Act and the other which has been issued by another judicial body. 
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The decision of this committee is final and is not subject to appeal. 63 
1.6 The emergence of the Saudi Arabian Constitution and the Organic 
Instruction. 
Unlike most other countries of the world, with the notable exception of the 
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia has until recently been without a written 
constitution. The government has always maintained that the constitution of 
Saudi Arabia is the Muslims' Holy Book, the Quran. On the question of whether 
or not Saudi Arabia has a written constitution, jurists are divided into two 
schools. This will be discussed in Section 1.8 below. Nevertheless, the reason 
there is no written constitution in UK is different. Lord Halisham pointed out in 
Halsbury's Laws of England that: 
The boundaries of English constitutional law have never been satisfactorily 
defined, partly because there is no constitutional document possessing an 
extraordinary sanctity or legally protected status, partly because the 
constitutional rules are susceptible to change by more or less formal means, 
partly because many of the rules are not justifiable, and partly because the 
differences between public law and private law are not clear. 64 
The reason given for there being no written constitution is that the British 
constitution has gradually evolved without the kind of fundamental revolutionary 
63 Article 32 of the Judicature Act 1975. 
64 J, Alder. Constitutional and Administrative law, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 6t' ed, 2007, p7. 
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event that has created the need for a new constitution in other countries65 such as 
Saudi Arabia. When the need for a constitution started in 1926, when Abdulaziz, 
the founder of current Saudi Arabia, captured the Hijaz region, he ordered the 
formation of a National Assembly of which eight members were elected by a 
secret ballot by representatives from the region, and five members were 
appointed by the King. The Assembly's function was to establish a governmental 
structure. 66 
This National Assembly issued the so-called Organic Instructions which were 
approved by the King in September 1926.67In the first section, Saudi Arabia was 
declared to be an Islamic, consultative, and monarchical state. The second 
section concerned the administration of the Kingdom, the dominant law of the 
state, and administrative responsibilities. The third concerned state functions 
such as legal, internal, foreign, financial, and military affairs. The fourth section 
covered the form and membership of consultative and administrative councils. 
The fifth section established a Financial Board to control the budget. The sixth 
section concerned administrative control of government activities. The seventh 
and eighth dealt with the government employees and municipal councils. 68 
In his unpublished thesis, Constitutional Development in Saudi Arabia, Saaty 
(1982) states that the "Organic Instructions" formed "a constitution for Saudi 
65 Ibid. 
66 It was established in 1925. See Dahlan, A., Dirasahfi al-Syasah al-Dakhaliah lil Mamlakah 
al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. 1984, p. 120. 
67 Um. Al-Dura official newspaper No. 90 on 3-9-1926 and No. 91 on 10-9-126. 
68 Ibid., and see also Solaim, S. A., Constitutinal and Judicial Organization in Saudi Arabia. 
Ph. D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1970. 
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Arabia at that time, which enjoyed many aspects of the constitutions in our 
time... , 
69 
Although those Organic Instructions included some aspects of a modern 
constitution such as the organization of legislative power (articles 28 to 37) it is 
doubtful that it could be considered a constitution as such. For example, its name 
"Organic Instructions" suggests a different concept to that of fundamental law. 
Moreover, it included some subjects that were irrelevant to what is generally 
accepted in other political systems as a constitution. Stating some of its defects, 
Saaty says: 
1. The first defect is the name "organic instructions ", which does not apply to 
its function... 
2. The organic instructions suffer from great weakness in the legal form, and 
constitutional sections, to the extent it did not apply the regular convention 
of the three powers... 
3. The organic instruction did not specify the head of the state, ... 
4. The fourth defect is the [omission] of rules on] the throne inheritance on 
which the system is based The lack of this subject could affect drastically 
the system when an inheritance problem arises, or when greed dominates 
the brothers or sons. 
5. The fifth defect of the organic instructions was that it was not voted upon by 
the people, as all other constitutions to be a result of the people's wish, not 
the consultative council. 
69 Saaty, A., The Constitutional Development in Saaudi Arabia, Phd. Thesis, Claremont Graduate 
school, 1982. pp. 6. 
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6. The constitution provides the main system of the country and does not 
include details because they must be in the laws, regulations, and by-laws. 
But the organic instructions entered into details which were not necessary, 
like the general inspection, audit, and municipals... pp. 100-105 See also 
Solaim, S. "Constitutional and Judicial organization in Saudi Arabia ". PhD 
thesis, the John Hopkins University, Washington D. C. 1970. pp 22-26.70 
It should be noted that the Organic Instructions were formulated for only one 
part of what is now Saudi Arabia i. e., the Hyaz region. The Organic Instructions 
were formed and organized by the people of Hijaz themselves only when the 
King asked them to do so. The National Assembly which created such 
instructions was formed from Hijazy people. When the National Assembly was 
formed to organize the structures of government and when that assembly issued 
the Organic Instructions in 1926, other regions which constitute Saudi Arabia 
today were not yet unified or consolidated. As mentioned earlier, these regions 
were united only in the leader. As Solaim states: 
Even when the country was named Saudi Arabia in 1932, the organic 
instruction remained applicable in Hyaz, and up to present time, there has 
never been a clear official statement suggesting that they are applicable over 
all the kingdom. ' 
The Organic Instructions declined and were eventually abandoned after the 
Council of Ministers Act was promulgated in 1953. 
70 Ibid 
" Solaim, op. cit. p. 23. 
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1.6.1 Majles Al-Shura, the Consultative Council. 
Pursuant to articles 28 to 37 of the Organic Instructions a consultative council 
was established. 72 However, after a year (1927) that council was dissolved and a 
new council of eight members was formed. Four of the members were chosen by 
the government after a consultation with experts. The remaining four were 
appointed directly by the government. 73 The President of the council was the 
general Viceroy, son of Abdulaziz King Faisal. King Abdulaziz addressed the 
first meeting of the council on its goals and aims, saying: 
I have ordered that no bill must be enacted in this country unless it is 
submitted to your council by the office of the Attorney General. You are free 
to examine and amend it. The examination and the amendments have to be 
for the sake and benefit of this country and the basis of our system and 
policies is the Islamic Shari'a. You may, independently, legislate any law 
and pass any regulations that are beneficial to the country on condition it 
does not encroach on the Islamic Shari 'a... 74 
The council had the power to enact laws. It was also invested with financial 
control of the government, its budget, financial and economic projects, and 
75 approval of public privileges. One of the main functions was its power to 
72 Um AI-Qura, No. 71,14-5-1926. 
73 Sadeq, op. cit., pp. 35-38. 
74 Al-Juhani, op. cit., pp. 80-81. 
75 Article 5 of the Consultative Act of f1927. 
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control the government's actions, so that it might draw the attention of the 
government to any illegality that might occur in implementing the laws. 76 
In 1928, the Act was amended to authorize the government to appoint any 
number of members to the Council. A new position, that of deputy president 
appointed by the King, was created by the amending Act. 77 
The Consultative Council based in Hijaz enjoyed many aspects of a modern 
legislature. It had a legislative as well as supervisory role. However, the fact that 
its members were appointed rather than elected would be considered significant 
in terms of modern democratic criteria. 
March 1992 witnessed the rebirth of a new Consultative Council. As has been 
noted in the introduction a council of sixty appointed members was established 
within six months of the promulgation of the consultative Council Act 1992. 
1.6.2 Majles AI-Wukala, the Deputies Council. 
At the end of 1932 a further council was established. 78 The main aim of this body 
was envisaged as the determination of public policy for the state. The Council of 
Deputies had the powers of the executive in modern constitutions. The Council 
of Deputies had power to take any decision without approval of the King. 79 
According to Harrington this council "... was to have been a strong government 
76 Ibid., Article 9. 
77 Um Al-Qura, No 186 in 12-7-1928. 
78 Um Al-Qura 15/1/1932. 
79 Sadeq, p. cit., pp. 45-47. 
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organ - in some ways stronger than the present Council of Ministers". 
80 The 
powers of the Deputies Council, however, were greatly reduced when the 
Council of Ministers was established in 1953 where most of the jurisdictions of 
the Deputies Council were brought under the Council of Ministers. 
1.7 Constitutional Development Since 1953. 
This era followed a period of political stability in Saudi Arabia. It marks a vast 
change in the political environment which enabled Abdulaziz gradually to change 
the institutional basis of government. As mentioned earlier, all councils, such as 
the consultative council, which were established before 1953 were exclusively 
limited to the Hijaz region. 
Following the consolidation of all the regions of the Arabian Peninsula under one 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the activities and the duties of the new state greatly 
increased. There was an increase in the number of government departments and 
ministries and in the expectations of the people. Consequently, in 1953, before 
the death of the founder of the state, an Act establishing a Council of Ministers 
was promulgated. 1 8 
The Council of Ministers had as its president the Crown Prince, and the ministers 
and advisers who comprised it were appointed by the King. 12 The Council was 
empowered to supervise and direct the internal and foreign affairs of the country, 
80 See Harrington, C. W. "The Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers", Afiddle Easy Journal. 1958, 
vol. 12 No. 1, p. 2. 
81 Royal Decree No. 5-19-1-4288 in 1-2-1372 Fl, See Um AL-Qum No 1485 on 16-10-1953. 82 The Council of Ministers Act of 1953, and see also Sadeq, op. cit., p53. 
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with the capacity to take decisions in all such matters. Treaties, international 
agreements, and government contracts were not valid unless they were approved 
by the president of the council. The decisions of the council were final, subject to 
the King's approval. One might therefore conclude that the king's power was 
still dominant and that, despite the terms of the law establishing the council of 
Ministers, it remained more a consultative than an executive body of final 
decisions. 
1.7.1 The Council of Ministers of 1958. 
At the beginning of 1958, after almost five years' experience, an amendment of 
the Act83 strengthened the council's powers. 
Under Article 7 of the 1958 Act, amended in 1964, the council is described as a 
"legally constituted body", the King being now the president. Thus the King had 
added the office of the Council president to his power. 
Article 18 which summarizes all of the council jurisdiction, provides that: 
the Council of Ministers shall lay out the policy of the country in relation to 
internal and foreign mailers, finance, education, the economy, defence and 
all public affairs and will supervise the implementation thereof It retains 
legislative power, executive authority and administrative power. It is the 
ultimate power for financial affairs and for entire affairs connected with the 
81 Royal Decree No. 38on 22-101377. See Um Al-Qum 1717 on 16-10-1958. 
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different ministers of the stale and measures which ought to be taken in 
these matters. Treaties and international agreements shall not be 
considered effective until approved by the council. The decisions of the 
council of ministers are final except for those which require the issuing of a 
royal decree or order in accordance with the provisions of this constitution. 
The council has the power to enact laws by certain procedures. When the council 
agrees to a Bill the latter does not become law until approved by a Royal Decree 
from the King. The Council's legislative role contributed to the erosion of the 
legislative power of the Consultative Council which was, as mentioned earlier, 
still in force without authority. 
Institutional development since the creation of the local and elected council in 
HUaz had been a gradual process of centralization of power in the hands of the 
rulers. Such developments also marked the erosion of the people's contribution 
to power. Thus it was clear when the Council of Ministers, with the King at its 
head, was established, that its powers spelled the demise of the older 
Consultative Council which had legislative power. In 1992 the Consultative 
Council was re-established but it is unclear whether its new phase of existence 
will challenge the overall high degree of centralized power held by the rulers. 
1.7.2 Pressure for constitutional reform. 
Before 1960 the question of adopting a written constitution and the demand for 
constitutional reform had seldom been seriously contemplated, for several 
reasons. Firstly, there was actually, as mentioned earlier, a participation in the 
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government, at least to some extent, and secondly, there was no constitutional 
consciousness among the people which encouraged them to demand participation 
in the government. In addition, the level of education, a strong factor in the 
raising of consciousness affecting the political system, was very low. By 
surveying the period before the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, 
one finds that there has been a series of developments important enough to raise 
a demand for constitutional reform. That period saw a transfer of power from the 
people to the rulers. More clearly, most of the power of the constitutional 
institutions such as the Consultative Council, as pointed out earlier, had been 
invested in one power i. e. the Council of Ministers. Consequently the need for 
constitutional reform arose. 84 In fact it came from within the ruling family, 
namely one of King Abdulaziz's sons. 85 This demand brought about a proposal 
for a written constitution86 but this proposal has not gone farther than the initial 
step. Nevertheless, it is a significant and serious attempt to create a new 
constitution. Solaim notes that: 
Its importance, however, lies not only in its being the only attempt, so far, at 
writing down a constitution for the kingdom and its relevance to any future 
movement in this direction but also in the fact that it came very close to its being 
adopted. s' 
The possibility of constitutional reform received support from an announcement 
on Radio Makkah in 1960 which stated that there would be a written 
"See Lackner, H. A House Built on Sand: a political economy ofSaudi Arabia. London: Ithaka 
Press 1978, p. 90. 
as He was Prince Talal Bin Abdulaziz. 
sa Solaim, op. cit., p. 70. 
87 Ibid. 
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constitution. 88 However, the movement for change did not succeed. The period 
between 1960 and 1964 marks a struggle within the ruling family for power. In 
1960 the Prime Minister, Faisal, resigned from the government. 89 Then in 1962 
his brother, King Saud, brought him back as Prime Minister. 90 Faisal promised to 
set up a "basic law" for the country. His promise was made when he established 
his Cabinet in 1962 and he spoke of working hard to draw up a written 
constitutional system based on Quran and Sunnah. This promise was never 
realised. It appears that there had been no intention to establish a written 
constitution. In 1966 in an interview with Le Monde King Faisal stated that there 
was no need for a constitution: "Constitution! What for ....? 
" he is quoted as 
asking. 
Announcements of constitutional reform had been nothing more than a tactical 
step to maintain political stability in the country. Such promises are quite often 
influenced by either internal incidents such as the Makkah crisis of 1979,91 or 
external ones such as the Yemen coup. 92 A similar conclusion might be drawn 
from the changes announced on the first of March 1992 in the wake of the Gulf 
crisis. 
88 See New York Times, Monday 26/12/1960. It says that "the Mecca Radio said today a national 
council to draw up a constitution for Saudi Arabia would be set up under a decree by King Saud". 
The announcement said a third of the council would be selected and the rest appointed from 
among tribal chiefs and business men... ", p. 3. 
89 Royal Order No. 35 on 3/7/1381, (1961). 
90 Royal Order no. 31 on 13/6/1381, (1962). 
91 Sankari, F. A. Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia, in Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World. 
Edited by, Dessouki, A. E, Greenwood Publishing Group 1982. 
92 See Saaty, op. cit., pp. 110-112. 
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1.8 The Constitution of Saudi Arabia: Does it exist? 
In the preceding section I have talked about the legal and governmental structure 
of Saudi Arabia. This section will conclude with a discussion of a subject of 
controversy which, on the other hand, has received little serious attention in the 
literature. Is there a constitution as such in Saudi Arabia? An answer to this 
question is of direct significance to the focus of this thesis, which concerns the 
right of the citizen to complain about abuse of rights and against those in 
governmental authority. Is the right to bring grievances against the King and his 
ministers, for example, a matter of grace or can it be said to have a constitutional 
basis independent of those who govern Saudi Arabia? 
In discussing the Saudi constitutional experience, we should first understand the 
meaning of constitutional; starting by briefly throwing some light on the concept 
of a constitution itself. One may note that the constitutions of most countries of 
the world, particularly those countries which have a single document that is 
called a "constitution", emerged as a result of achieving independent statehood, 
usually from colonial power. Wheare, in his study of modern constitutions 
(1962), describes how such countries as "... Austria or Hungry or 
Czechoslovakia after 1918, communities [that] had been released from an 
Empire as the result of a war and were now free to govern themselves.... " 
established new constitutions. 93 This applies also to most of the developing 
countries such as Nigeria. 94 In still other countries, such as the Eastern European 
93 Wheare, K. C., Modern Constitutions, Frome & London, Butler &Tanar Ltd, 1951 
94 See Ostheimer, J., Nigerian Politics. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973, pp. 20-29. 
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states, the constitution or constitutions developed after wars. In others the 
constitution emerged after political unrest. 95 On the other hand some countries, 
such as Britain, that do not have a written constitution, claim that they have a 
special type of constitution that differs from other countries, i. e. an unwritten 
constitution. 
Saudi Arabian constitutional experience does not fit within any of the categories 
mentioned by Wheare, for the state of Saudi Arabia was not created from 
colonial rule but consolidated from local power centres by the rulers of Najd, nor 
did it result from a pact following internal conflict or civil unrest. 
A few points should be completed about the literature which has discussed or, 
more to the point, mentioned the subject before reviewing the particular debate 
over the existence of a constitution in Saudi Arabia. Books or articles which 
concern the constitution of Saudi Arabia are few. Even those books or articles 
which deal with such matters hardly treat the subject in depth. Even though the 
title of an article or chapter may be called "The constitution in Saudi Arabia", 
typically the writer does not examine the issue in any satisfactory way, 
emphasizing rather the political history of the country and its origins. 
Against this sparse background, the question of the nature of the constitution will 
be examined in the light of available material. The test, it may be said in 
advance, as to whether a constitutional basis exists for modem Saudi Arabia, is 
less the possibility of pointing to a document called a constitution than the 
95 Yardley, D. C., Introduction to British Constitutional Law. London: Butterworths, 6th 1984, p. 5. 
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answer to the question whether constitutional rules can be identified which 
function to constrain and regulate the exercise of power. In particular the concern 
of the thesis is whether a constitutional rule can be identified which legitimates 
both the right of the citizen to call apparently absolute authorities to account and 
with the institution through which such may be done, the Board of Grievances. 
Opinions on the question of the constitutional basis of Saudi Arabia may be 
divided into two categories; those writers who argue that there is a constitution 
and those who assert there is not. 
1.8.1 The argument that there is a constitution. 
The first group can be divided into two sub-groups. First are those who say that 
the constitution of Saudi Arabia is contained in the Council of Ministers Act of 
1958 which was first promulgated in 1953 before the death of the founder of 
modern Saudi Arabia, namely King Abdulaziz. This Act has since been amended 
and took its final form in 195896 and contains a number of articles where the 
structure of the Council of Ministers is specified. Second are those who claim 
that the constitution of Saudi Arabia is the Islamic Shari'a. 
In his article on the Saudi Arabia Council of Ministers, Harrington (1958), 
although he does not address the question whether there is a constitution in Saudi 
Arabia or not, calls the Council of Ministers Act a "constitution" on many 
96 It was amended in 1964. 
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occasions. 97 Similarly, Madani, although he does not claim explicitly that the 
Council of Ministers Act is itself a constitution, states that " the constitution of 
1953 which was the core of the 1958 Act... comprised the closest approach to 
modern, constitutional law in Saudi Arabia. "98 That opinion about the Saudi 
constitution is also supported by Hanson in his article, "The Influence of French 
Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia", (1987). Hanson states that "in 
the absence of other dispositions, this statute (i. e. the Council of Ministers Act) 
can be understood as a constitutional instrument". 99 None of these assertions is 
sufficiently developed in the sources cited. ' 00 
Al Juhani, who writes on public law in Saudi Arabia, gives more details about 
the Saudi constitution. He argues that, as a constitution might be written in a 
single document, Saudi Arabia has a constitution, which is the Council of 
Ministers Act 1958. This law, he claims, is considered to be the basic law of 
Saudi Arabia, i. e. the constitution. He supports his argument by stating that 
"... the rules of that Act have the same nature as of the constitutional character of 
other constitutions whether it is written or conventional constitutions. "101 He 
supports his opinion by reference to some features of that Act. He points out; 
firstly, that Saudi Arabia has one single written document which is considered to 
be the fundamental law of the Kingdom, i. e. the Council of Ministers Act. 
Secondly, the basic law in the Kingdom is considered to be flexible and not rigid. 
97 C. W. Harrington, op. cit., p 19. 
98 M. Madani, The Relationship between Saudi Arabian Domestic Law and International Law: A 
Study of Oil Agreement with Foreign Companies. Ph. D. dissertation, George Washington 
University, 1970. 
99 See Hanson, M. "The Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi Arabia", in 
Arab Law Quarterly. 1987, vol. 2, part 3, pp. 283-285. 100 Ibid. 
101 See Al-Juhani, op. cit., p. 93. 
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He defines the flexible constitution as that "... constitution which could be 
amended by the same procedures by which other ordinary legislation could be 
amended". In the case of Saudi Arabia, the state has the right to amend any rules 
or articles in the law whenever it wants, which means the Act is flexible. Thirdly, 
the basic law of Saudi Arabia is developed according to the social development 
in Saudi Arabia. Its drafters did not take rules from other constitutions as did 
other countries. In summary, Al-Junhani argues that Saudi Arabia has a written 
and flexible constitution which is the Council of Ministers Act. It seems that the 
reason underlying his argument is that the Council of Ministers Act organizes 
some constitutional organs such as the legislature and the executive. Al-Juhani 
states that the Act delineates the general framework of state powers. 102 
If such arguments were correct, Saudi Arabia would be a unique case. However 
it is submitted that they are not. One of the most important features of a 
constitution is its supremacy over other laws, as Wade and Bradley state in the 
textbook, Constitution Law. It is, according to these authors, "... a document 
having a special legal sanctity which sets out the framework and principal 
functions of the organs of government of a state and declares the principles 
governing the operation of those organs". 103 Similarity Wheare states that a 
constitution "... is intended to state supreme rules of law". 104 
102 I. M. Al-Juhani, " Majlis al-wzarafi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabia al- Sa'usia byn al-Shari'a al- 
Islamia wa al-Ijtahad al-Mua'aserh ". First edition, Riyadh: Al-Majd Press, 1984. pp. 45-48. 
10' E. C. Wade & K. D. Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law. Pearson Education 
Limited, 14th ed. 2007, and also see, E. C. Wade & A. W. Bradley, Constitutional Law. London: 
Longmans, 10th ed. 1985. 
104 Wheare, op. cit., p. 73. 
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However, if, as accepted by Al-Juhani and other writers, any law is subject to 
Islamic Shari'a, even the Council of Ministers Act, how can that Act be the 
constitution? Moreover, the Council of Ministers Act was not regarded as a 
constitution by the people who made it in the first place. For example, Article 20 
states that laws, treaties, international agreements, and concessions should not be 
amended except by law to be promulgated according to Article 19 of the Act. 
Accordingly, in 1964 when the Act was amended for the second time105, it 
referred to that Article as a ground of the amendment. This means that the Act is 
nothing other than ordinary law. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers Act 
cannot be regarded as a constitution in itself, as that term is understood in other 
countries. As has been said previously, it has no supremacy over other law, 
especially Islamic Shari'a. It does not determine, for example, the form of the 
state, the type of government, nor does it concern the citizens' rights or the 
organization of the Judiciary, its independence and immunity. De Smith points 
out that a constitution is mainly about political power. He adds that it also 
establishes "... the location, conferment, distribution, exercise and limitations... " 
of the power of the various government branch. 106 Further, the Council of 
Ministers Act contains elements that are not constitutional. As Ballantyne states: 
[The] "constitution" of the Council of Ministers contains such features as 
measures to avoid conflict of interest in Ministers, the requirement that taxes, 
duties and exemption therefrom be by law and that all states revenues pass 
through the Council hands, and the appointment of Comptroller-general to 
'05 Royal Decree No. 14, of 1389. 
106 A. S. De Smith, De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law. London, Penguin Books, 80' 
ed., R. Brazier ed., 1989. pp. 6-7. 
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audit all government accounts - features which are encountered in the 
constitutions of other jurisdictions. However, these are not constitutional 
instruments, but legislation, or regulations, outlining the machinery of 
government, and cannot therefore validly be drawn into a comparison of 
Constitutional Law. I 07 
Finally, one should take into consideration the purposes and the motives that lay 
behind the passing of such an Act in the first place. This Act was designed to 
organize the Council of Ministers. On the face of it, it does not purport to do 
anything else. It was concerned to establish the institution of the Council of 
Ministers, to regulate its meetings, its jurisdiction and other features. It appears 
that one of the purposes of the promulgation of that Act was the necessity for a 
single power to control and organize the activities and work of various ministries 
and offices of the Government. Harrington, who was one of the few early writers 
who wrote about the Council of Ministers, pointed out that the establishment of 
the council, was: 
... one more step in the coordination and consolidation... that remained 
for the 
ministers to be assembled into a coordination body. This started in October 
1954 when King Abdulaziz ordered the formation of the council of ministers. 
The Decree preamble states that the King decided to establish a council of 
ministers, in part "... because of increase in the number of obligations and the 
diversification of the responsibilities placed upon state. 108 
107 H. W. Ballantyne, " The constitution of the Gulf states, a comparative study", in Arab Law 
Quarterly. 1986, vol. 1. 
18 C. W. Harrington, op. cit., p. 27. 
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It was the economic development which occurred after the discovery of oil in the 
1930s that forced the rulers to reorganize the political system. 109 
It is submitted that the Council of Ministers Act cannot be considered as the sole 
comprehensive source of the constitution of Saudi Arabia. 
Hassn11 ° appears to agree with this position. While he argues that the 
constitution of Saudi Arabia is the Council of Ministers Act and that it is basic 
law, he adds that the Act is supplemented by Islamic Shari'a rules such as the 
consultative Principle. "' His argument is that although the Decree which was 
promulgated in 1958 carries the name of the council of Ministers Act, yet it is in 
fact a basic law and it stands on the same level with other world constitutions. 112 
Although this opinion has merit, it can also be criticized. Hassn argues that the 
council of Ministers Act as a constitution is supplemented by the rule of Islamic 
Shari'a. However, as has been stated earlier, all law in Saudi Arabia is subject to 
Shari'a, in the sense that it must not conflict with it. Hassn's argument should be 
the other way round. He should have stated that the "basic law" derives from 
Islamic Shari'a constitutional rule, and is supplemented by the council of 
Ministers Act. 
109 Solaim, op. cit. 
110 A. Hassn, "Durus fi al-Qanon al-IdarP'. Riyadh: Institute of Public Administration, (No date), 
pp. 116. 
11 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
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The second set of opinions is expressed by those who argue that there is a 
constitution in Saudi Arabia, and is based on the claim that the Saudi Arabian 
constitution is Quran and Sunnah i. e Islamic Shari'a. Thus, Mahmassani states 
that the monarchy in Saudi Arabia is constitutionally restricted in its powers by 
Islamic Shari'a. 1 13 
Amin, likewise, argues that the state Constitution is Islamic law. In his article, 
"Legal systems in the Gulf States" he states: "Saudi Arabia adopted no formal 
constitution other than the Quran and the other Sources of Classical Islamic 
Law" 114 
Another writer, Ahdab, 115 takes a position which seems contradictory. He asserts 
that there is no constitution in Saudi Arabia; the royal power is unlimited; there 
are no constitutional limits to restrict that power. Then he concludes by saying 
... Quran is the written Constitution.... "116 The view that the Quran has 
constitutional status finds support in Saudi rulers. Thus King Faisal said, in an 
interview with Le Monde in 1960, when he was asked about this matter: 
Constitution! What for? The Quran is the oldest and the most efficient 
constitution in the world; election of parliament? After the unsuccessful 
113 Mahmassani, op. cit,. p. 317. 
114 Amin, S., "Legal systems in the Gulf States", in Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law. 1983, 
pp. 71-85. 
115 Al-Ahdab, A. Al-Nidham al-Qanuni Lil Betrul fi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. 1982, 
Pp. 64-78. 
16 Ibid., p. 64, and see also Dhanani, G. "Political Institutions in Saudi Arabia", in International 
Studies. 1980, vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 59-69, where the writer also supports the idea that, Saudi 
Arabian supreme law is based on Quran and Sunnah. 
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experiences held in neighbouring countries, sufficiently, simply and, flexible 
enough to the happiness of our people. "? 
However this argument can hardly be correct. While Islamic Shari'a has 
constitutional rules like the Consultative principle it is not exclusively about 
constitutions. It sets out at the same time criminal, civil and commercial Laws 
which lack any constitutional aspects. Anderson, a scholar on Islamic law, has 
pointed out that the Shari'a is not only a political system but also embraces other 
aspects of life. He notes "the Shari'a, therefore, covers a much wider field then 
any detail of man's life - his conduct towards God, the state, his fellow creatures, 
his family and himself'. 118 A constitution, as the concept has been widely 
understood in the modern world, concerns the relationship between the 
governors and governed, their duties, rights and a system of government. Shari'a 
goes beyond these matters. 
1.8.2 Claims that Saudi Arabia lacks a constitution. 
It is time to examine the alternative thesis, that Saudi Arabia lacks any 
constitution. The point is asserted boldly by Peaslee, "... there is no constitution 
117 Le Monde, 24a', June 1966. 
1" Anderson, "The Shari'a Today", in Journal of Comparative Legislation. 1949, No. 31, p. 18. 
Dhanani, Assistant Professor of Gulf studies, seems to agree with Anderson's view. He states 
that: 
A constitution is the highest law of a country to be followed by its Government and the people 
towards a regulated and constantly improving life in the country. Shari'a is much more than a 
constitution..., it is not just an instrument for a better life. It represents "the great eternal goals" 
which an Islamic Government should strive to achieve for their own intrinsic merit. 
58 
Chapter One Law & Constitution of Saudi Arabia 
[in Saudi Arabia]". 119 Other writers support that position. For example Serhal 
argues that there is no constitution in Saudi Arabia as it is understood in other 
countries. He goes on to point out that the Monarchy is absolute, i. e. it is not 
restricted with a written constitution. However, he adds that the King cannot be 
described as a totalitarian or autocratic king as were European monarchies in the 
medieval era; he is restricted by Shari'a principles. 120 In this context, however, 
he does not, as some writers such as Mahmassani or Amin do, treat the Shari 'a as 
a constitutional source. 
It seems that the arguments of those who think that there is no constitution are 
based on the fact that there is no written document that regulates the relationship 
between the government and the governed. 
From the above survey of opinion, it can be seen that the matter of the existence 
of a constitution in Saudi Arabia was, and still is, controversial. However, to 
resolve this conflict, some facts should be taken into account. First of all, the 
political system and the type of constitution that is adopted are affected, in one 
way or another, by the context that surrounds it, such as the social and economic 
background. Saudi Arabia, unlike other developing countries, has never been 
under any sort of colonial rule. Consequently, as has been said earlier, it has not 
passed through the same stages as other developing countries, which have a 
written constitution. Secondly, Saudi Arabia has a unique situation that 
distinguishes it from other countries, in that it applies a divine law, i. e. Islamic 
19 A. J. Peaslee, "Constitution of Nations". Dordrecht: Martnus Najhoff Pubishers, 4`h ed., VOL. 
11,1985. pp. 1297-1298. 
120 A. Serhal, "Al-Nudhm al-Syasyah wa al-Dusturiah fi Lubnan wa al-Duual al-A'rabiah ". 
Beirut: Dar Al-Baheth, 1980. pp. 342-343. ' 
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Shari'a, as a way of life. Accordingly, the religion of Islam as a social force 
plays a significant role among the people in Saudi society. Therefore any opinion 
would be inaccurate if it ignored such issues. 
Consequently it would also be inadequate to apply to one country the concepts 
and principles that developed in another, whilst at the same time ignoring the 
environment that strongly affects them. 
Be that as it may, and taking into consideration the above mentioned facts, it can 
be said that Saudi Arabia has a constitution, yet it is not written in a single 
document. The absence of a single constitutional document does mean that there 
is no constitution at all. 
The British constitution is usually classified as an unwritten constitution. The 
constitutional institution and rules in Britain have their origins in old and deep- 
rooted conventional rules. These are the general basis of the current 
constitution. 121 With respect to Saudi Arabia, its constitution theoretically 
comprises many constitutional rules, derived from various sources, the main 
source being the Islamic Shari 'a. It is considered to be the fundamental basis for 
every act including constitutional rules. It is according to Al-Awaji, 1971, the: 
... supreme 
law of the land. As a socio-legal framework, it is concerned 
with all activities of the individuals and the government from the most 
private to the most public, that is, from questions relating to the most 
public, that is, from the most private to the most public, that is, from 
121 Wade and Bradely, op. cit., pp. 1-5. 
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questions relating to definition of higher public authority to detailed laws 
regulating marriage and divorce. Such an unlimited scope of AI-Shari'a 
plus its sacred status are the basic features in the claim of the 
constitutional function... 122 
Islamic Shari'a has three main legislative sources in Islam. They are Quran, the 
Sunnah and Ijma. The Quran is the word of god as revealed to the Prophet 
Mohammed; it contains directives given to Muslims in this life., 23 The Sunnah is 
considered to be the second source of Islam and comes directly after Quran. It 
means the statements, acts and conformations of the Prophet. Generally speaking 
the Sunnah usually amplifies and explains the rules which are laid down in 
Quran. In some situations, it creates new rules about which Quran is silent. 
The third legislative source is Ijma is an Arabic word meaning consensus. It is 
"an agreement of Muslim jurists in a particular age on a juridical question". Its 
authority as a source of law is based on certain Quranic verses and the sayings of 
the prophet, chiefly the saying: "My followers (nation) will not agree upon an 
error or what is wrong... 124 These are the three sources upon which all Muslim 
scholars agree. 
Muslim scholars and jurists agree that the Quran and Sunnah contain the basic 
foundation, general principles and rules. They do not cover every individual 
situation i. e. there are some aspect of legislation which have been left to the 
122 See Al-Awaji, I. M., "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia" Ph. D. Dissertation, 
University of Virginia, 1971, pp. 104-105. 
123 See A1-Hakeem, S., Al-Raqabah a'la Aa'mal al-Idara fi al-Shari'a al-Islamih wa al-Nudhum al- 
Wada'iyah. 1987, pp. 74-75. 
124 Ibid. 
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Muslim nation to deal with. Qualified jurists and scholars can create rules which 
are suitable to particular issues, on the condition that they do not infringe the 
Islamic law. 125 This is a fourth source of Islamic Law which is called Ijtehad or 
independent reasoning. 126 There is therefore no obstacle to the making of 
constitutional rules in order to meet new situations because the texts are limited 
but the cases are not. 127 In the light of the previous facts some constitutional 
documents have been enacted in Saudi Arabia, such as the Council of Ministers 
Act 1958. 
The above mentioned points can be summarized as follows: Saudi Arabia can 
claim to have an unwritten constitution; it does not have its most important laws 
establishing the structure of government, stating the rights and duties of both 
ruler and ruled, and the organs of the state, codified in one single document. 
Nonetheless, it does possess such laws which combine with the principles of the 
Shari'a to make up its constitutional norms. 
On 1st March 1992, King Fahd promulgated a new law which is described as AI- 
Ndham Al-Asasi Llhukm, The Basic Law of Government. While the Act has been 
described as a constitution 128 and does contain some important constitutional 
features it does not as such contradict the argument made here. Thus the Basic 
Law of Government in Article 1 states that: 
125 See Odah, A. Al-Islam wa Awda'na al-Syasyah. 1986, p. 233. 126 Qalaji, M. & Qunaibi, H. Dictionary of Islamic Legal Terminology. 1988, p. 43. 127 Mohammed, M. A. Al-Tatawur al-Tashria'I fi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa, udiah. 1977. 128 See for example the International Herald Tribune, 2/3/92. 
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as 
its religion; the Book of Allah (The Quran) and the Sunnah of his Prophets, 
Allah's prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution, Arabic is its 
language and Riyadh is its capital'29 
Therefore the case remains that the constitution of Saudi Arabia is an amalgam 
of sources, Shari'a and its principles, as well as the legislation already discussed, 
including the Basic Law of Government. 
That Saudi Arabia has a constitution, albeit an unwritten one, can be 
demonstrated by an enquiry into the central focus of this thesis: the right of 
citizens to a remedy against the administration. Is there a constitutional norm 
which governs this question? 
As has been pointed out, Shari'a is the main source of constitutional rules in 
Saudi Arabia. According to that source the right of the people to complain 
against the governmental authority is recognized. The caliphs used to hear 
complaints brought against the governors and officials of the different regions of 
the state, when they used to deal with the complaints directly by themselves. 130 
Throughout Islamic history there was a separate institution called "The Board of 
Grievances", where the complaints against governors of provinces, powerful 
people, and functionaries were heard. 131 This institution will be examined in 
detail in Chapter Two. 
129 Article 1 
10 Abdul Muna'm, H. Diwan al-Madhalimfi al-Islam. 1983, pp. 36-94. 131 Ibid. 
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The Council of Ministers Act of 1958, as a constitutional document, does not 
deal in detail with complaints procedure. Nor does it mention the right of the 
people to bring their grievance before a court. It does however refer to the Board 
of grievance established by other legislation. Article 46 of the Act states. 
The Grievances Board and the staff of the office of the Comptroller General of 
State Accounts come under the president of the Council of Ministers, in 
accordance with their respective regulations. 132 
The new Basic Law states the rights of the people to litigation in general. Article 
47 states that the right to litigation is guaranteed to citizens and residents of the 
kingdom on an equal basis. The law defines the required procedures for this. 
"Article 33 refers without any detail to the Act of the Board of Grievances. It 
would appear that the Basic Law of Government is more specific than the 
Council of Ministers Act. 
The constitutional basis, therefore, of the citizen's right to complain and right to a 
remedy lies in the Shari'a as the fundamental source and in the legislation 
mentioned, the Council of Ministers Act 1958, the new Basic Law of 
Government and the Act of the Board of Grievances of 1982. 
132 See the Council of Ministers Act 1958. 
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1.9 Conclusion 
In the course of this chapter, the law and the constitutional background of Saudi 
Arabia have been examined. The emergence of Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 
this century, the constitutional developments, and the modem governmental and 
judicial system has been traced. The main thrust of this chapter has been to place 
the Board of Grievances within the constitutional and legal environment in 
which it operates, in other words, within the history of the growth of the state 
itself. The chapter also considered the debate over whether Saudi Arabia may be 
considered to have a constitution as such, in the sense understood in 
contemporary legal debate. The most recent innovation, the adoption of a Basic 
Law in March 1992, has been noted. This welcome development confirms the 
argument in the chapter that Saudi constitutional norms are to be found in 
various legislative sources including the Basic Law, but mainly in the principles 
of Shari 'a. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The Board of Grievances is a stage developed from Islamic law and Islamic 
culture: the Board established under Saudi legislation is not a new institution. It 
has its origins in the Islamic institution of the same name and the concept has 
firm roots in Islam. The earliest information on the Grievance Board was written 
around the I Ith Century by a greater number of Muslim jurists. 
This chapter explores this historical source of the Board through a discussion of 
the judiciary in Islam. The chapter will also briefly compare the Islamic Board of 
Grievances with an institution that has interesting similarities, the court of 
chancery in English legal history. 
2.2 Original form of the Islamic judiciary 
To approach a clear understanding of the judiciary in Islam we should first of all 
understand its origin when the prophet started his mission. After his emigration 
from makkah to madina, capital of the Islamic state at that time, and until his 
death in 632, Prophet Mohammed laid the foundations of the Islamic state. This 
period is considered to be unique by virtue of the prophetic position. ' He 
received the revelation which contains the Shari'a, or Islamic law, as a 
messenger of God, as well as other rules such as those concerning worship per 
See Ahamed, Manzooruddian, "The Classical Muslim State", Islamic Studies. 1962, vol. 1. 
pp. 96. 
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se. He was not only the head of state, but also of the judiciary. In other words, he 
was both the political and religious leader. 
The judicial position of the Prophet in the Islamic society of Madina is made 
clear in the following verses from the Quran: 
But no, by your Lord, they can have no (real) Faith, until they make you 
(Muhammad) judge in all disputes between them, and find in themselves no 
resistance against your decisions, and accept (them) with full 
submission. (Quran 4: 65) 2 
And: 
If they come to you (Muhammad), either judge between them, or turn away 
from them. If you turn away from the in, they cannot hurt you in the least. And 
if you judge, judge with justice between them. Verily, Allah loves those who 
act justly. (Quran 5: 42) 3 
These verses emphasize the position of the prophet as both a judge and head of 
state. According to Guraya, who wrote about the judiciary in Islam: "... the 
function of the prophet is to submit himself to the will of Allah and to apply the 
divine principles in case of dispute and not to resort to his wishes". 4 
2 Surat An-Nisaa. Or the Women (SAA . 65) "THE HOLY QURAN" English translation of the 
meaning and Commentary, King Fahd Holy Quran Printing Complex., 1410 H, p. 230. 3 Surat Al-Maida. Or the Table Spread (S5A 42) ) "THE HOLY QURAN" English translation of 
the meaning and Commentary, King Fahd Holy Quran Printing Complex., 1410 H, p. 297. a Guraya M. Y., Judicial system under the Holy Prophet. Lahore (Pakistan): Kutub Khana: 
Anjuman Himayat -1-Islam, (1982), p. 119. 
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The Prophet had the authority to appoint judges for different provinces of the 
Islamic state. He used also to appoint them to settle disputes or case where he 
himself could have been the judge. 5 This shows that the Prophet laid down a 
principle of delegation of part of his authority to another judge. In the Caliphate 
period the Caliphs followed suit. According to Muslim scholars and jurists the 
Caliphate period was special in the sense that it immediately followed the 
Prophet's death. As in the Prophet's time executive and judicial powers were 
exercised by the Caliph himself. 6 The role of the judiciary was still one of the 
fundamental functions of the head of state, and it was developed considerably 
during this period, probably during the rule of the second Calipf, Omar Ibn Al- 
Khattab. According to some Muslim thinkers, he developed a framework which 
gave more significance and independence to the role of judges. 7 
This change of policy could be attributed to the expansion of the Islamic state 
which at that time included Egypt, Iraq, and Iran, as well as the Arabian 
Peninsula. The caliphs had, naturally, many responsibilities that made them 
unable to carry out all judicial functions. As a result, they appointed judges in 
different areas of the Islamic state even in Madina, their place of residence. The 
first Caliph, Abu Baker, for example, appointed Omar as a Judge. Similarly 
Omar, as a second Caliph, assigned Zayd Ibn Thabit, one of the Prophet's 
companions, to the job of a judge. As Guraya states 
Ibid. p. 155-159. 
e Manzooruddin, op. cit., p. 97. 
ý See in this respect Al-Qasimi, "Nidham al-hukum fr a! - Shari'a wa al- Tarikh al-Islami: al- 
Sullah al-Qadiayah". P. 187, and Zydan. Nidham al-Qada fi al-Shari'a al-Islamiah. 1984, pp. 71- 
76. 
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The first step which Omar took for the separation of judiciary and executive 
was the appointment of Zayd Ibn Thabit as a judge of Madina... [He] was 
appointed not only a judge in Madina, but was also frequently consulted by 
Caliph in judiciary matters" 
In the Abbassid period9, the delegation of the judicial function witnessed further 
development when the judiciary itself was invested with the power to appoint 
judges. Qadi Alqudah i. e. the Judge of Judges, for instance, had the power to 
select, control and dismiss judges with the consent of the Caliph. 10 Hence the 
independence of the judiciary became more established. 
2.3 Emergence of the Board of Grievances 
The adjudication of grievances has simultaneously developed with the expansion 
of the Islamic state. The early Islamic state, including the prophet's period as 
well as that of the caliphate, did not pass without witnessing cases that involved 
grievances against the state. In fact some Muslim jurists and thinkers nowadaysI I 
believe that there were some cases similar to present day administrative cases. 
For example, a case occurred during the prophet's period which could be 
summarized as follows: the prophet appointed one of his companions, Khalid Bin 
8 Guraya. Op. cit., p. 302. 
9 AI-Abbasiyah, is the second major Muslim dynasty (750-1258 A. D. ) ruling after the Umayyad. 
Its capital is Baghdad and during this period, much development ensued. The dynasty began with 
Abbas, an uncle of the prophet Mohammed 
10 See Abu Fares, M.., Al-Qadafi al-Islam. 1984, pp. 210-211. Regarding the dismissal of a 
member of the Judiciary, it should be noted that certain attributes must be present in a person in 
order to be appointed as a judge; such as good health, intellect. If the judge, for instance, 
becomes deaf or blind or he becomes very ill that he can not perform his duty, he could be 
dismissed. However, the Caliph cannot dismiss any ordinary or grievances judge without legal 
reasons. Shanqity. pp. 226-227. 
11 See Al-Refa'ai, Al-Qada al-Idari. 1987, p. 119, Ulian, op. cit., p. 51, and Abdul Muna'm, H. 
Diwan Al-Madhalim. 1983, pp. 49-69. 
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Al-Walyed, as the chief commander of a detachment. On his way with the 
detachment, Khalid met members of a tribe who levelled weapons at the soldiers 
of the detachment (unsheathed their weapons). Then Khalid asked them to drop 
their weapons and informed them that he had not come to fight, but to call for 
Islam. Then they dropped their weapons. However, Khalid thinking that this was 
an act of deception, because they were famous for their deceit, ordered his 
soldiers to tie them up and killed some of them. A member of the tribe, however, 
managed to escape and met and related the matter to the prophet. The prophet 
said "0' God, I am innocent of what Khalid did". Then he asked another 
companion who was Ali Bin Abi Talib to go to that tribe and determine what 
actually had happened. He took some money with him to be paid as blood- 
money and other compensations for those who had been killed. Then he asked 
them whether they had something that they would like to be compensated for; 
they replied there was nothing. Then he distributed all the remaining money 
among them. 12 
This case may illustrate how complaints against one of the state officials were 
dealt with. In this case, Khalid was the chief of a detachment of the state, or a 
military leader, who took a wrong decision which resulted in a complaint against 
him which was brought before the prophet. The prophet compensated the 
aggrieved people for the consequences of such a decision and at the same time 
chided Khalid for such a grievous mistake. 13 
12 Al-Refa'ai, op. cit., p. 120 
13 Ibid. 
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The period after the prophet's time witnessed some cases which could also be 
classified as complaints against the governing authority. Omar, the second 
caliph, used to control his governors and officials and try them for complaints 
made against them. For example one of his military leaders tried to cross a river 
with his soldiers on a very cold night; he ordered one of his soldiers to look for a 
place where the water was shallow so that the soldiers could cross the river to the 
other bank. The solder refused to obey, saying the water was extremely cold and 
that he might die of cold. Despite the soldier's plea, the leader forced him to 
cross the river. As the soldier went to check the water and stepped into the river, 
he shouted "O'Omar". Then after a while, he died. When Omar was informed 
about this incident he dismissed the leader and ordered blood-money to be 
given. 14 The case shows the leader, a government official, taking an 
inappropriate decision which resulted in his dismissal from the job and led to 
compensation being paid from the state treasury for the life of the deceased 
soldier. 
These cases show there was no body or separate judicial institution which dealt 
specifically with complaints against the government in early Islamic history; at 
that phase the judiciary itself was not a separate body. There were few state 
institutions as the Islamic territory was small, being restricted to Madina and its 
hinterland. Since the population was small, there were few disputes to be settled. 
This, however, does not mean, as has been shown, that there were no complaints 
against the government and its officials. There were some cases which can be 
14 Ibid. p. 121. 
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said to be of an administrative nature. But the general jurisdiction of the ordinary 
judge at that time included the power to try such cases. 
Later, when the Islamic state expanded during the Umajyad and Abbassid 
Caliphates, its population and government functions increased, with the result 
that complaints multiplied. The need thus arose for a person with characteristics 
such as strength, reverence, and justice, and who could restore aggrieved 
individuals' rights against oppressive, strong, and influential people. This 
encouraged the development of procedures for adjudication that became 
increasingly distinctive. In the period of the Umayyad and Abbassid caliphates, a 
separate day was allocated to hear complaints against any oppression. The first 
Caliph who devoted such a day was Abdulmalik Bin Marwan (685-705). His 
practice was to examine all individual complaints that were brought to him and 
then refer them to a judge to try under his supervision. 15 It seems that there were 
two reason for the Caliph's giving personal attention to such grievances: to 
underline that such complaint were to be considered important, and to exercise a 
form of supervision by the head of state over his officials. 
Cases are recorded which concerned complaints against government officials. 
For example, during the reign of one of the Umayyad Caliphs, Omar Bin 
Abdulaziz, a government official abused his power and usurped land from 
someone by force. The owner complained to Omar, who examined the case with 
his judge by reviewing official records concerning the registration of lands. 
15 Al-Mawardy, A., Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniah wa al-Wilayaat al-Deenyh. Cairo: Al-Baby press, 
1972, P. 78. 
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When he determined that the claim was proved, he ordered the land to be 
returned to the complainant. 16 The case illustrates two features: the quashing of 
an administrative act on the ground that there was an abuse of power, and the use 
of compensation for the injury caused by such a wrongful act. 
The Caliph himself was also subject to the Grievances Board. Haroun Al- 
Rasheed, one of the Abbassid Caliphs, appointed a judge, Abu Yousef, to hear 
grievances from the public in his presence. Abu Yousef used to read complaints 
and sign them in the presence of the Caliph at a special meeting. One day while 
he was examining complaints, he came across a grievance against the Caliph. 
The complainant claimed that the Caliph had usurped his land. Abu Yousef put 
the case aside with others until the day he and the Caliph usually heard 
grievances from the people. On that day, he started reading grievances and 
giving judgement on them until he reached the complaint against the Caliph. He 
called the complainant to present his case, after which the Caliph replied that the 
land "was ours which we inherited from Al-Mansoor, [the second Caliph of 
Abbassid era]". Abu Yousef asked the plaintiff whether he had no evidence. The 
plaintiff replied that he had no evidence, but asked the Caliph to take an oath. 
The Caliph took the oath and the man left. '? 
It could be concluded from the above instances that the power to try complaints 
against administrative officials came under the ordinary judge's, Qadi, 
jurisdiction. As it has been seen, the Caliph used to refer all grievances to the 
16 See Abdul Muna'm, H., op. cit., p. 78. 
17 Al-Shanqyty, M. A., Wilayat A1-Madhalim fi al-Islam wa Dawrahafl al-Raqabh a'la Aa'mal 
al-Sultah. 1987, pp. 76-78. 
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ordinary judge. Such cases were distinguished from others in that, firstly, that 
they had been given a particular day for hearing. Secondly, the Caliph himself 
maintained an interest in the hearing of such cases to the extent that he was often 
present while they were tried. 
During the Abbassid era the process of adjudication of grievances became more 
developed than before. One of the Caliphs established a board in the form of an 
assembly to hear grievances, and appointed a person to hear and try them. 
18 He 
used to appoint some of his local governors in distant provinces to hear 
grievances from the people and sometimes authorized them to appoint persons to 
hear and try complaints against officials or prestigious people. 
19 
It should be noted that during the Abbassid era, at certain time the vizier played a 
central role in the development of Diwan Al-Madhalim. 20 They were in charge of 
supervising grievances. Haroun Al-Rashid vested the power to hear grievances in 
Ja far Al-Barmaki. 21 According to Nielsen (1985), "the vizier would [offer] the 
delegate the supervision of the [Madhalim] to an official carrying the title of 
[Nazir Al-Madhalim] or [Sahib Al-Madhalim]". 22 Later, however, after the fall of 
the Barmakid viziers, the viziers were prevented from supervising the Madhalim. 
IS See Al-Sayd Radwan, Judicature of Grievances, in Dirasat. (1987), Vol. 14, No. 10, pp. 127- 
173. 
19 Abdul Muna'm, op. cit. pp. 81-87. 
20 See Nelson, J., Secular Justice in an Islamic State: Mazalim Under the Bahri Mamluks, 
662/1264-789/1387.1985, p. 4, Al-Refaai, op. cit., p. 130, and Amedroz, H, F, "The Mazalim 
Jurisdiction in the Ahkam Sultaniyyah of Mawardi" in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of 
Great Britain and Ireland, 1911, p. 656. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Nielson, op. cit, p. 4. 
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2.4 Separation from the form of the ordinary courts 
It is believed that in this period, i. e. Abbassid, the court of grievances began to 
separate from other ordinary courts. It began to take form as a board attended by 
the Caliph himself . 
23 
That form developed in the late stage of Islam. Sultan Nor Al-deen Zingi (1146- 
1174 AD), for example, established a house in Damascus where grievances were 
heard and tried. It was called Dar Al-A'dl or the House of Justice. 24 The Sultan 
used to visit it twice a week accompanied by judges and jurists to hear 
grievances and their trials. 25 
Under Mamluk rule in Egypt, Baybars (1260) established another Dar Al-A'dl. 
Later Qalawan, one of the Mamluk sultans, used to hear grievances in Al-Iwan 
Al-Kabir, the Great Portico Hall. This Iwan was also commonly called the Dar 
Al-A'dl. 26 
23 Al-Sayed, R. op. cit., p. 174. 
24 Al-Refa'ai, op. cit., p. 131. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Nielson, op. cit., p. 51. 
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2.5 Reasons for the rise of the Board of Grievances. 
Not much has been written on the subject of why a separate institution dealing 
with grievances emerged in Islamic judicial process. Most Muslim scholars give 
no more than three or four lines to the subject. For example, Al-Mawardy and 
Abu Ya, la state that the Board's emergence resulted from the weakness of the 
religious consciousness and an increase of oppression and the abuse of power by 
local governors and officials. Al-Mawardy claims that ordinary judges failed to 
implement their decisions and to do justice, because one party of the litigation 
was powerful or had a high social position and could easily refuse to abide by the 
law. Then the need emerged to assign a special person with characteristics such 
as strong-mindedness and determination in order to deal adequately with those 
cases, which involved powerful litigants. 27 
Al-Ashmawy (1953), a modem writer, cites what A1-Mawardy said and adds that 
the emergence of the Board is to be accounted for by the expansion of the 
Islamic state. Expansion gave rise to a need to maintain law and order and to 
require oppressive people to submit to the law. 28 
The importance of these historical factors in the emergence of the Board of 
Grievances cannot be disregarded. Religious consciousness had a strong role in 
social control. It prevented oppression and the abuse of rights of the weak. 
However, it is doubtful whether this was a sufficient reason to account for the 
27 Al-Mawardy, op. cit., p. 77. Most late Muslim authors quoted his opinion. 
28 Al-Ashmawy, A., cited in Abdul Muna'm. op. cit., p. 219. 
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establishment of a separate judicial institution to deal with such cases. The claim 
that the ordinary judges failed to do justice seems unlikely to be a major factor. 
The ordinary judge, appointed by the head of state, had powers over every 
dispute regardless of its nature or the parties involved. His aim was to restore 
justice. What would allow him to fulfil his duties adequately was not the 
establishment of a new institution but rather genuine support. The question that 
might be asked is what explained the weakness of the judges which, it is argued, 
resulted in the emergence of the Board? 
Al-Tamawy (1961), an Egyptian scholar of administrative law, also explains the 
rise of wali Al-Madhalim and subsequently the Board of Grievances, as resulting 
from the need to assure the dominance of the rule of law over every individual, 
however high his social standing. 
... [T]he actual reason 
for the establishment of this system was to see 
the rule of law prevail over senior governors and state officials whom 
the judiciary failed to subjugate to the rule of law... 29 
The principle that all were subject to Islamic law can be found in the sources of 
Shari'a itself. One Hadith, i. e. narrative, relating to deeds and utterances of the 
Prophet says that "there is no obedience due to a human being if it entails 
disobedience to God". 30 Therefore the administration has no immunity against 
29 Al-TamawyS., Al-Tatawwur al-Syasy Lit-Mujtma' al-Arabi. 1961, pp. 112-118. 30 See A1-Hakeem, S., Al-Raqabah a'la A'amal al-Idarafi al-Shari'a al-Islamiah wa al-Nudhum 
al-Wada'yiah. 1987, pp. 53-60. 
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the law. Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, in this first speech after his appointment as 
leader of the Muslims, shows this perfectly: 
Oh people I have been appointed as your Leader and I am not the 
best of you. If I rule properly then support me; and if I transgress 
correct me... If in my acts I disobey God then you are not bound to 
obey me. 
AI-Tamawy's thesis that the emergence of the Grievances Judge and then the 
Board of Grievances was to assure the dominance of the rule of law over every 
person, may however, also be questioned. If the assurance of the dominance of 
law was the principal reason behind the establishment of the Board of 
Grievances presided over by the Grievances Judge, in what sense did the 
function of the ordinary judge differ? The objective of the ordinary judge was 
also to ensure the proper application of the law. If one argues that it was 
necessary to appoint Wali Al-Madhalim in order to deal with special kinds of 
cases as the ordinary judges failed to do justice because of their weakness, the 
argument returns to the question asked above, what is the reason for the 
weakness of the ordinary judge? 
Kahdduri (1984) states that one of the reasons for the emergence of the Board of 
Grievances in Islamic history was in order "... to provide a set of positive laws to 
deal with questions for which there existed no applicable rules in Shari'a". 31 This 
view may be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it could be that the writer means 
31 Khadduri, M., The Islamic Conception of Justice. 1984, p. 156. 
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that the Board was established to decide on issues for which there were no 
corresponding rules in Shari 'a. In this respect, the Board could create rules 
applicable to those issues. This method is known in Shari'a as Ijtihad 
(independent reasoning which must accord with the principles of Shari 'a). 
However, it should be noted that this power (of Ijtihad) was also available to the 
ordinary judge who could use the same method in dealing with issues that had no 
corresponding rules in Shari 'a. 
A second interpretation of Khadduri's assertion may be that the Board of 
Grievances was established to provide and apply rules which were different from 
those applied by the ordinary judge in Shari'a courts. 
Coulson (1964) who says that the political authority would like to exercise 
judicial function in certain matters according to different procedures and 
different laws agrees with this view. As a result, another judicial system is 
created outside the ordinary system. He goes on to say that "... the Qadi [the 
ordinary judge] was regarded as a representative of God's Law, the Sahib Al- 
Mazalim was regarded as a representative of the Ruler's Law". 32 He substantiates 
his opinion by saying that the Wali Al-Madhalim used to hold sessions of the 
court in a private building and not in the mosque as the Qadi usually did. 33 
The location of the court is not proof of any difference in the substantive law. 
According to AI-Awa (1974), during the history of the Madhalim, the Madhalim 
32 Coulson, N. J., A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964 pp. 128- 
129. 
33 Ibid. 
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judge would sometime hear grievances in the market place of the city and in the 
government building. 34 
The view of Khadduri and Coulson is questionable on the grounds that both the 
ordinary and grievance judges were bound by the same rules, i. e. Shari 'a rules. 35 
The Board of Grievances consisted of Shari 'a jurists, apart from its other 
members. The presence of Shari'a jurists on the Board was important in the 
sense that the Grievances judge could consult them about matters he could not 
resolve. If the Grievance judge were to apply a different law than that of the 
Shari 'a law, there would be no need for Shari 'a jurists on the Board. Al- 
Mawardy says "... hearing a grievance does not permit rules which are prohibited 
"36 by Shari 'a... 
However, the previous view may be based on what Al-Maqrizi said. Al-Maqrizi 
pointed out that during the Mamluks era in Egypt (1264-1387), the Mamluk 
rulers applied the rules of the Mongol law beside the rules of Shari 'a. He added 
that the Mamluk rulers applied the rules of what is called the "Yasa" of the 
Mongols. 37 Al-Maqraizi was quoted by Nielsen as writing: 
Know that people in our time and even from the arrival of the Turkish regime 
in Egypt and Syria consider that the laws have consisted of two parts, the 
Shari'a and the Law of Siyasa38,.. There are two kinds of siyasa. The just 
34 Al-Awa M., "Qada Madhalim", Mjalat Idarat Qadaia al-Hukumah. No. 8,1974, p. 998. 
35 Al-Mawardy, op. cit., p. 83. 
36 See Al-Mawardy, op. cit., p. 86, and see also Amedroz, op. cit., p. 645. 
37 See Abdul Muna'm, op. cit. p. 189 and Nielsen, op. cit., p. 104. 
39 "Siyasa" in Arabic is "politics" in English. 
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siyasa extract the truth from the wrongdoer and the profligate. It is part of the 
Shari 'a; they have in common what it recognizes and what it ignores; men 
have written a number of books about siyasa Shar'iyya. The second is the evil 
siyasa which the Shari'a has forbidden, despite what people today say about 
it. In origin, yasa' is a Mongol word to which the Egyptians have added a sin 
[s] and say siyasa. They introduced it with an ali and lam. and those who are 
ignorant think it is an Arabic word. 39 
Yasa was laid down by Ginghiz Khan during the process of organizing his 
empire. 40 However, the above opinion may be questioned. According to Nielsen 
(1985), who based his study on a number of cases, the Al-Maqrizi's opinion finds 
little support in case material. He says "there is ample evidence to show that the 
[Madhalim] dealt with administrative questions, but very little support for the 
idea that these were dealt with according to the Yasa". 41 In any event, it is 
submitted that even if Al-Maqrizi 's statement was correct, it could never be taken 
as a basis from which one may argue that the Board was established to apply 
different legal rules, for one important reason: this statement only concerned a 
political period in Islamic history which came after the emergence of the Board 
of Grievance, i. e. 1264-1387 AD. Thus, it cannot be regarded as a reason for the 
emergence of the Board. 
39 Nielsen, ibid., p. 104. 
40 Ibid., p. 106. 
41 1 bid., p. 109. 
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It might also be argued, as Coulson and Khadduri do, that the Board was created 
in order to afford different procedures from those applied by the Shari 'a judge. 42 
In some respects the Board did apply different procedures from the ordinary 
judge. 43 But this argument is questionable. The Shari'a judge also had the 
authority to apply the same procedural law which was applied by the Grievances 
judge. According to Ibn Farhun, a jurist of the Malikite Islamic jurisprudence 
school, the ordinary judge can exercise most of the procedural rules which are 
stated by A 1-Mawardy. 44 
Consequently, if the ordinary judge were allowed to use the same rules of 
procedure as applied by the Grievances judge, it could not be argued that the 
Board was created to provide another set of procedural rules different from those 
of the ordinary judge. 
It is submitted that the explanation for the rise of the Board of Grievances was a 
rather more political one. It should be noted first of all that the jurisdiction of 
Madhalim was an integral part of the jurisdiction of the ordinary judge, except in 
cases involving powerful people, which required the intervention of the Caliph to 
maintain justice and show commitment to restore people's rights and defend the 
aggrieved individuals against oppressors. But in later stages of Islamic history 
the intervention of the head of state and other governors in the jurisdiction of the 
42Coulson says that the rules of evidence of the Islamic Shari'a that the Shari'a Court should 
apply raises the need '... for these rules to be supplemented... '. He adds that '... the jurists admit 
the power of the ruler to employ such methods as the use of threats or extortion of confession by 
corporal punishment and imprisonment... '. See Coulson, N, J, "The state and the Individual in 
Islamic Law" in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 6, part 1,1957, p. 52 
43 Al-Mawardy, op. cit., pp. 83-84. 
44 See Al-Awa, op, cit., p. 999, and Nielsen, op. cit., p. 31. 
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ordinary judge had reached such an extent that it undermined the latter in 
carrying out his duties. 45 Such frequent interventions contributed significantly to 
the weakening of the stature of the ordinary judge. The creation of the Diwan Al- 
Madhalim or the Board of Grievances, presided over by the head of state at the 
expense of the ordinary judge (the Qadi) was therefore in the first place an 
initiative to restore the authority of the law. Ibn Al-Arabi (468-534 AH) clearly 
expresses this explanation for the emergence of the Board: 
... as to Madhalim jurisdiction, it is a strange one created 
by the late 
leaders due to corruption of both leadership and people. ... It is also 
reported that it was originally part of the judiciary, but the leaders 
have weakened the judiciary to monopolize the weakness of the citizens 
so that the latter would always need [their interference] in which cases 
they [the leaders] would abandon them and so grievances remain 
unsolved. 46 
The rise of the Board was therefore a corrective measure which did strengthen 
the administration of justice. However its later history contributed to the 
undermining of the ordinary judge. This fact became evident during the time of 
the Bahri Mamluks, 662/1264-789/1387. Nielsen (1985) points out that of the 
various factions of the Bahri Mamluk military elite, `... it could be used for or 
against the power of the Sultan or any official or institution according to the 
current balance of power'. 47 
45 See Abdul Muna'm, op. cit., pp. 132-133. 
46 Ibn Al-Arabi, Ahkam A1-Quran. Vol. 4. p. 1643. 
4' Nielsen, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 
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2.6 Nadhir or WaliAl-Madhalim: (The complaints director or governor) 
If the aim of the grievances judge in Islamic history was to enforce justice in 
disputes between the powerless and those who seek to oppress them, 48 then apart 
from legal qualifications, he required certain moral characteristics such as 
strength and will, beyond those demanded of the ordinary judge, who should be 
an honourable person who is powerful and influential. He ought also to be 
virtuous, righteous and pious and he should have sufficient legal training to 
enable him to carry out his duties. 49 
2.7 Mailis Al-Madhalim (The Board of Grievances categories or structure) 
According to Al-Mawardy, 50the Board of Grievances traditionally consisted of 
five categories of officials apart from the person who was in charge of grievances 
i. e. Nadhir Al-Madhalim. He lists these officials as: 
1- Guards and assistants similar to the police or security officers of today, to 
maintain security and keep order in the court. 51 
2- Judges and governors; the duty of these people in the Board was to guide and 
help the Grievances Judge to try the case, in accordance with Shari'a rules. 
3- Jurists or Shari'a scholars, advisers whom the grievances judge might consult 
on matters of law. The scholars' role was not to weigh the evidence but to 
48 Abdul Muna'm, op. cit., p 97 
49 Al-Mawardy, op, cit., p. 77. 
50 Ibid p. 80. 
51 Al-Refa'ai, op. cit., p. 137. 
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identify rules for disputes, which were consistent with Shari 'a principles. In 
other words, they were practicing If tihad. 
4- Witnesses; their duty was to witness the judgments that the grievances judge 
would pass. 
5- Court clerks who wrote down the record of the hearing and the judgement. 
It appears however that it was not necessary for all of these assistants to be 
always present in the court for the investigation of grievances to be carried out. 
During the Mamluks period, for example, the personnel of the Board, which was 
then called `Dar Al-A'dl', consisted among others of the sultan, the deputy of the 
Dar Al-A'dl, the Hajb, `chamberlain', the Qadis, `judges', and secretarial staff. 52 
2.8 The judicial authority 
Al-Mawardy was the first authority to lay down the principles of jurisdiction 
from the Board of Grievances. In his book Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniah wa al- 
Wilayaat al Deenyah Al-Mawary deals with grievances in Islam. He makes a 
detailed study of the Board's jurisdiction, procedure and personnel. Writers who 
came after him like Al-Shayzari, Al-Nuwayri and Al-Qalgashandi adopted his 
general principles. 53 
52 Nielsen, op. cit., pp. 79-92 
53 Ibid., pp. 28-31. 
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Cases could come before the Board in two ways. Firstly at the initiative of the 
Grievances judge himself and, secondly, as a result of cases brought before him 
for litigation by parties. 54 
2.8.1 Issues that the judge of Grievances could examine on his own initiative 
The authority to examine and investigate matters at the initiative of the 
Grievances Judge is known to have extended to at least five types of case. 
1- Considering rulers' and governors' transgression against subjects, and 
generally their abuse of power and authority. The judge of grievances could 
review the actions of the rulers in order to support them in cases where they had 
acted justly and to prevent abuse of power or dismiss them in cases where they 
had transgressed. 55 What is worthy of notice here is that the Judge of Grievances 
had the authority to inquire after the ruler and official of the state and penalise 
them. This is clearly expressed in the words of prominent Muslim leaders. For 
example Abu Baker, the first Caliph, said "the weak among you is the powerful 
in my opinion until I do him justice, and the powerful among you is weak in my 
opinion until I punish him for his offence by God's will... " 
2- Oppression by revenue officials: where the appropriate rules should be 
invoked and applied to such as Zakat (alms) and Kharaje (land tax). If the state 
official collected and took from the public treasury more than the amount due, 
54 Ibid., p. 158. 
55 Al-Mawardy, op. cit., p. 78. 
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the judge of grievances had the authority to order the excess to be returned to 
those who were unfairly forced to pay. 
It can be inferred from this jurisdiction that to annul wrong imposition of 
taxation, the Court of Grievances had the power to quash what is nowadays 
known as administrative decisions or actions in relation to taxes. Thus it is 
related that Al-Muhtadi, one of the Abbassid Caliphs, was hearing grievances 
concerning the increase in the land tax i. e. Kharaj, levied on the people 
oppressively. "Whether the tax was levied before or after me, it makes no 
difference; it must be abolished". He then abolished it because it was illegal. 
Some of the people at the meeting said "If Amir Al-Moomenin, the commander 
of the Believers, abolishes the increase in the land tax, there will be a decrease of 
twelve thousand Dirham in the state Treasury income". AI-Muhtadi replied "I 
have to assure and confirm the right, and abolish the wrong..., s6 
3- Scrutiny of governmental officials and clerks. Such officials were the 
authorized representatives of the Muslims in the Treasury, advising on what was 
due to and required of them. It was the duty of the Grievances Judge to 
investigate what had been entrusted to them. If a mistake was committed in the 
recording of income or expenditure, the Judge of Grievance should rectify it, and 
if there were deliberate acts, punish the offender. 
4- Restoration of properties usurped by Rulers. Illegal seizure by rulers or 
governors of individual's properties could be challenged by the Grievances 
56 Al-Shanqyty, op. cit., p. 85. 
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Judge. If the latter knew about these offences, he should order the property back 
to its owner even if no complaint had been made. If however, he was not aware 
of it, it remained the task of the aggrieved individual to make a complaint. 
5- Organization of public religious endowment Waqf. As this came under the 
state administration, it became the duty of the Judge of Grievances constantly to 
investigate public religious endowment to fulfil it in accordance with the 
conditions and wishes of the donors of the Waqf. 
It is these types of jurisdiction available under Islam to the Judge of Grievances, 
which influenced the modem office of Diwan Al-Madhalim as an institution for 
controlling modern government and its administration. The principle seems clear 
that the Board of Grievances from the outset had a power of administrative 
supervision over all facets of government activities including the collection of 
revenue. 
As noted earlier the Grievances Judge or Wali A1-Madhalim was often the Caliph 
himself who was the head of the Executive. In cases when he delegated this 
power to someone else he, the Caliph, was usually present at the session of the 
Madhalim meeting. Thus it seems that the Wali Al-Madhalim, when he was some 
one other than the Caliph, was often also a member of the executive. Such power 
of investigation and decision which the Grievances Judge might undertake at his 
own initiative amounted to a system of control exercised by the executive over 
its members. 
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2.8.2 The jurisdiction to receive complaints 
Within the framework of traditional jurisprudence there were cases which the 
Grievances Judge could not examine unless he had received a complaint. Such 
cases were: 
I- state employees or officials: if there was a reduction in their wages or delay 
i. e. unjust decisions by their employers, the Judge of Grievances referred to the 
appropriate rules which dictated salaries and allowances. If an injustice had been 
done, he would compensate the aggrieved employees. If it was an employer's 
mistake, the Judge of Grievances would seek recompense from him; otherwise 
the compensation should be made from the public treasury. 
2- Restoration of properties usurped by people of high social rank, not being 
rulers or state officials. The outcome of such cases depended on the aggrieved 
person i. e. whether he complained or not. For example, an aggrieved woman 
brought her case before Al-Mamoon, an Abbassid Caliph. She claimed that Al 
Abbas, the son of the Caliph, usurped her lands. Al-Mamoon asked his judge to 
try the case. The latter tried it in the presence of the Caliph and his control, and 
decided that her lands should be returned to her. A1-Mamoon immediately 
implemented the decision. 57 
3- Implementation of decisions of the ordinary judges against the powerful. This 
might occur when the defendant had a high social position; the Grievances Judge 
57 Al-Mawardy, op. cit., pp. 84-85. 
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as powerful authority could ensure the execution of the ordinary judge's 
decision. 
4- Where officials, in charge of the general supervision of religion and moral 
welfare of the people (e. g. Muhtasib) had failed to perform their duties, the Judge 
of Grievances might act and deal with offences and settle disputes arising from 
such cases until the normal situation were restored. 
5- Private religious endowments. The Waqf officials managing such endowments 
often misused their authority. On complaint, the Grievances Judge could take 
control of the endowment on behalf of the eligible people who might have been 
unaware of their right to it. 
6- Hearing and settling disputes of an ordinary nature between ordinary litigants 
according to the law. This function overlaps with that of the ordinary judge. 58 
The existence of this overlapping authority with that of the ordinary court is 
supported by Al-Mawardy. Mustafa however has argued that such cases should 
not be included in the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances (i. e. Wali Al- 
Madhalim's jurisdiction). If, as Al-Mawardy states, this power is invested in Wali 
Al-Madhalim, there would be a conflict between him and the ordinary judge. 
Mustafa considers a number of possible reasons which may have explained why 
the writer Al-Mawardy included this power to hear, ordinary cases in his account 
of the Board of Grievances. These need not be detailed here, except to note that 
58 Al-Refa'ai, op. cit. 
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Mustafa rejects them. 59 He concludes his argument by stating that the authority 
to intervene and adjudicate ordinary litigation is not within the competence of the 
Wali of Al-Madhalim. As a result he is of the opinion that this authority should 
be excluded from the initial jurisdiction of the Wali A1-Madhalim. 
It is submitted that Mustafa has failed to recognize an important principle 
concerning the nature of judicial authority in Islam which may support the 
opinion of Al-Mawardy. According to Muslim scholars and jurists, the judiciary 
is one of the functions of the head of state. 60 In Islamic political theory, which 
has been developed by Muslim scholars, the executive and judicial powers are 
vested in the Caliph. 61 Ibn Jama'a, one of the Muslim jurists, has pointed out 
very clearly that the Imam (caliph) had the power, among other powers, `to 
obtain justice for the oppressed from the oppressor'. 62 Over time the head of 
state, for the reasons discussed earlier, began to delegate the power to others. 
Delegation of the judicial function does not mean however that he abandoned 
this power completely. Ulian (1982), states that the delegation of judicial power 
did not prevent the Caliph from exercising it whenever required. 63 On the one 
hand the Caliph himself could exercise the judicial power as an ordinary judge. 
On the other hand as the Caliph usually had the necessary characteristics, like 
strength and honour, he was, as noted earlier, for much of the time the Wali Al- 
Madhalim in person. Thus jurisdiction in ordinary litigation was one of the 
Caliph's original functions in addition to his role as Grievance Judge. The 
59 Mustafa, M., Wilayat Al-Madhalim: Dirasa Muqarana, pp. 76-8 1. 
60 See Ulian, op. cit., p. 66. 
61 See Lambton, A, S, State and Government in Medieval Islam. (1981), p. 308, and Coulson, op. 
cit., p. 57. 
62 Lambton, ibid, p. 140. 
63 Ibid., p. 133. 
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argument for including such a jurisdiction with that of Wali Al-Madhalim arises 
from the fact that it was historically the same person who exercised both forms 
of judicial authority. Since the establishment of the Islamic state in Madina, it 
has been known that according to Islamic political practice, the head of the state 
performs judicial functions. The prophet Mohammed was in the habit of hearing 
and deciding cases, then the four caliphs who succeeded him performed the same 
role. The learned caliphs who were familiar with Islamic Jurisprudence also used 
to carry out judicial functions. As the later caliphs became less knowledgeable 
about the rules of the Shari'a they began to leave this function to the specialists, 
i. e. the judges. 64 
2.9 The legal personality of the Board in the Islamic judicial system 
Having examined the history, aims, structure, and jurisdiction of the institution 
of the Board of Grievances and the Grievances Judge, it is appropriate now to 
consider the Board's legal character in Islamic history. 
Many writers have argued that the nature of the grievances jurisdiction in Islam 
(i. e. Diwan Al-Madhalim) is equivalent to an appeal court in a modem court 
system. Thus for Mustafa, Professor of the History of Law at Alexandria 
University, the Board of Grievances is similar, in some aspects, to the high 
appeal court. The Board tries cases which the ordinary judge could not settle, or 
64 See Odah, A., Al-Islam wa Awda'ana al-Syasyah. (1986), p. 237. 
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where one of the litigants brings his case before the Judge of Grievances 
claiming that the ordinary judge has been unjust in his judgment. 65 
Mansoor, 66 in his preface to Abdul Muna'm's book `Diwan Al-Madhalim' The 
Board of Grievances (1983) briefly stated that apart from the power of the 
Grievances Judge over administrative matters, he has also the power to 
investigate and control the ordinary judges' decisions when one or both parties of 
the litigation complains that the judge's judgment is unjust or wrong. 
Consequently, he adds, the Grievances Judge is considered to be an appeal venue 
i. e. an appeal court. 67 
Anderson (1976), in the course of his discussion of courts in Islamic, points out 
that the Grievances Judge i. e. Judge of Madhalim, has several functions, one of 
which is the appellate one. He says: 
... [The grievances judge] 
had multiple functions. Primarily it was 
designed as an informal court of appeal, in the sense that anyone who 
felt outraged by the judgment of another court, whether that of a Qadi 
[Judge] or anyone else, could appeal to the Caliph for justice. 68 
Anderson also states that the Grievances Judge has power to try cases for the first 
time i. e. power as a first instance court. 
65 See Mustafa, U., Usul Tarikh al-Qanun. 1960, p. 399, cited in Abdul Muna'm, op. cit., p. 230. 
66 The President of the High Committee of Islamic Legislation and the President of High 
Constitutional Court Egypt. 
67 Abdul Muna'm, op. cit. 
68 Anderson, N., Law Reform In Muslim World. London Athlone (1976) p. 14. 
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Shapiro also argues that Madhalim jurisdiction was an appellate procedure where 
the litigant might pursue his case and have the ordinary judge's decision 
reviewed or even quashed. He points out three elements which eventually come 
from the appellate procedure. They are: 
... 
Firstly the mazalim is court of complaints against all government 
officials, including the Qadi [judge]. Second, it is a kind of equity court 
designed to do substantial justice where the Qadis [Judges] have failed 
to achieve that end. Third, the Mazalim jurisdiction is peculiarly 
connected to the head of the regime. 69 
For these writers and others therefore, the Grievances Board or Diwan Al- 
Madhalim is rightly characterized as an appeal court in modern terms. Other 
writers have come to the same conclusion. 70 
What is decisive for this conclusion is the abundant evidence that decisions of 
the other courts and judges have been reviewed and quashed by the Grievance 
Judge. One example cited by the writers is that of Al-Amin, a Caliph of the 
Abbassid period, who overruled a decision of another court on the ground that 
the decision was not an honest or fair one. 71 
69 Shapiro, M., "Islam and Appeal", California Law Review. 1980, vol. 68, part 1, pp. 1034-1039. 
70 See for example: Taha, A., Al-Qada fr Usureh al-Mukhtalifah" Majalt Al-Muhamh Al- 
Shari'ah. 1952, p. 17, Al-Rafea'i, M., Al-Tandhim al-Qadaifi Lubanan. 1969, p. 19. Both 
previous references are cited in Abdul Muna'm, op. cit., see Also Coulson, A History of Islamic 
Law. 1964. Coulson says that "no hierarchy of Shari'a courts existed and no system of appeal as 
such, although dissatisfied litigants could always seek the intervention of the political authority 
through his Mazalim jurisdiction. ", p. 163. 
71 Mustafa, M., op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
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However the view that the Board was an appeal court is not unanimous among 
writers on the Board of Grievances in Islam. Thus Sayed argues that the occasion 
on which the judgments of other courts brought before the Grievances Judge 
were rare and too infrequent to justify the conclusion that the Grievances Judge 
exercised the functions of an appellate judge. He argues that the majority of 
cases considered by the Board of Grievances were first instance complaints. 72 In 
his view to treat the exceptional cases as defining the nature of the tribunal is 
questionable. Al-Awa also rejects the characterisation of the Grievance Judge as 
an appellate institution. 73 In his view there is no indication that the judge had 
such competence. It is submitted that the reasoning of these writers is persuasive. 
Unlike the jurisdiction of the ordinary judge, the Board of Grievances' 
jurisdiction was limited to certain kinds of claim or conflict. The Board of 
Grievances lacked the power normally associated with an appeals court, i. e. to 
review, uphold or reverse a judgment. 
Another characterisation of the Board is that of an administrative court, an 
institution where an aggrieved person or persons can seek protection against 
administrative injustice. The Board of Grievances seeks to ensure that those who 
have power or duties of a public nature exercise them adequately and according 
to the law, and the nearest analogue in a modern judicial system is that of the 
continental European administrative court. 
72 Al-Sayed, op. cit. p. 161. 
73 Al-Awa, op. cit. 
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Al-Refa'ai (1987) and Al-Juhani (1983 ), 74 believe that the Board of Grievances 
in Islam is a full administrative court where the wrong actions or decisions taken 
by the administration could be quashed and the plaintiff compensated against any 
loss as a result of such decisions. 
However, although the Board of Grievances in Islam performs the same 
jurisdiction as modern administrative courts, such as controlling the 
administration, trying cases where the administration is a party, compensating 
people when it is found out that hardship has occurred, the modem Board like its 
antecedent has more power than the model of an administrative court with which 
it is being compared. Thus in addition to its power over administrative matters, 
as has been seen, it can try ordinary cases which are usually tried by ordinary 
judges. This distinguishes it from an administrative court such as the Council' 
d'Etat of France. According to Garner and Brown, "... the administrative courts' 
power of judicial review requires the existence of an acte administrative (i. e. 
"7S administrative action) emanating from some organ of the administration. 
In concluding this survey of opinions on the nature of the Board it must first be 
said that there is value per se in attempting to draw parallels with modern 
developed court systems. But the possibility should also be considered that the 
Board is Sui generis. It is a judicial body with characteristics similar and 
dissimilar to other courts. But ultimately it is an institution which was created in 
its own Islamic legal culture and particular historical conditions. Plurality of 
74 Al-Refa'ai, op. cit., and Al-Juhani., I., Al-Qada al-Idari. P. 108. 
75 Brown, L. N. French Administrative Law. Oxford University Press, 5"' ed, 1998. p, 98. 
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judicial bodies is possible76 as in the similar but not identical case of the English 
Chancery jurisdiction. It can be argued that plural, parallel judicial institutions 
should be the exception. Judicial institutions should be united in common 
functions. Rulers should not resort to the creation of judicial agencies if there is 
no instantaneous and exceptional need for such agencies to fulfil the public 
interest. In that connection it is worth recording (as Al-Mawardy and Ibn Al- 
Arabi do) that during the first stage of the Caliphate, the Caliphs did not appoint 
any person as Wali Al-Madhalim. 77As these authors note, later Caliphs resorted 
to the establishment of the Board of Grievances as an exceptional expedient in 
face of the challenge of powerful people and corruption in the later stages of 
Islamic history, a time when the religious motivation weakened and the people 
appeared resigned to oppression. 
2.10 The English court of Chancery 
Some writers on the Board of Grievances have spoken of its jurisdiction as 
incorporating "equity" although none has sought to draw a parallel with the 
development of equity jurisdiction in the history of English Law. It seems 
appropriate for research carried out on this Islamic institution in England to make 
some reference to the emergence of the jurisdiction of Chancery in the English 
legal system. The account can be but brief and the comparison only suggestive. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that in further work that might be undertaken the 
76 See AI-Marzogy, M., Sultat Waly al-Amr fi Tagyid Sultat al-Qadi. M. A. dissertation, 1986, p. 
121. 
77 Ibid. 
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parallels between the Board of Grievances in Islam and the Chancery jurisdiction 
based on the Christian Church may be worth deeper exploration. 
2.10.1 Origins and development of the Chancery in English Law. 
The origins of the Chancery and the Chancellor can be dated to the twelfth 
century. 78 The Chancellor, who became, in later stages of the Chancery's 
development, the head of the Chancery, was a department secretary in the King's 
Council. 79 In the later stages of its history, the Chancery became a department of 
the Curia Regis. Later the Chancery began to separate from the Council. 
According to Holdsworth (1938), this separation may be dated to the thirteenth 
80 century, and to the year 1238. 
After that, the office of the Chancellor grew in importance particularly when the 
chancellor was appointed as the keeper of the Great Seal. That post placed him in 
an important position in the English legal system. Holdsworth points to this great 
power of the Chancellor, "... the Chancellor's position as the keeper of the Great 
Seal ... puts 
him at the head of the English legal system, and makes him the legal 
centre of the constitution". 81 As the keeper of Great Seal the Chancellor had the 
power to issue writs. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the king began to 
78 Holdsworth, W., A History of English Law. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., vol. 1, V, IX, X, XII, 
1938 pp. 446. 
79 See Holdsworth. Vol. 1, p. 395, and Kiralfy, A., Potter's Historical Introduction to English 
Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 4`h ed, 1958, p. 161. For more details about the history of 
English Law and the history of Chancery see, for example, Milsom S., Historical Foundation of 
The Common Law London: Butterworths, 1981,2nd ed., see also, Levy-Ullmann, H., The 
English Legal Tradition, its sources and history. London Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1935, and see, 
T. Plucknett,, A Concise History of The Common Law, London: Butterworths 5`h ed 1956. 
80 Ibid., p. 395. 
81 Ibid. 
99 
Chapter Two Historical development of the Board in Islam 
refer to the Council petitions presented to him by citizens who sought justice in 
the Common Law Courts. For example, a note is endorsed on a petition of 1394 
that "Le roy voet qu soun Counsel Ardayn", which means that "The King wills 
that his Council ordain". 82 The Chancellor, the most important person in the 
Council, used to hear such petitions and deal with and decide on them. 
Holdsworth notes: 
Applicants for justice in the Courts of Common Law, petitioners to the 
King, to the Council, or to the parliament, will sooner or later come to 
the Chancery either for an original writ, or to obtain the execution of 
the answer endorsed upon their petition. 83 
One may ask why the Chancellor possessed such power. According to 
Holdsworth, there are two reasons. First, the Chancellor had control over the 
issue of original writs, and second, the Chancellor and Chancery had from the 
first been closely connected with the King's Council. 84 
The first complaints which were seen by the Chancellor were first presented to 
the King by individuals. The involvement of the king and the Chancellor in a 
purely judicial matter could be attributed to the fact that there might have been 
"... miscarriages of justice in the Common Law Courts for which they 
82 Kiralfy, op. cit., p. 155. 
83 Holdsworth, op. cit., pp. 396-397. 
84 Ibid. pp. 397-400. 
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[petitioners] could get no redress... " 85 Consequently, the King intervened to 
maintain justice among his subjects. 
The jurisdiction of the Chancellor developed at a later stage whereby instead of 
presenting petitions to the king first, the petitioners sought redress from the 
Chancellor directly. 
In the fifteenth century the Chancery court began to exercise judicial functions 
independently from the Council. Later it developed into a fully independent 
court. Indeed, by the end of the fifteenth century and in the sixteenth century, the 
development of an independent court with its own procedures, and officials 
could be manifestly observed. 86 Furthermore in order to avoid the rigidity of the 
common law, the Chancellor began to develop equitable principles outside the 
boundaries of the common law and even contrary to it. 87 In fact, the rise of the 
Chancery Court was partly attributed to the need for equity which could not be 
formed in a system of fixed rules. Consequently, there were two different judicial 
channels, the common law courts which applied common law and the chancery 
which applied equity. 88 
Holdsworth in his account of this development of a Chancery Court explains that 
during the fifteenth century it was possible to make a distinction between the 
different types of cases that were brought before the Council on the one hand and 
the Chancellor on the other. This distinction between "fields of jurisdiction" had 
as See Levy-Ullmann, 1935, op. cit., p. 299. 
86 Holdsworth, 1938, pp. 216-217, and vol. 1, pp. 400-409, and Baker, op. cit., 1990. 87 Holdsworth, op. cit., vol. v, pp. 215-218. 
88 Ibid., pp. 215-218, and pp. 278-337. 
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resulted in the development of other institutions, such as the Court of Admiralty, 
which took much jurisdiction considered to be under the Council's authority. 
This breakdown in the Council's power enabled the Chancery to obtain 
independence from it. 89 It seems that at that time there was a tendency to 
distinguish between jurisdiction and the institutions in the judicial system. 
Later the Chancery court witnessed a further development. During the eras of 
Lord Hardwick, Chancellor from 1736 to 1756, and Lord Eldon who was the 
Chancellor from 1801 to 1827, equity which was applied by the Chancery 
became a body of set rules. 90 This means that the Chancellors eventually 
produced a body of rules which controlled the application of equity by the 
Chancellors as a means of justice. 
By the nineteenth century the Chancery Court was in the final stage of its history 
and the jurisdiction of equity was merged with common law in the Judicature 
Act 1873. 
2.10.2 Reasons for the appearance of the court of Chancery 
The growth of equity jurisdiction may be attributed to defects in the Common 
Law in its early stages and defects in the courts and their procedures. According 
to Levy-Ullmann (1935), however, it could also be attributed to the personality of 
those who held the post of chancellor. 91 
89 Holdsworth, pp. 407-409. 
90 See Kiralfy, op. cit., p. 598. 
91 Levy-Ullmann, 1935, op. cit., p. 199. 
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One of the greatest defects in the Common Law was its rigidity. 92 That rigidity 
meant either there was no rule or remedy which could be applied to new cases, or 
there was a remedy but it was not effective and adequate. In the Earl of Oxford 
Case, Lord Ellesmere explained: 
... the cause why there is a Chancery, for that men's actions are so 
diverse and infinite, that it is impossible to make any general law which 
may aptly meet with every particular act and not fail in consciences for 
frauds, breaches of trust, wrongs, and oppression, of nature 
whatsoever they may be, and to soften and mollify the extremity of the 
law, which is called Summum just. And for the judgment, etc., law and 
equity are distinct, both in their Courts, their judges, and rules of 
justice. 93 
Litigants who found no remedy or rules included cases related to uses, trusts and 
cases concerning the family. Such defects led the people to seek redress from 
other channels i. e. the Chancellor, who usually interfered to restore justice. As a 
result, he gradually developed principles which might be applied in such cases. 
The Common Law remedy was frequently inadequate or ineffective. The sole 
remedy damages in Common Law were in early stages inadequate. As a result, 
the Chancellor interfered and might offer special relief. 94 
92 See for example, Baker, 1990, op. cit., pp. 121-123, H. Holdsworth, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 404- 
406. 
93 Earl of Oxford's Case cited in Kiralfy, Supra, p. 586, and Baker, op. cit., p. 122. 94 See Kiralfy, op. cit., p. 583. 
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A further problem concerned cases which had a remedy in Common Law, but a 
remedy which could not be obtained because of the disturbed state of the country 
or the power of the defendant. His social standing could be employed to abuse or 
frustrate the common law machinery. 95 
Procedures before the common law Court were also defective. A chief grievance 
was delay and for others it was the expense of bringing their cases before the 
court. 
96 
The rise of chancery was also influenced by the position of the chancellor 
himself. As mentioned, the Chancellor had the responsibility to issue writs by 
virtue of which he became "... the door-keeper of Justice... "97 Hence, every 
petitioner or suitor had to bring his case to the Chancellor in order to get a writ. 
The Council referred the petitioners to the Chancellor who was one of its 
important officials. The connections between the Chancellor and the King who 
was the "fountain of justice", strongly contributed to the later emergence of the 
Chancery Court which with the Chancellor as head dealt with some petitions 
independently. 98 
2.10.3 The Chancellor (the Head of Chancery) 
At the head of the Chancery court was the Chancellor. Until later stages in the 
development of Chancery, i. e. prior to the reign of Henry VIII, the Chancellor 
9s See Holdsworth, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 405-406, and H. Levy-Ullmann, supra. P. 299. 96 Ibid. op. cit. vol. 5, pp. 279-280. 
97 Ullmann, (1935), op. cit., p. 301. 
98 Ibid. 
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was a churchman. 99 In the early stages of Chancery, lawyers did not hold the 
office of Chancellor. However, after the Reformation, the ecclesiastical 
Chancellors began to yield to legal professionals. According to Holdsworth, this 
development tended to ease the tensions between the Chancellor and the 
Common Law judges and at the same time kept the Chancellor close to the 
judges. 100 In later stages, the Chancellor's post became exclusively occupied by 
lawyers. 
2.11 The Chancery Court and the Board of Grievances 
Despite the fact that the two institutions operated in vastly different 
environments and different eras, and that there are clear differences as will be 
noted later, in one major aspect they had a common purpose. That was the 
restoration of justice and fairness among people who sought relief by petitioning 
their rulers. 
Thus the Court of Chancery, like the Board of Grievances, tried cases and 
petitions where the King was a party. The rise of Chancery was attributed to the 
fact that the King might not be questioned or tried before his own courts. The 
Board of Grievances in Islam also tried cases where the Caliph, a member of his 
family, or a prestigious person was involved. However, it should be noted that 
the reason which enabled Chancery to hear cases against the King was the fact 
that the Common Law Courts had no power over the King to be tried before 
99 Holdsworth, W. Sources and Literature of English Law. Oxford: the Clarenton Press, (1952), 
Fp. 178-179, and see also Levy-Ullmann, op. cit., pp. 292-293. 
0 Ibid. 
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them because "the King could not be sued by his own writ in other Courts". 101 
The Caliph, however, was in fact subject to the ordinary courts, he had no 
privileges; but the Grievances Board had to interfere when the ordinary judge 
failed to restore justice in cases involving the Caliph or prestigious people. 
Secondly, both institutions had competence to try cases which might have a 
remedy in the ordinary courts. The Board, like the Chancery, could hear cases 
which fell under the ordinary court's jurisdiction. 
The origins of Chancery consisted in hearing cases which arose from petitions 
presented to the King by his people. In other words, the King in person would 
exercise judicial power in order to ensure justice. Later he referred them to the 
Council and the Chancellor. 102 The parallel with the Board of Grievances is 
striking. The Caliph would hear complaints from individuals and then refer them 
to a judge. The Caliph, like the King, also interfered in certain cases in which 
powerful and influential people likely to frustrate justice were involved, in order 
to require of them that they submitted to the law. 
Levy-Ullmann (1935) refers to the factor of power in explaining the early "Court 
of Conscience". 
English authors seem nowadays to agree that the first cases referred to 
the Chancellor arose from petitions presented to the `graces' of the 
101 Baker, op. cit., p. 116. 
102 Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 396. 
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King by his subjects, on account of miscarriages of justice in Common 
Law Courts for which they could get no redress because of the social 
standing of the defendant, his high rank or the protection afforded him 
by some powerful Baron, the Sheriff, or some other officers of the 
County where circumstances arose. The petitioner often also pleaded 
his poverty, and that he was opposed by a rich and influential 
adversary, "too rich, too influential `as Maitland says' to be left to 
clumsy processes of the old courts and the verdicts ofjuries. 103 
Moreover, as Amedroz (1911) points out, there are similarities in jurisdictions. 
As the Board could examine cases of wa or endowment both public and 
private, the Courts of Equity had the same competence, "e. g. trusts charitable and 
private, and mandatory and prohibitive injunctions". '04 
There are naturally many differences between the two systems. The Chancery 
Court, unlike the Grievances Board, tried cases where the common law had no 
adequate remedy or where rights that were not recognized by the Common Law 
required protection. The Chancery Court applied equity, which it had developed 
as "... a body of rules or principles which form an appendage to the general rules 
of law or a gloss upon them"105. The Grievances Board in contrast was bound to 
apply the same rules of Shari'a that were applied by the ordinary judges and 
courts. 
103 See Levy-Ullmann, op. cit., p. 299. 
104 Amedroz, op. cit., p. 662. 
105 See Snell's Equity, 30`h ed (2000), paragraph 1-03. 
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This last point of contrast is worth emphasis. The existence of a separate Court 
of Chancery in Britain led to a separate body of law, the principles, and later the 
rules, of Equity. However, according to Liebseny (1975): 
This is not the case with the Mazalim jurisdiction. It was not 
systematized in a manner comparable to the equity jurisdiction of the 
Chancery. 106 
Nielsen argues that under the Mamluks, there were different bodies of law. Apart 
from Islamic Shari 'a there were the Mongol Yasa, customary law, Jewish and 
Christian communal laws and the international law of treaties. 107 He identifies 
the relationship between the Shari 'a rules and Madhalim in certain fields such as 
property, personal cases, and trade. But he disputes the existence of Mongol 
Yasa and finds no relationship between Mongol Yasa and the Board of 
Grievances. 
There is no clear evidence from the Nielsen study that the Board of Grievances 
developed and applied different laws during the Mamluk era. According to some 
jurists, customary law is considered to be one of the sources of the Shari'a rules. 
Jewish and Christian laws were applicable to these communities in the Islamic 
state and it does not mean that different laws existed. Consequently no separate 
and independent law was developed by the Board. Nielsen himself says 
106 See H. Liebesny, The Law of the Near and Middle East. Readings, cases and materials, 1975, 
p. 257. 
107 Nielson, op. cit., pp. 93-95. 
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... what 
distinguished Mamluk - and the Islamic- state from so many 
others was that the nominal role of legislator and the legal system 
had been pre-empted by the Shari'a and its theoreticians buttressed 
by the religious authority of God and His Prophet. There was no 
room for an official recognition of a secular legislator or formal 
legal system parallel to the Shari 'a. 108 
By way of conclusion it can be said that both institutions had a similar purpose: 
to respond to grievances and to restore justice. Beyond this observation, which 
led in different cultural political conditions to the dual character of both judicial 
systems (although the Islamic system never developed a completely parallel set 
of courts like its English counterpart), a comparison between them does not seem 
to offer the researcher great insight. However more detailed research could lead 
to a revision of this opinion. 
2.12 Conclusion 
In this chapter the historical development of the Board of Grievances in Islam 
has been examined. In early Islamic history, there was no special institution 
which would hear complaints against the state other than the ordinary courts 
applying Shari'a. However, at later stages specific jurisdiction to answer 
grievances against the rulers and the powerful gave rise to the Judge of 
Grievances and later the Board of Grievances. 
ioa Ibid. 
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The development of the Board has been examined. The Board might both deal 
with cases on its own initiative, and adjudicate cases brought before it by an 
aggrieved person. 
A comparison with the Chancery court in England, while interesting, yields little 
more than the observation that the growth of both courts was a response to 
inadequacies in the ordinary system of courts. The system of Wali Al-Madhalim 
and then the Board of Grievances in Islamic history remains as distant from the 
court of Chancery in English Christian history, as do their contemporary 
counterparts. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Although the origins of the Board of Grievances have deep roots in Islamic history, in 
Saudi Arabia those roots are fairly recent. The provinces of the Arabian Peninsula 
became united only in 1931 (1351). ' There was, at that time, no modern administration. 
As the state came to play a more active role in regulating the affairs of individuals and 
to fulfil public interests, disputes were bound to arise between the administration and 
individuals. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to explain the various stages of the development of the 
Board of Grievances as established in Saudi Arabia. It will concentrate on the basis of 
the Board prior to the 1982 Act. It thus seeks to provide the historical formation of the 
modem Board as an introduction to an examination of the present functioning of the 
institution in the country. 
3.2 The declaration of the King 1926 (1344). 
King Abdulaziz managed to establish foundations of justice for all citizens when he 
unified Saudi Arabia in the 20th century, a matter that has required giving attention to 
the settlement of grievances. The first evidence of the hearing of complaints against 
government officials and other people of power can be traced to 1926 (1344). 2 The late 
King, Abdulaziz, repeating what the earlier Caliphs in Islamic history had done, made 
an announcement calling the people to bring their complaints and grievances against 
any person whatsoever, directly before him. He placed a box called the "complaints 
I See Chapter 1. 
2 See for example S. Solaim, "Constitutional and Judicial Organization in Saudi Arabia", 1970, PhD 
Dissertation p. 134, & M. AL-Rasheed "Criminal Procedure in Saudi Arabia Judicial Institutions". 1973, 
Ph. D Thesis University of Durham, pp. 69. 
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box" at the governmental palace where the people could put their complaints. The 
announcement was published in the official paper, Um Al-Qura, and ended with the 
words: 
His Majesty makes it public to all people that whosoever has a grievance against 
whoever it is (be it an official or any body else senior or junior) and then 
conceals it, is himself that he should blame. And whosoever has a complaint, it is 
to be public that a box whose key is with His Majesty the King, had been placed 
by the Government building. Whosoever has any complaint is urged to place it in 
that box. It is also to be known to the public that they will not be harmed as a 
consequence of their just complaints against whoever official it is. Complainants 
should observe the following: a) the complaint should be true, and not false, and 
whosoever is found doing so will be penalized. b) any complaint that does not 
bear a signature of the aggrieved person will not be accepted, and whoever does 
so will be punished. It should be known to the public that justice is accessible to 
all people, regardless of their standing, and they will be treated the same until 
justice is done. And peace be upon you. 
Before the conquest of Hijaz, 1926 (1344) there was no formal way whereby people 
could bring their complaints against those in authority; the king used to hear complaints 
by way of letter, telegraph, personal visits to his office and even on his way to prayer. 
This was simply because there was no modern administration in the Arabian Peninsula 
at that time. The "complaints box" was only created after the conquest of Hijaz, at that 
time the most developed of the regions of the Peninsula and the territories that were to 
become the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 3 
3 See S. S. Huyett, "Political Adaptation in Saudi Arabia: A study of the Council of Ministers". (1985), 
pp. 52-56. 
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It can be assumed that King Abdulaziz's decision to establish a complaints procedure, 
which was the beginning of what was to become the Board of Grievances, was made in 
order to maintain political stability in the region and at the same time to assure the 
people of the justice of the new power. 
From 1923 (1341) until 1953 (1373) the state's administration was underdeveloped. As 
a result, the country must have experienced fewer complaints or disputes about 
administrative errors or illegal actions than a more developed country. In 1953 (1373) 
modem administration was introduced in the form of the Council of Ministers discussed 
earlier. 4 It was in the Act of the Council of Ministers that the Board of Grievances was 
first mentioned as a governmental bureau among others. Article 17 of the regulations 
states that: 
A general department within the cabinet shall be formed under the name 
Grievances Board to be supervised by a chairman appointed under Royal decree 
and shall be directly responsible to the king who will be its high authority 
Thereafter, the Grievances Board regulations were issued under Decree No. 2/13/8759 
In 1955 (1374) the Bureau of Grievances was separated from the council and became a 
"Board" or "diwan", with its own president and staff. Article one of the said regulations 
states that: 
An independent board under the name of 'Grievances Board' shall be formed and 
administrated by a chairman with the grade of Minister to be appointed under a 
royal decree and to be responsible to the King who will be his high authority. 
Royal Decree No 5/1911/4288 in 1/2/1373. See Chapter 1. 
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Its beginning, however, can be traced to the petition box, and in turn to ancient Islamic 
5 jurisdictions 
3.3 The stages of the modern development of the Board. 
The development of the courts is very important for the achievement of justice in any 
country. Germany, for example, has seen the progress of independent administrative 
law courts since 1863. There is no equivalent of the conseil d'Etat to act in a not 
compulsory capacity to government and public administration; in actual fact, this is 
deliberate, which is peculiar to the French conseil d'Etat, and those models directly 
derived from the French system and other latter models do not always possess an 
advisory capacity. While in France, the progress of administrative law followed a 
central direction under the conseil d'Etat, in Germany the arrangement of administrative 
law emerged from the Länder and not from centralised institutions. 6 The first 
development took place in Baden-Baden. There followed the Prussian Higher 
Administrative Court between 1872-75.7 Schwarze describes how in 1949, following 
the Nazi era, the concept of public administration evolved from a liberal constitutional 
system to a State scheme which integrated social laws and customs. The situation is 
similar in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the development of the administrative 
system came through the development of the administrative court, as will be seen 
below. 
See M. S. Abu Saad, "Qwa'id al-ljraat wa al-Murafa'at al-Idariah Amam Diwan al-Madhalim", Al- 
Idarah Al-A'amah. 1990, No. 68, pp. 97-151. 6 P. Birkinshaw, "European Public Law" Butterworths, 2003, pp. 135-136. 
J. Schwarze "European Administrative Law" London Sweet & Maxwell, (1992), p. 114. 
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Some commentators have spoken of the Board having undergone two stages of 
development: 8 the first, following its creation in 1953 (1373), when it was a bureau 
within the Council of Ministers, the second when in 1982 (1402) the Board of 
Grievances Act was promulgated. However, a member of the Board, Al-Shangyty, 
states that the Board has passed through three stages of development. 9 The first 
occurred when the Board was a department in the Council of Ministers like other 
departments regulated by Article 19 of the Council of Ministers Act (1953) and by the 
Bureaux of the Council of Ministers Regulations. 1° The second phase occurred when 
the Board became an independent body and was separated from the Council of 
Ministers fourteen months later, i. e. 1955 (1374). It then had its own president and 
procedures and the new regulations were slightly more detailed than the previous ones. 
The final stage, the current one, began in 1982 (1402) with the promulgation of a new 
Act, the Board of Grievances Act, under which the Board was formed as a "Judicial 
body". 
Closer analysis suggests that the evolution of the Board of Grievances in Saudi Arabia 
should be accounted for over a period of time during which the institution's 
development evolved in five distinct stages. The first began when the Board was 
constituted as a bureau within the Council of Ministers, as noted by Al-Shangyty above. 
It is here that the "Board" appears for the first time. Article 19 of the Council of 
Ministers Act of 1953 (1373)" provided that: 
8 M. Y Mustafa, "Wilayat al-Madhalim: Dirasa Mugarana" M. A. Dissertation, Imam Mohammed Bin 
Saud University, pp. 173-177. & I. Al-Juhani, "Al-Qada al-Idarr". 1984,111-121. 
9 M. A. AL-Shangyty, " Wilayat al-Madhalimfi a! -Islam wa Dawrahfi al-Raqabh a'la Aa'mal al 
Sultah". 1987 M. A Dissertation, Imam Mohammed University, Riyadh, pp. 255-263. 
10 The Bureaux of the council of Ministers Regulations, Section 4. 
11 Royal Decree No. 5/19/4288 in 9/10/1953 (1/2/1373). 
116 
Chapter Three The modern development of the BG 
A Board will be formed for the Council of Ministers. It consists of the following 
bureaux: A) General Secretary. B) The state's Account Control. C) Technical 
Experts. D) Grievances. 12 
The next Article of that Act stated that these bureaux would be organized and formed 
by a royal order. 
The Regulations of the Bureaux of the Council of Ministers were promulgated in 1953 
(1373). The form, jurisdictions and procedures of the Grievances Bureau were laid 
down in Articles 17 to 24. The Regulations state that the Grievances Bureau would be 
presided over by a person who would be appointed by an order from the King. 
According to the Act, the President would be directly responsible to the King. The 
Bureau had the power to investigate any complaints that were brought before it and to 
prepare a report, including the result of any investigation and the proposed remedy that 
the Bureau would recommend. The Regulations provided that the President of the 
Bureau would forward a report to the King, who would give his instructions either to 
implement the Bureau's proposed remedy or not to implement it. 13 
This stage of the Board's development, although short, fourteen months, was 
characterized by some important features. In the first place, the so-called Grievances 
Bureau was not independent of the executive. It was a department among other 
departments of the executive, described as a legal Department. Secondly, the 
jurisdiction of the Bureau was general and vague. Article 18 of the Regulations stated 
that: "the Bureau had the power to register and investigate `all complaints' ". There 
12 Ibid 
13 M. S. Abu Saad, op. cit., pp. 97-151.. 
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was no precision about what type of complaints the Bureau could register and then deal 
with. All complaints could be registered and investigated, regardless of their type, 
which might result in a conflict of jurisdiction between the Bureau and other ordinary 
courts, as is discussed later. 14 Finally, during this initial stage, the Board's decisions 
were neither enforceable nor mandatory. The department concerned was not obligated 
to implement its decision unless there was an order from the King. 15 
The second stage of the Board began with the new regulations, issued by Royal Decree 
in 1955 (1374). The Grievances Bureau was renamed as a "Board of Grievances". In the 
same year the Bureau had been separated from the Council of Ministers, and was, 
therefore, formally independent of it. 16 This occurred because the Chairman of the 
Grievances Bureau, a member of the royal family, was able, by his influence, to have 
the Bureau separated from the Council of Ministers. Al-Rasheed comments that 
Prince Musa'ad ben. Abdul Rahman, an uncle of the King, was appointed to be 
[chairman] of the Board. Its being presided over by this important prince gave the 
Board considerable prestige. This fact was demonstrated in 1955, when a royal 
decree was issued re-organizing the Board. 17 
However the separation from the Council did not give the Board complete or effective 
independence. New regulations still provided that the Chairman of the Board would be 
of the rank of minister and appointed by the Head of State. The new regulation of 1955 
(1374) consists of ten articles according to the Royal Decree No. 7/13/7859. In this 
regulation, we understand that the king has final authority over the Board. The 
14 Article 18 (a) of the Regulation of the Bureaux of the Council of Ministers. 
15 See Clauses B &C of Article 18 of the Regulations of the Bureaux of Council of Ministers, (1373). 
16 of 1374 H. Um Al-Qura No. 1577 in 8/5/1955 (17/9/1374). 
17 Al_Rasheed, op. cit., p. 69. 
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judgements of the Board were not valid and final unless the king ratified or approved 
them. 18 Moreover, the Board of Grievances under this regulation was considered as 
executive with regard to its function and did not enjoy immunity of judiciary judgment 
because its judgments (called proposals or suggestions) were not final unless ratified by 
the king. 19 
Article Five of this regulation indicates the rules of procedure, but the rules are limited 
and cover only the investigation of cases and questioning the Ministries and the workers 
to determine responsibilities and responsible people. There is no article that indicates or 
covers the review of judgments, there is nothing about an appellate system, and I think 
the regulation did not indicate the appellate system because its judgments are not final 
and are only considered as proposals or suggestions. 
It is noted that the Board's authority has been increased. First, the Chairman of the 
Board of Grievances issued on 1/11/1379 H (1960) Decision No. 3570/1 in respect to the 
Board's by-law giving more details and clarification of its authorities and also, by 
empowering the Board to investigate and issue judgments on crimes of bribery and 
falsification. Moreover, in 1962 the Board was entrusted to give decisions on 
applications to execute judgements issued by the courts of Arab countries and to discuss 
the cases resulting from violation of Arab-Israeli boycott regulations, as well as the 
cases concerning the validity of excuses given by employees for their delay in filing 
claims for the delegation allowance for six months etc., in addition to authorities 
exercised by the Board in participation with other organizations. 20 
18 Article 2, Paragraph (d) of the regulation of the Grievances Board 1954 (1374H). 
19 Article 2, Paragraphs (A), (B), (C) and Article 4, of the regulation of the Grievances Board 1954 
(1374H). 
20 Explanatory memorandum for Grievances Board regulation. 
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In 1958, the power of the King in relation to the Board was transferred to the President 
of the Council of Ministers. 21 However, in 1964, after an amendment of the Council of 
Ministers Act, the King also became the President of the Council of Ministers. As a 
result, the Board was supervised directly by the Head of State. 
The supervisory link between the executive represented by the President of the Council 
of Ministers, now the King, and the Board, at this point was reflected in the following: 
a) The King appointed the Chairman of the Board and his deputy. 
b) The Chairman of the Board was directly responsible to the President of the 
Council of Ministers, who was also the King. 22 
C) The Board's officials who would occupy the fourth scale position or above 
would be. appointed and dismissed by the President of the Board with the 
King's approval. 23 
D) The decisions of the Board were not obligatory or enforceable unless 
approved by the King. In other words the Board's decisions were merely 
suggestions. 24 
21 See The Council of Ministers Act of 1958 Article 46. 
22 Article 1 
23 Article 3 
24 Article 2 
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E) The Chairman of the Board had to submit to the King a detailed report 
every six months on the activities of the Board during that period. The 
report had to include the result of the investigations specifying the 
responsibilities of different governmental bodies and their employees and 
the proposed actions recommended by the Board. 
25This can be contrasted 
with the French legal system, where the Conseil d'Etat is officially 
presided over by the Prime Minister but in reality, by its vice-President, 
appointed by the Cabinet. 26 
Although these regulations did not change until the 1982 Act was promulgated, 
27 the 
next development (the third stage in this analysis) witnessed an extension in the Board's 
power over some disputes. 
The third stage of the modern development of the Board began when The Council of 
Ministers issued its Decision No. 818 dated 17/5/1396 H (1976) authorizing the Board to 
give a final decision on claims for compensation submitted by contractors contracting 
with the government agencies in cases where claims by those contractors are based on a 
default by the government agencies resulting in losses or damages to contractors. 
Z$ In 
that time a tendency had emerged whereby the executive prevented the Shari'a court 
from hearing disputes against government departments unless there was permission 
from the King to do so. This practice began with a case brought before a judge in the 
Shari 'a court in Riyadh by a contractor against a government department, the Ministry 
of Health. The contractor claimed that the Ministry withdrew two projects from him 
25 Article 4 
26 C. Dadom and S. Farran, "The French legal system". London, Sweet & Maxwell. 1996, pp. 89-95 
27 It should be noted that some amendments took place later, which will to be mentioned in due course. 
28 Explanatory memorandum for Grievances Board regulation. 
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because he had failed to finish them on time. 29 As a result of this case and the decision 
of the court, where the judge decided to call the General Administrator of the Health 
Ministry to attend the court and take oath before the court, an exchange of letters took 
place between the president of the Council of Ministers (i. e., the King) and the Chief 
Judge. In this exchange, the former attempted to persuade the latter to stop ordinary 
judges hearing cases against the administration unless they had the King's permission. 30 
The first response of the Chief Judge was refusal to give such an undertaking. 31 It was 
only after the President of the Council of Ministers had explained the necessity for his 
consent before the hearing of any case against the administration 32 that the Chief Judge 
issued33 a circular to judges, asking them to implement the content of the King's 
request. He informed the judges that the King promised to refer to the court any 
controversial matter needing a judicial decision. 34 
The King's letter No. 20941/1 in 1968 (1387) also indicated that the Board of 
Grievances should investigate any dispute between government departments. 35 
It might be said here that the main idea behind the request of the President of the 
Council of Ministers was his inclination to filter the disputes arising between the 
administration and individuals before having recourse to the court. In other words, as he 
was the head of the administration and the highest figure in the executive, he had the 
29 The author has no full details about this case. It was mentioned in the exchange of letters that took 
place at that time; see, for example, a letter from the President of the Council of Ministers to the Chief 
Judge No 20941 on 28/1/1968 (28/10/1387). 
30 A letter from the Deputy of the President of the Council of Ministers No 11166 in 1976 (19/6/1387), 
referred to in letter No. 3298/1 in 8/10/1987. 
31 See letter No. 3298/1 in 8/10/1387 
32 See letter from the Council of Ministers to the Chief Judge No. 20941 in 1968 (28/10/1987). 
33 It appears that there were oral discussions about this matter between the King and the Chief Judge. 34 Circular No 0/3/T on 5/4/1968 (7/2/1388). 
35 A. Al-Muhaiza', "Diwan al-Madalim fi al-Mamlakah al-Arabiah al-Saudiah ". 1977, Dissertation, 
Public Administration Institute, Riyadh, pp. 31. 
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power to resolve such disputes that the department concerned failed to solve because of 
his paramount power. So one might say that the request of the President of the Council 
of Ministers to the Chief Judge was to enable the former to exercise his administrative 
power of control over governmental departments before the judiciary could be involved. 
However, such an interpretation of the King's request was contradicted by subsequent 
events, which saw many matters that were commonly considered to fall under the power 
of the ordinary court being vested in the Board. 
This period, it would appear, was a turning point for the Board, for it witnessed the 
explicit investment of the Board with a power to investigate disputes between the 
administration and individuals. 
In the period to 1976, the Board was granted many additional areas of jurisdiction. 
Examples are the investigation of forgery cases and the hearing of complaints brought 
by electricity companies over punitive measures imposed on them by a statutory 
committee formed under the Regulations of the Electricity Services Agency of 1972 
(1392). Such fields of jurisdiction were conferred upon the Board in addition to its 
principal competence under the 1955 (1374) Regulations. These powers were usually 
granted to the Board by orders or decisions issued by the Council of Ministers, or 
according to other regulations which typically stated that disputes arising because of the 
application of such regulations should be heard and investigated by the Board. 36 
The history of the Board of Grievances at this time includes a point when its dissolution 
was a possibility. According to a draft of the Council of Ministers issued in 1967, the 
Board was to be dissolved. However, for unknown reasons, this decision was not 
36 See for example, the Foreign Capital Investment Act 1964 (11/9/1383), Article 35. 
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carried out. It may be useful to examine this draft decision of the Council. In its 
Preamble, the draft Decision cited the rationale for the dissolution of the Board. Firstly, 
the Board could no longer fulfil the objectives and purposes that lay behind its 
establishment. This was due to the vast development of the government and the 
expansion of the activities of the administration, which had resulted in an increased 
number of disputes concerning administrative contracts and decisions. Secondly, 
although regulations were issued in order to control the administration, to penalise 
various administrative and financial violations, and lay down the proper punitive 
measures to stop wrong doers, such regulations did not fulfil their purpose because there 
was no special body to apply such controls properly. Thirdly, the current Board was 
performing two different jobs, namely, investigation and adjudication. It could never be 
sufficiently just and impartial in deciding penal cases, in particular, if the Board 
continued to combine these functions. There was, according to the draft Decision, a 
need to create a different body to deal with these pressing problems. Consequently, it 
was decided to dissolve the Board and to create a new body to be called Majlis Al- 
Madhalim. 37 
The proposed Council would be presided over by a chairman of the rank of minister 
who would be under the authority of the King and directly responsible to him. 
Moreover, all members of the Board would be appointed, promoted, sent to other 
regions, transferred, dismissed or retired by royal order. 
37 M. S. Abu Saad, op. cit., pp. 97-151. 
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The draft Decision also set out the proposed jurisdiction and procedures of the new 
Council. Noteworthy was a radical provision that decisions the Council might reach had 
to be approved by the King and would otherwise have no legal effect. 
38 
This draft decision of the Council of Ministers, as has been pointed out, was not 
implemented. The point of discussing the draft decision here is that, later, its contents 
substantially formed the basis of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. However the 
proposed subordination of the Council through the King's personal involvement in 
approving decisions was not to be implemented. 
Prior to its new legal basis in the 1982 Act, the Board of Grievances was in its next 
period gradually directed towards hearing cases which involved government 
departments only. 39 
This tendency to concede to the Board the power of an administrative court continued to 
increase until the middle of the 1970s, when an important case led to the promulgation 
of a crucial decision by the Council of Ministers. This further turning point in the 
Board's development led to the fourth stage in its history. The case involved a 
complaint from the Dallah Company, a contractor. The company appealed to the 
administrative department concerned (the Defence Ministry) to alter the cost of a 
contract in order to meet the changes in prices that had occurred in 1975. The Defence 
Ministry referred this request to the Council of Ministers. This case brought to light the 
vast change that had taken place by that date, including the increase in the activities of 
the government which contributed to the increase in disputes between the government 
38 Ibid. 
39 A circular issued by Chief of the Judges No 10/3/1' in 1968(7/2/1388). 
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and individuals. The result was the promulgation of the Council of Ministers Decision 
No. 818 in 1976 (17/5/1396). This Decision concerned the principles which would 
govern indemnity against damages caused by the administration with regard to contracts 
between the administrative department and other parties. 40 
Decision No. 818 declared that the Board might hear cases brought before it by any 
contractor who had contracted with a department where they sought compensation from 
the government on the basis that the department had made a mistake which resulted in 
damages or loss to the contractor. Examples given included situations where a 
government department failed to hand over the site of the project on time or when the 
department concerned changed the specifications of the project. Under the Decision, the 
Board's verdict concerning such issues would be final, following approval by the 
President of the Board. 
What is noteworthy here in the evolution of the competence of the Board is that, for the 
first time, a final and binding decision against a governmental department can be made. 
From this point, the Board had acquired, in addition to the jurisdiction to indemnify, the 
power to make a final decision binding on a government department. The Board had 
acquired the essence of an administrative court. 
3.4 Board offices 
The composition of the Board prior to 1982 changed little. According to the 1954 
legislations, the main offices were that of Chairman, his deputy, the advisers and 
40See for more information, A. K. Musa, "Diwan al-Madalim bayn al-Hadir wa al-Mustaqbal" Al-Idarah 
Al-A'mah". 1982, No. 34, pp. 45-52. 
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investigators. 41 The equivalent of these offices is examined in more detail in the 
analysis of the modern Board (Chapter Four). 
3.4.1 The Chairman. 
The Chairman was appointed and dismissed by a Royal Order. He was of the rank of 
Minister and assumed the responsibility of the Board's functioning: 
An independent board under the name of 'Grievances Board' shall be formed and 
administrated by a chairman with the grade of Minister to be appointed under a 
royal decree and to be responsible to the King who will be his high authority. 42 
The Chairman, on the other hand, was the highest authority in the Board and in the 
communications of the Board with other government departments. He had also the 
power to distribute the work among the Board's officials and members according to 
their jurisdictions. 43 
3.4.2 The Deputy Chairman 
The King also appointed the Deputy of the Board by a Royal decree: 
A sufficient number of advisors, investigators and clerks shall be appointed for the 
Board under a decision by the Chairman except for the following: 
41 Article 17 of the Regulations of the Bureaux of the Council of Ministers. 
42 Article I of the Board's of Grievances Regulations 1955 (1374H) 
47 Ibid and Article 3 of the Internal Regulations. 
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1) Deputy Chairman to be appointed under a Royal decree. 44 
He would perform the Chairman's job in the case of the latter's absence. Moreover, he 
would preside at the Cases Review Committee. He had also to administer the work in 
the Board and follow the inquiries that were sent by the Board to government 
agencies. 45 
3.4.3 The General Administrator 
The General Administrator of the Board (GAB) had the task of supervising the work in 
the Board since he represented the highest authority among the secretaries, clerks and 
workers. He had the responsibility of the finance affairs of the Board and was directly 
responsible to the Chairman of the Board. 46 
3.4.4 The Advisers 
There were two types of adviser to the juridical Board, advisers of Shari 'a and legal 
advisers. 47 It was their duty to provide clarification of legal questions ordered to them 
by the Chairman or his deputy. They were duty bound to help the investigators in 
technical and legal matters. Also, they were members of the Cases Review 
Committee. 48 
44 The regulation of the Board of Grievances of 1374, Article 3. 
45 See decision of Chairman of the Board of Grievances No 3570/1 in 1960(1/1/1379). 
46 Article 4 (b) of the Internal Regulations. 
47 Ibid, article 2. 
48 Ibid, article 4 (c). 
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The advisers of Shari 'a, or the consultants, had to be qualified and graduates from 
Shari'a Colleges or have experience and knowledge in matters of Shari 'a, or be former 
judges. 49 The legal advisers, on the other hand, were advisers in matters concerning the 
state regulations, with knowledge in administrative law. Most were Arab Muslims from 
different Arab States, particularly Syria and Egypt. so 
It seems that the influence of other legal systems on the Board such as that of Egypt 
occurred through these advisers. As Mahassni and Grenley (1987), noted: 
Most of these advisers were educated and trained in countries following or 
influenced by the French legal system; consequently, many of the decisions drafted 
by these legal advisers adopted the principles laid down by the Conseil d'Etat in 
France to the extent such principles did not conflict with Shari'a precepts. 5' 
The theory of risk, whereby the administrative department may find itself liable even 
where it is not at fault, was applied by the Board which used to compensate the person 
i. e., the government contractor, when supervening circumstances arose, such as a sharp 
increase in prices, after a contract had been signed, and which otherwise might render 
the contractor unable to carry out the project. A contractor was entitled to an increased 
cost of contract and to compensation for unexpected damages incurred in the process of 
carrying out a contract. As an example, once the contractor [the plaintiff] was on site 
and had started on the job, he was faced with the fact that the soil on which the building 
was to be erected was not suitable. Thus, it would not be possible to carry out the 
49 This was explained to the author by personal contact with one of the Board members. so The above-mentioned contact and see H. Mahassani, &N. Grenley, "Public Sector Dispute Resolution 
in Saudi Arabia: Procedures and Practices of Saudi Arabia Administrative Court", The International 
lawyer. (1987), Vol. 21, No. 3 pp. 835. 
51 Ibid 
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construction in accordance with the contractor requirements. The contractor attempted 
to treat the soil but without success and in so doing, lost time as well as money; during 
this period the cost of labour and materials rose sharply. 
The Board decided that the plaintiff had encountered unexpected difficulties which he 
could not have anticipated. He had been forced to call in experts to examine and treat 
the soil, and had thus incurred financial loss. Moreover, the Board decided that the 
contractor was not responsible for the rise in price of labour and materials during that 
period. Thus the administrative department [the defendant] had to compensate the 
plaintiff for the unexpected rise in prices. 52 
3.4.5 Investigators 
According to Article 3 of the main Regulations (the Board of Grievances Regulations of 
1954 (1374)), the Chairman of the Board appointed investigators. There were Shari'a, 
legal, financial and technical investigators. 53 Everyone investigated cases referred to 
him by the Chairman of the Board or his deputy. When they finished an investigation, a 
report on the case was submitted to the Chairman containing his opinion and 
recommendations. 54 As with the advisers, many investigators were not Saudis and most 
came from Syria or Egypt. 55 
52 See the Board decision No 7/T of 1978 (1398) in case No. 205/Q of 1976. 53 Article 3 (0 of the Internal Regulations of 1379. 54 Ibid. Article 4. 
55 The previous contact and see also, H. Mahaani, &N. Grenley, op. cit. 
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3.5 Jurisdiction 
Before the Board of Grievances Act 1982, the jurisdiction of the Board can be divided 
into three categories: administrative, advisory or consultative and judicial. The Board 
was in charge of differences between individuals and the state. At the same time, it 
could investigate and decide in civil and criminal cases where the government was not 
involved, such as enforcement of foreign judgements and cases of corruption such as 
bribery cases. In this respect, it differed from the French Conseil d'Etat, which is both 
an advisory and a judicial body. As an advisory body, it delivers opinions to the 
Government on legislative and administrative matters and, as such, takes part in the 
law-making process. As a judicial body, it is in charge of disputes between the citizens 
and the administration. 56 
3.6 Conclusion 
With this account of how the Board of Grievances survived to achieve its new 
competence, and a brief account of the offices of the Board, the study of the legal 
background and stages of development of the modern Board of Grievances is complete. 
The present day Board was established in 1982, and in the following chapters the work 
of this reconstituted Board will be discussed specifically as it concerns its 
s' administrative jurisdiction. 
56 C. Dadom and S. Farran, op. cit., pp. 92. 
57 The previous interview of ex-chairman, not 49. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In an earlier chapter, the historical development of the Board of Grievances in Saudi 
Arabia and its Islamic origins, in particular, were examined. The structure and 
membership of the present Board of Grievances are considered in this chapter. 
The modern legislation regulating the Board of Grievances was promulgated in 1982 
(1402)'. This Act replaced the Regulations of the Board of Grievances 1955 (1374). 
Under the 1955 Regulations, the Board of Grievances lacked formal independence and 
was not defined as a judicial body. The 1982 Act explicitly changed the character of the 
Board. Article I declares the Board of Grievances to be "... an independent 
administrative judicial body... " directly accountable to the King. Unlike in the previous 
Regulations, therefore, the Board is clearly acknowledged as being a court. The extent 
to which the Board is properly considered as an administrative court is examined in 
Chapter Five, although this chapter also discusses the judicial character of the members 
of the Board, who have been given the title of `counsellor'. 
The Board of Grievances Act 1982 vested a new jurisdiction in the Board, to try 
"disciplinary cases". z Nevertheless, it also withdrew from the Board certain powers of 
investigation, which the former Regulations had given it, and vested these in the 
Control and Investigation Board, which is separate from the Board of Grievances. 3 
I Royal Decree No. 51, in 1982, (17/7/1402). 
2 Clause 1(e) refers to "... disciplinary suits filed by... " This refers to cases brought against civil servants 
3 See Article 10 of the 1982 Act. 
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Generally, the new law has organised and defined the areas of jurisdiction more clearly 
than the previous 1955 regulations. 4 
Changes also extended to including the organisation of the Board and its membership. 
The Board of Grievances is of considerable legal importance, and its decisions affect 
many individuals, both Saudi Arabian citizens and foreigners, as well as foreign and 
home-based companies. The success of the Board in the exercise of its powers largely 
depends upon its composition. Qualified and well trained, as well as experienced, 
personnel will inevitably have a positive impact on the practice of the Board and 
contribute to the public perception of the institution as an effective means for the 
redress of complaints against the government. 
Writers on the Board have sought to describe it formally in terms based on the 1982 
reforms. Mustafa, for example 5 divided the Board into two: members, those who 
adjudicate, and employees. Everyone else connected with the institution. The first 
category he further classified into three: the administration, the judicial section and the 
General Body of members. Under the category of administration the writer included the 
powers and function of the Chairman, the Deputy or Deputies to the Chairman, the 
Assistant Deputies, the Administrative Affairs Committee of the Board's Members 
(identified by its initials as CAAMB), and the Disciplinary Committee. The judicial 
section is said to include the Presidents of the various branches of the Board, at Jeddah 
Dammam and Abha, and the main and subsidiary panels. The General Body is 
composed of all members of the Board. Under Mustafa's second category of 
4 See M. S. Abu Saad, "Qwa'id aI-Ijraat wa al-Murafa'at al-Idariah Amam Diwan al-Madhalim", Al- 
Idarah Al-A'amah. 1990, No. 68, pp. 97-151. 
See Mustafa, M. Y., "Wilayat al-Madhalim : Dirasa Muqaran", Master's degree, (1986), pp. 188-200. 
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"employees", he included everyone employed to deal with the Board's administrative 
affairs, including finance, records, typing, and other ancillary departments. 
Musa (1982) made a similar analysis but with some differences. 
6 He divided the Board 
into two sections: the presidential and administrative section, and the specialist 
(technical) section. Under the presidential and administrative section, Musa described 
the powers of the Chairman of the Board, the Deputy and Assistant Deputies, and the 
General Administrator of the Board, and the person who has the power to appoint them. 
However, unlike Mustafa, he does not include CAAMB under this section. In the 
specialist (technical) section, Musa placed the various panels of the Board including the 
Review Committee, the General Body and the CAAMB. 
Shaibt Al-Hamd (1989) discussed the composition of the Board under two headings, 
judicial and administrative. According to him, the judicial section consists of the 
Chairman, the Deputy, the Assistant Deputies, the judicial panels, the CAAMB, and the 
General Assembly. 7 
The various classifications adopted by those who have written on the Board may seem a 
trifling matter, but the classification adopted can hide important aspects of the 
institution. The classifications already outlined fail to give weight to such questions as 
the status and relative power of different members and fail to recognise, for example, 
the advisers as an integral part of the Board of Grievances. 8 Moreover, Mustafa and 
6 Musa, A. K. "Diwan al-Madhalim bayn al-Nadir wa al-Mustaqbal" AI-Idarah Al-A'amah. 1982, No. 34, 
pp. 45-52. 
Shaibt Al-Hamd, M. Al-Wilaya al-Qadaiya Ii Diwan al-Madhalim fil Mamlakah al-A'arabiah al- 
Sa'udiah. 1989, Ph. D dissertation, pp. 802-836. 
8 Beside the writers mentioned, there are other who have written about the composition and the 
membership of the Board. See for example Ja'afar, A. G., Wilayat al-Madhalim ff al-Islam wa Tatbigahfi 
al-Mamlakah al A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. (1989), pp. 73-85,. Al-Uthman, A. Y. , 
Wilayat al-Madhalim fi 
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Musa treat Assistant Deputies, who are judicial officers, as administrators, which is in 
conflict with the clear terms of the legislation. The Disciplinary Committee is 
considered by Mustafa to be an independent body within the Board. In fact, its members 
are drawn from the CAAMB. 
Most of these accounts of the composition of the Board are descriptive only. The 
writers consider the Board and construct their classifications of its work, by reference to 
the terms of the 1982 Act, sometimes misreading its terms in the process. 9 They do not 
examine how, in practice, the Board's activities relate to the formal provisions of the 
Act, including the key significance of decisions made by the Chairman of the Board. 
Accordingly, this chapter attempts to discuss the formal structure and membership of 
the Board. This approach will not only identify specific personnel who play an 
important role on the Board; it will also bring out the roles and relationships between 
the various levels of the Board, in particular the advisers. 
4.2 The internal organisation of the Board of Grievances 
The personnel of the Board consists of the Chairman and a number of Deputy 
Chairmen, Assistant Deputies, the judicial members, and advisers. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 
provide a picture of the main personnel and the internal organisation of the Board of 
Grievances. The organisation of the Board is as set out in Figure 4-2. Where necessary 
for the analysis, reference is made to the organisation of the ordinary judicial system 
al-Islam wa Tatbigatih bil Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah. (1988), M. A. dissertation, pp. 169-186. 
Al-Fahal, A., Diwan al-Madhlim fi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah wa al-Qada al-Idari. 1990, 
Ph. D dissertation, pp. 254-280. Turck, N. B., "Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia", The International 
Lawyer. (1988), vol. 22, No. 2, p. 402. Lerrick, A. &Mian, Q. J., Saudi Business and Labour Law. (1987), 
2°d edition, p. 238. 
9 However some studies are of high quality. See, for example, Al-Fozan, A. "Diwan al-Madhalim fi Dhil 
Nidhameh al-Jaded", Al-Idarah al-A'amah (1982), No. 3, pp. 109-143. 
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and its hierarchy (discussed in Chapter 1). These diagrams will assist in the detailed 
discussion of the composition of the organisation, which follows below. 
Figure 4.1 
The personnel of the Board of Grievances 
The Chairman 
Advisers 
The Deputy Chairman 
Assistant Deputies 
Judicial Members 
General Administrator for Financial 
and Administrative Affairs 
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Review Committee 
General Body 
CAAMB 
The Disciplinary 
Committee 
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Figure 4.2 
The Chairman 
General Panels 
Penal Commercial Administrative 
4.2.1 The Chairman of the Board 
Subsidiary Panels 
Disciplinary 
The President or Chairman is at the top of hierarchy of the Board. According to the 
1982 Act, the Chairman is appointed and removed by Royal Order of the King. 10 He has 
the rank of Minister. The Chairman is directly accountable to the King, who is President 
10 The King is at the same time the President of the Council of Ministers. In other words one-person 
performing two jobs. However, in theory the duties, power, and responsibilities of the King are different 
from those of the President of the Council of Ministers. 
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of the Council of Ministers. The qualifications for appointment as Chairman of the 
Board are somewhat unclear. The 1982 Act states that: 
The Board of Grievances shall consist of a President with the rank of Minister, 
one or more Vice-Presidents and a number of Assistant Vice-Presidents as well 
as Members with qualification in Shari'a and law's 
and 
The President of the Board shall be appointed and his services terminated by 
Royal Order. He shall be directly answerable to His Majesty The King. 12 
We can see from this translation of the Act that the person selected as President need 
not previously have held a judicial post. Nor does the Act lay down particular 
procedures to be complied with in the appointment of the Chairman of the Board. There 
is no requirement, for example, that a committee be appointed to recommend a person 
for the post. Furthermore, it might be argued that it is only the judicial members of the 
Board for whom it is compulsory to be qualified "in Shari'a and Law". In the Arabic 
original, a similar ambiguity exists. In practice, the Chairman and other offices 
mentioned have such qualifications. Nevertheless, it has not proved possible to obtain 
an official interpretation as to whether such qualifications are required of these officials. 
According to Article 3 "the President of the Board shall be appointed and his services 
terminated by Royal Order", we can see from this translation that the King not only has 
wide powers over the appointment, but also over the dismissal of the Board's 
Chairman. 13 The Act does not state the grounds which would justify dismissal. It is a 
1' The 1982 Act, Article 2 
12 The 1982 Act. Article 3. 
13 Article 3. 
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matter entirely at the discretion of the King. As well as the appointment and removal of 
the Chairman by the King, the Chairman "... shall be directly answerable to His Majesty 
the King ... 5914 This 
link with the King repeats what was stated in Article 1 of the former 
1955 Regulations "... and to be responsible to the King who will be his highest 
authority. " The responsibility of the Chairman of the Board to the King raises directly 
the issue of the independence of the Board. 
This authority to appoint is accorded to the King by virtue of the fact that judicial power 
in the Islamic state is vested in the Head of State, that is, the Caliph himself (according 
to some Board members interviewed). 15 Traditionally, in Islamic institutions the 
grievances officer, Wali Al-Madhalim, was appointed by the Head of State and 
responsible to him. The King in turn vests this power in another person who is directly 
responsible to him. The connection between the Chairman, and therefore the Board, to 
the King is also justified in the Explanatory Memorandum issued with the 1982 Act. It 
says "... the Board's direct affiliation to his Majesty the King is natural because his 
Majesty is the Ruler. " At certain stages of the development of the Board, the grievance 
officer functioned in the presence of the Head of State (the Caliph). The formal 
responsibility of the modern Chairman of the Board to the King therefore reflects 
Islamic principles. However, the power to appoint does not, it is submitted, mean that 
the king can intervene in the judicial functions of the Board. In practice, the King's 
sovereign interest concerns the proper administrative functioning of the Board only. 
Thus, Article 47 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982 provides: 
14 Ibid. 
15 Interview with A. Al-Ali, 18/1/2006, Al-Daweesh, 19/1/2006 and Al-Masoud, 17/1/2006. 
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At the end of every year, the President of the Board shall bring before His 
Majesty the King a comprehensive report of the Board's activities including his 
observations and recommendations... 
Nevertheless, the power to appoint and dismiss the Chairman is subject to debate, in the 
light of the nature of the exercise of that authority. No discussion of this vital matter is 
to be found in the literature on the Board of Grievances Act, 1982. 
It is necessary therefore to discuss some reforms, which could make the Chairman and 
the Board itself a court independent of the King and the Council of Ministers. By 
`reforms' is not meant a fundamental change in the constitutional environment in which 
the King is the source of all power and authority. One proposal might be that a 
committee should be established to interview, and to recommend to the King, a number 
of candidates for the post of Chairman. This is the procedure for the appointment of 
judicial members of the Board. The independence of the Chairman selected by the King 
could be guaranteed by establishing, through law, conditions which must be met in 
order to justify his removal from office, for example when he reaches a certain age or is 
found to have acted improperly. Independence for the Chairman might entail that the 
person appointed by the King should not have the rank of Minister in the Council of 
Ministers. It is submitted that these and other options should be considered in any 
further legislation on the Board of Grievances. 
4.2.1.1 Power and functions 
According to and within the 1982 Act, the Chairman wields significant authority over 
both the judicial and administrative sections of the Board, which, together with the 
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power to make administrative internal decisions issued by the Chairman himself, 
defines the functions of the Chairman. He presides over the Committee of 
Administrative Affairs of the Members of the Board (CAAMB) and chooses its 
members. 16 He also presides over the "General Body" of the Board and exerts 
supervisory and administrative authority over the members and the various panels. For 
example, he appoints one or more members of the Board to carry out an inspection of 
work which is usually done once, but not more than twice, a year. 17 He also authorises 
the setting up of the disciplinary committee from among the members of the CAAMB. 18 
Moreover, the Chairman may, either on his own initiative or on the recommendation of 
the President of the panel to which the member belongs, initiate disciplinary 
proceedings against any member of the Board. 19 
The Chairman has the highest authority on the Board of Grievances regarding the 
application of the 1982 Act and the organisation of judicial work from the 
commencement of the case until the issue of judgment. 20 In short, he always plays an 
important role in the judicial work of the Board. For example, he allocates the cases to 
the various panels. According to Article 47, at the end of every year the Chairman 
submits an annual report, (as already noted) which is not public, to the King with his 
observations and suggestions regarding the functioning of the Board. 21 The Chairman 
also has the duty to classify and arrange the publication of all decisions issued by the 
16 The Chairman is a graduate of the Shari'a College. The Board has had three Chairmen since its 
establishment in 1953. One, who was also the first Chairman, was from the Royal family. The other two 
were qualified in Islamic law. 
17 Article 4. 
1S Article 22. 
19 Article 30. 
20 Article 31. 
21 See Clause 2 of the Decision of the Chairman of the Board No. 12 of 1982 (17/8/1402). See also 
Article 28 of the 1982 Act. 
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Board. 22 Furthermore, commentators on the Board have not discussed the potential 
danger arising from the power exercised by the Chairman over the judicial members of 
the Board. This needs to be considered and questioned. The Chairman's power of 
inspection and discipline with regard to the member's affairs, for example, might easily 
run the risk of abuse and result in undue influence breaching their independence and 
their neutrality. Article 28 reflects an awareness of this problem. It reads: 
Without prejudice to the impartiality and independence of Board members, the 
President of Board may supervise all circuits and members, and the head of 
each circuit may supervise members subordinate to the circuit. 
Nevertheless, it may be necessary to do more than just recognise the risk, in order to 
avoid the possibility of excessive influence being brought to bear. To reduce the 
possibility of any infringement of the neutrality and independence of the members, for 
example the CAAMB and the Disciplinary Committee should be reviewed. At present 
supervisory and other committees are composed of people selected by the Chairman. 
Members of such committees might be elected from among the Board's members for a 
certain number of years. The possibility of influence over members could thus be 
reduced. Secondly, the monitoring power of the Chairman over the court or the judicial 
work of the board should be reviewed. He allocates cases to panels and has oversight 
of the processes of adjudication from the commencement of cases to completion. The 
objection is not to this power in itself but to the absolute freedom the Chairman has in 
exercising it. There should therefore be some involvement in supervising functions by 
others in addition to the Chairman. If the power to supervise cases exercised by the 
22 Article 47. 
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Chairman is allowed to continue without restriction, then the independence of the 
members and the Board itself will continue to be at risk. 
4.2.2 The Deputy Chairman: appointment and dismissal 
According to Articles 2 and 3 of the Board Act 1982, the Deputy Chairman is also 
appointed by Royal Order, and dismissal, which is by the king, may be based on the 
recommendation of the Chairman of the Board. Article 12 clarifies that the Deputy 
Chairman holds the rank of President of the Appeal Court of the Shari'a Courts, which 
are the ordinary courts. Article 12 states that: 
Ranks of members of the Board are as follows: 
Trainee of the rank of Judicial Trainee, 
Assistant Chancellor (C) of the rank of Judge (C), 
Assistant Chancellor (B) of the rank of Judge (B), 
Assistant Chancellor (A) of the rank of Judge (A), 
Chancellor (D) of the rank of Court Deputy (B), 
Chancellor (C) of the rank of Court Deputy (A), 
Chancellor (B) of the rank of Court President (B), 
Chancellor (A) of the rank of Court President (A), 
Assistant Deputy with the rank of Appeal Judge, 
Vice President with the rank of Appeal President. 
This post is the most senior post that may be held by a member of the Board. 23 The Act 
is clear about the rank of Deputy Chairman of the Board and the Chairman's 
23 Articles 2 and 3 of the 1982 Act. 
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recommendation for the post is restricted to those members who hold the rank of appeal 
judge: that is, the rank of Assistant Deputy. The qualifications required for the post of 
Deputy Chairman is not specified in the 1982 Act. It refers to the Judicature Act 1975, 
which sets out the qualifications which a person should possess for nomination to the 
post of appeal judge, or, in the case of the Board, to Assistant Deputy. A nominee either 
should have been a counsellor of least two years' standing, or have taught the subject of 
jurisprudence and its fundamentals at one of the Shari'a colleges in Saudi Arabia for at 
least eight years. 
The requirements have at least the advantage that the Chairman has not unlimited 
discretion in the selection of his Deputy. The post is also open to academics, who 
usually have the legal knowledge to deal with complex cases. However, the risk in 
appointing academics may lie in the fact that they usually lack experience of litigation 
and of Board procedures, since they will not have previously served on the Board or 
even within the hierarchy of Shari'a courts. A further requirement to be noted is that the 
post is restricted to those who are over forty years of age. However, the most important 
issue, which arises with the position of Deputy, concerns dismissal, and the grounds of 
dismissal. On what grounds can the Chairman of the Board recommend the dismissal of 
the Deputy to the King? The answer is unclear in the 1982 Act. 
There are two possible interpretations. Firstly, the grounds for dismissal of the other 
members could also apply to the Deputy. An argument in support is the fact that the 
post is on the same level as the other members of the Board. 24 The Deputy also 
performs judicial work, as do the other members. However, the procedure for dismissal 
of other Board members is by Royal Order on the recommendation of CAAMB. The 
24 Article 21. 
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Deputy Chairman is dismissed in accordance with a recommendation of the Chairman 
of the Board. Another interpretation is that the Deputy Chairman has a special position, 
different from other members of the Board. Article 3 of the 1982 Act confirms that 
status: "... the Deputy Chairman of the Board shall be appointed and their services 
terminated by Royal Order at the recommendation of the Chairman of the Board... " 
The Deputy's status is different therefore from other members in respect of his 
dismissal, and in addition there are no grounds laid out by the Act. The Chairman 
therefore may have an unfettered power to recommend the dismissal of the Deputy 
Chairman. It might be concluded therefore that the Deputy Chairman seems to be 
insecure and vulnerable as a result of the lack of clarity in the Act. That situation is not 
compatible with ensuring his independence in the exercise of his important functions. 
4.2.2.1 The functions of the Deputy Chairman 
The Deputy performs all the tasks that are vested in him by the Chairman of the Board. 
The Deputy also assumes all the functions of the Chairman, in the event of the latter's 
absence. Article 46 of the Act states that: 
The Vice President shall act instead of the President in case of his absence 
and shall assist him in the duties that he entrusts him with. 
In addition, according to Decision No. 12 of 1983 (1403) of the Chairman, the Deputy 
has the power to supervise the work of the various panels of the Board. He has the 
authority to follow up cases heard by the panels. The Deputy also has administrative 
and financial power in relation to the members of the Board who are subject to the 
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Judicature Act. 25 Moreover, the Deputy has the authority to examine any draft of 
legislation for regulations that affect the members or improvement in the work of the 
Board on the various panels; he then refers the result of the study to the Chairman. 26 
The Deputy has the duty to take necessary measures to improve the level of the 
members' knowledge and organise and supervise their training. The Deputy also has 
the task of examining and solving problems that might confront the members in their 
judicial work. He is also expected to suggest solutions to such problems and refer them 
to the Chairman. 27 
It seems that the Deputy is no less important than the Chairman. He has wide powers, 
but they are performed with the authority of the Chairman. Consequently, as already 
noted, to fulfil his duties properly, his independence should be secured by guaranteeing 
his tenure, by statute, for a definite period. It is submitted that once appointed, tenure 
should be subject to continuing capability and good behaviour. This function of removal 
on such grounds should be exercised by an independent committee of senior members 
drawn from the General Body of the Board. 
4.2.3 Assistant Deputies 
There are several Assistant Deputies whose qualifications are specified by Article 2 of 
the Act. They all are specialists in Shari'a law. Mechanisms for the appointment or 
retirement of the Assistant Deputies are not specifically stated in the Board of 
Grievances Act 1982 or in the Decision of the Chairman of the Board No. 12 of 1983, 
which was based on the 1982 Act and which determined inter alia the jurisdiction of the 
25 Article 12. 
26 See Article 17, and see Decision of the Chairman No. 12 of 1983 (1403). 27 Clause 4 of the Decision of the Chairman No. 12 of 1983 (1403), op. cit. 
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Deputies. It would seem that the Assistant Deputies are subject to the same methods of 
appointment, dismissal, or retirement as the judicial members of the Board. The powers 
and functions of an Assistant Deputy are not set out in either the 1982 Act or in the 
previously mentioned Decision. In practice, the Presidents of the three branches of the 
Board are selected from amongst the Assistant Deputies. The Assistant Deputies also 
preside over some of the panels of the Review Committee. 
4.2.4 The judicial members of the Board 
The 1982 Act concerning the Board of Grievances contains fifty-one articles, forty of 
which deal with the members. Six articles deal with other matters, such as the panels of 
the Board, the General Body, annual reports, and the date from which the Act was 
effective. Only four articles deal with the legal nature and jurisdiction of the Board. The 
appointment, qualifications, and training of the members and their removal or 
retirement, transfer, promotion, and discipline are discussed in this section. 
The above situation might suggest that the 1982 Act emphasises control of the 
members. However, it may also be interpreted to mean that the Act places more 
emphasis on the rules of promotion, transfer, retirement, resignation, and discipline in 
order that the rights and duties of the members are beyond dispute, thereby minimising 
any chance of misinterpretation or abuse of the power vis-ä-vis members. In addition, 
the members of the Board form the main body of the Board personnel and carry out its 
judicial functions. In all there are more than two hundred and fifty members on the 
different judicial panels of the Board. As provided in Article 12 of the 1982 Act, they 
have different ranks starting from Assistant Mulazim up to Deputy Chairman, the most 
senior rank. 
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The 1982 Act uses the word "member" literally, a term in Arabic and English which is 
confusing if it seems to distinguish one from others attached to the Board. Who is 
entitled to be called a member? "Members" are those who are appointed to carry out the 
judicial functions of the Board, who hear cases between litigants. The Chairman of the 
Board therefore, is not considered to be a `member' of the Board in the same sense, 
because he has special status on the Board. Equally, administrators and advisers (whose 
position is discussed below) are not members as such of the Board. All members are 
subject to the rules of appointment, promotion, retirement, discipline, transfer and 
assignment as stated by the 1982 Act. However, according to Article 12 of the Act, 
despite the fact that the Deputy Chairman is named as a member, he is not subject to 
these rules. Like the Chairman, he also has special status. 28 
4.2.4.1 Are the members of the Board judges? 
The 1982 Act refers to members of the Board as `counsellors' or Mustashar. 29 This title 
is unusual for describing the judiciary in Saudi Arabia and its use raises a question 
about the legal status of the members. Are they judges and if so why are they called 
counsellors? According to Al-Fozan (1982) and Shaibt Al-Hamd (1989), the title 
"counsellors" conforms to the trend which prevails in most countries where a system of 
administrative courts applies, and where the members of the Council of State are 
usually called "counsellor". These writers argue that the use of the term does not alter 
28 Ibid. 
29 Article 3 of the Act. 
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the legal status of the Board's members as judges. Their decisions are judicial and the 
characterisation of the person taking a judicial decision is that of judge. 30 
It may be agreed with this argument that the members of the Board are judges, but for 
different reasons. In the first place, the first Article of the Act establishing the Board 
calls it the administrative "judicial body". This means that the members of this body 
who perform its judicial functions are judges. Moreover, the appointment, retirement, 
duties, and rights set out in the Judicature Act for judges, also apply to the members of 
the Board. 31 Although it is usual to find the title of counsellor used in countries where a 
system of administrative courts operates, it should be applied to the members of the 
Saudi Board with caution for three important reasons. Firstly, the Board and the 
members not only adjudicate in administrative cases as do the Councils of State in other 
countries, but they also have a larger jurisdiction of a civil and even criminal character. 
Secondly, whereas the members of the Council of State in other countries are usually 
selected from the rank of civil servants, as in the case of the Conseil d'Etat in France32, 
the members of the Board are very different in that they have qualifications more or less 
similar to those of an ordinary judge. Finally, the role of the Council of State in other 
systems is not only judicial but also consultative as, for example, in Egypt and France. 33 
Referring to a member, therefore, as counsellor is simply an expression of their actual 
functions. 
The qualifications, as well as the functions laid down by law of the members of the 
Board are quite likely to place them as judges rather than counsellors. However the 
30 Article 12. 
31 Al-Fozan, op cit.; Shaibt Al- Hamd, op. cit. 
32 See Articles 16 and 17 of the 1982 Act. 
33 See N. Brown and J. Garner, French Administrative Law. (1998 ), pp. 50-52. 
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question still remains, why are they called counsellors? Pursuant to Article 12 of the 
Act a circular was issued by the Chairman of the Board instructing the members to refer 
to themselves as "counsellors", a name specially reserved for them, as the Chairman 
explained 
... 
due to technical considerations which strongly encourage the enriching of 
independent judgment "Ijtihad" based on consultation and for historical 
considerations which strengthens the call for the independence of adjudicating of 
grievances in its direct relation with the Custodian of two Holy Shrines [i. e. the 
King] and that nobody has right to intervene in the Judiciary... 34 
The authority for this name as stated in the circular, therefore, is derived from and 
invokes both the Judicature Act and the Board of Grievances Act, legislation which 
emphasise the independence of the judiciary and the Board. 
The circular however is not entirely convincing. It attributes the name to the need to 
strengthen the procedures involved in the taking of judicial decisions in the Board 
through consultation. This may be a reference to the fact that the decision of a panel of 
the Board, particularly one which is composed of more than the members, is usually 
taken after discussion and consultation between the panel's members. However, this 
also applies to ordinary judges. Decisions of the appellate court are taken by at least 
three judges depending on the type of case. 35 Moreover, first instance courts are formed 
34 Ibid, pp 42-43, and see Al-Tamawy, S., AI-Qada al-Idari: Qada al-Ilgha. 1996, pp. 155. 35 Circular No. 8 in 1989 (23/12/1409). The author was informed that the reason behind the above circular 
was the fact that some members used to sign their decision as "Judges". 
151 
Chapter Four The composition and structure of the Board 
by three judges in special cases. 36 Forming a court from more than one judge implies 
that discussion and consultation between its members is sought. Nevertheless, they are 
still called "judges". 
The circular refers to historical considerations that strengthen the independence of the 
Board of Grievances, but it does not actually elaborate on any of these considerations. 
In addition, it mentions independence as a factor in the choice of counsellor, yet it does 
not specify who the independence is from! However, it should be noted that the circular 
refers to the fact that in Islam the person who adjudicated grievances was the Caliph 
himself or was appointed by the Caliph and supervised by him. This office was later 
established parallel to and independent from the ordinary judges, to deal with cases 
involving powerful people; it was called the Wali Al-Madhalim (see Chapter Two). 
However, this historical background is not particularly helpful in explaining why the 
present members are called counsellor. The ordinary judges were appointed by the 
Caliph who also appointed the grievances officer. Additionally, although the person 
who adjudicated grievances was called the Wali Al-Madhalim, he was also explicitly 
called "Grievances Judge" by other authorities. 
It is submitted that one reason for calling the members of the Board "counsellor" is the 
result of the influence of other systems, such as the Council of State of France and the 
Council of State of Egypt, despite claims that there is no such influence at all. 37 A 
second explanation could be to mark their clear separation from the ordinary judges, 
despite the fact that they have similar privileges and duties and the members have more 
or less the same qualifications. It might be argued that under a separate name, those 
36 Article 13 of the Judicature Act 1975, 
37 Article 23. 
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who serve on the Board are more likely to be considered as a separate court, that is, an 
administrative court. 
4.2.4.2 Appointment of members 
The Board members should be selected from those who have relevant knowledge and 
experience in order to perform their duties properly and meet the expectations of the 
society they serve. Pannick (1987), in discussing the selection of judges, comments on 
the importance of their role in relation to the individual and society: 
Those who find it necessary to bring forward, or have brought forward against 
their will, the detritus of their lives for public examination and judgment in 
courts of law are entitled to be heard by judges who understand and reflect the 
values and concerns of contemporary society. That litigants do not invariably 
enjoy such benefit is not the fault of judges. It is the inevitable consequences of 
... 
[the] system of appointing and training the judiciary. 38 
According to the 1982 Act, the members of the Board shall be appointed in a similar 
manner to judges under, the Judicature Act, 1975. The appointment is by Royal Order, 
issued by the King and is based on a recommendation of the CAAMB. 39 The King may 
or may not approve the recommendation of the CAAMB. In this connection, the 
selection procedures of those recommended for consideration by the King is regulated 
by the 1982 Act and the Judicature Act, 1975. In the case of appointments to the rank of 
Assistant or Mulazem, the candidates are drawn from those who have graduated from 
38 Pannick, D., Judges. 1987, p. 49 
39 Interview with M. Al-Marsoqy, 21/1/2006, who participated in drawing up the draft of the Act of the 
Board. 
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one of the Shari'a colleges in Saudi Arabia. 40 In fact, appointees are employed on a one 
year probationary period. The appointee can either be confirmed in the post of assistant 
or removed by a decision of the CAAMB. 41 Moreover, appointments to the higher ranks 
of counsellors or Mustashar require candidates to meet additional criteria of experience 
and relevant qualifications. All appointees should be Saudi nationals, of good behaviour 
and conduct, and hold a degree from one of the Shari'a Colleges in Saudi Arabia. 
42 
Although Article 12 of the Board of Grievances Act, 1982 provides that the 
qualifications of a Board member are those prescribed for the equivalent ranks in the 
Judicature Act of 197543, the article also provides that various optional qualification 
requirements are necessary for promotion, such as a Master's degree or a Diploma in 
Law from the Institute of Public Administration (IPA). It is useful at this point to 
examine in more detail the question of qualification for the Board. 
The Board's members are designated from among those who graduate from the Shari'a 
Colleges. There are two main subjects of Islamic jurisprudence taught. These are the act 
of Worship, Ibadaat, such as prayer and fasting ordinances, and the rules of individuals' 
"mutual dealing", and Mua'amalat, which include rules of contract and sale, and such 
topics as criminology. 44 The Shari'a Colleges also teach the legislative sources of 
Shari'a such as the Quran, Sunnah, Ijma (consensus), and Qiyas (analogy). These 
40 See Article 17 of the 1982 Act; see also Article 53 of the Judicature Act of 1975. 
41 See Article 12 of the Act of the Board. 
42 Ibid., Article 14. 
43 See Article 11 of the 1982 Act. The Board shall satisfy the following: 
a) He shall be a Saudi national. b) He shall be of good conduct. c) He shall be fully competent to assume 
judicial work. d) He shall be a holder of a degree from one of the Shari'a Colleges in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. e) He shall not be less than twenty-two years of years. f) he shall be medically fit for the 
job. g) He shall not have been convicted of an offence under Shari'a Law or of a crime against honour 
and shall not have had a disciplinary decision passed against him dismissing him from a public position, 
even if he was rehabilitated. " 
44 See Article 13. 
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subjects are taught as the fundamentals of jurisprudence over a period of four years full- 
time study. Furthermore, is a qualification from a Shari'a College sufficient for the post 
of member of the Board? Some believe it is. 45 However, some lawyers and advisers 
believe that the syllabus and the length of time involved is insufficient to qualify a 
person to be appointed as a member. 46 Some critics go further and compare it 
unfavourably with the traditional method of study, whereby circles of people were 
taught in the mosques by scholars, and conclude that the modern method is not 
adequate. Such critics claim that the scholars would never have permitted their students 
to become teachers themselves, give legal opinions or judge between individuals unless 
they were positive that their students were fully competent to do so. 47 They argue for a 
much longer period of study, the length depending on the abilities of the student. 
Even if this opinion has merit, it is not easy to see how it could be implemented today. 
An alternative would be to insist on only graduates with the highest grades and to have 
an initial period of intensive training in the type of work they will be expected to carry 
out, before confirmation as a Board member. In practice, graduates of Shari'a Colleges, 
are appointed as Assistants or Mulazim, for one year as a minimum, and usually work as 
secretaries for one of the various panels of the Board. But a secretary does not 48 
undertake judicial work on the panel and this system of induction does not provide the 
experience necessary to take up a judicial post. More focused training is needed. 
Another shortcoming of this selection procedure is the fact that most graduates do not 
have an adequate knowledge of laws issued by the Council of Ministers, despite the 
requirement in Article 2 of the 1982 Act to be knowledgeable in this field. Mahassini 
45 Personal phone contact with Dr. Fahad Al-Hugbani 
46 Interviews with Dr. A. AI-Dhala'a, and N. Al-Wahaibi, 27/1/2006, members of the Board. Riyadh 
" Interviews 
48 Al-Munifi, and Mansoor, op. cit. 
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and Grenley (1987) reported that the Board tries to solve this problem by requiring that 
the new members "... take a six month course of study of Saudi Arabia's secular laws at 
the public Administrative Institute in Riyadh". 49 However, the writer has been given to 
understand in interviews with some members that study at the Institute is optional. 
It is suggested that the Shari'a Colleges should, in line with other colleges, teach the 
general principles of law, although not every aspect of law will be covered. At present, 
it is a fact that instruction does not include the teaching of laws enacted by the Council 
of Ministers. 
With regard to age, a person can be appointed to the Board at the age of twenty-two and 
pursue a probationary period for one year, following which he will be confirmed in the 
post at the age of twenty-three or four. The writer would submit that the evident lack of 
experience in the Board is due to the fact that the Board's members are relatively young 
and this applies not only to new members but also to those who occupy higher ranks. In 
practice, most of the members are in the age range between twenty-seven and forty-five 
years old. 5° 
The members who are appointed while still young lack not only the experience of 
judicial skills, law, and procedures, but also experience of life itself. This is important, 
bearing in mind that they will be dealing with the lives as well as the livelihoods of 
others. Saxe (1991), who is a Justice of the New York Supreme Court, believes that to 
be effective a judge 
49 Personal contacts. 
so Mahassni, H. & Grenley, N. "Public Sector Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia", International Lawyer. 
1997, pp. 835-836. 
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... requires an understanding of 
human nature and a motivation that is often the 
product of life's seasoning, and even some gray at the temples. 5' 
He emphasises that older judges are more likely than younger ones to have developed 
judicial experience and skills. 
The quality of work in the Board is directly affected by the shortcomings in the 
appointment procedures and in the qualifications of its members. Members need to gain 
more experience over a longer period of time than that prescribed by the 1982 Act 
before being considered for appointment. Before assuming the post on the Board they 
should have reached a certain age, which would indicate, among other things, that they 
have adequate experience. Members would thereby avoid gaining experience at the 
expense of the community. 
4.2.4.3 Training 
Training is very important, as it is the process whereby judicial or procedural skills that 
are lacking may be acquired from specialists. As judges, members of the Board in 
particular deal with the lives and livelihood of the people and, above all, with a 
powerful party, the administration. They should therefore be able to demonstrate at the 
very least the minimum standard of an ordinary judge. Jerome Frank (1973), 
commented that a man would not be allowed, 
51 The author has actually met at least fifteen members whose ages range from twenty seven to forty five, 
and at least five of them are in their late twenties or early thirties 
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... to perform a surgical operation without a thorough training and certification of 
fitness. Why not require as much of a trial judge who daily operates on the lives 
and fortunes of others? 52 
It is clear from what has been said that members of the Board, and new appointees in 
particular, require training. In the first place, as they are not qualified in the current 
regulations promulgated by the Council of Ministers, they should have intensive 
training in those regulations. A practitioner, when interviewed, related an incident in 
which the parties to the case asked the member in charge to refer the case to arbitration. 
The member ended the hearing and closed the case, stating he was referring it to an 
arbitrator, whereas he should properly have referred it while keeping the case open until 
agreement was reached between the parties on arbitration. At which point the member 
would then have approved settlement. When the lawyer drew the attention of the 
member of the Board to this point, the latter had to look up the procedures in a copy of 
the Act of Arbitration. 53 It would appear that some members have never, in fact, 
exercised any sort of administrative, commercial, or criminal jurisdiction. Members 
should be fully conversant with all aspects of their work. 
Training is also needed in procedures and in the conduct of cases. Thus, the rules make 
it clear that the Board sits in public, but one member, when asked, stated that it was 
unnecessary to sit in open court and he would not allow members of public to attend a 
hearing. 54 
52 See Saxe, D. "Selecting younger Judges -a critique" American Bar Association Journal. Nov. 1991, 
3pp. 
66-67. 
See Frank. J Courts on trial, (1973), p. 251, cited in Pannick, op. cit, pp. 70-71. 
54 Interview with Munifi op. cit. 
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Responsibility for the supervision and control of training in the Board rests with the 
Deputy Chairman. 55 The Board has enabled the members to attend either the public 
Administration Institute or the high Institute of Judiciary. 56 The former awards a 
Diploma in Law after two years study, and the latter awards a Shari'a Masters degree in 
different subjects, one of which is Comparative Jurisprudence. However, the members 
are not obliged to attend such courses; they may attend if they wish. In other words, 
neither the 1982 Act nor any subsequent internal decision of the Chairman of the Board 
makes these courses obligatory. 
Training is important not only for the new appointee but also for other members. The 
Board deals with many different cases57 which require not only knowledge but skilful 
handling. Members need practical training, that is, training in the actual work of the 
Board. For example, they should be fully familiar with the nature of government 
administration and the problems that face it in a modern state. They should have a clear 
sense of their role as being that of administrative judges in administrative courts. In 
France, for example the Conseil D'Etat draws its members from those with civil service 
experience of the administrative problems on which they adjudicate. 58 
It is submitted that a degree from the Institute of Public Administration or the High 
Institute of Judiciary should be a required qualification for membership of the Board. 
Secondly, for the reasons outlined above, training should be properly organised to meet 
the growing importance of the Board in Saudi society. Regardless of seniority, training 
should cover all members, either by seminar and lecture, or by sending them to 
55 Conversation with a member of the Board. 
56 See Decision of the Board No. 12 in 1983 (17/8/1403). 
57 Based on an interview with Dr. Fahad AI-Huqbani 
58 For example, in 1989 5,836 cases were registered. 
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universities to familiarise themselves with new legal problems, actual techniques of 
hearing and deciding cases, and the continuous development of laws, particularly in the 
field of administrative law. 
4.2.4.4 The dismissal of Members 
Security of tenure and immunity from dismissal are important to the Board as a whole, 
as well as to its judicial members. It guarantees independence in order that the member 
can concentrate on deciding cases freely and fairly without fear of dismissal. 
The Board of Grievances members, with the exception of the assistant Mulazim, are not 
subject to dismissal. They are subject to retirement when they reach seventy years of 
age or if a member lose the trust and credibility essential to his position. Article 15 
provides: 
Except for the Trainee Mulazim, a Board Member may not be dismissed but 
must be retired upon reaching the age of seventy. However, should a member 
lose confidence and respect required for the post, he shall be retired by 
Royal Order based on a recommendation by the Administrative Affairs 
Committee for Board Members. 
From the above, it can be deduced that dismissal is not actually offered as a means of 
terminating a judge's service. In certain circumstances he could be forced to retire; this 
is explained further below. Other than death or retirement "... by the reason of attaining 
the age specified in the law... ", a member of the Board can be placed on pension by 
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Royal Order issued by the King and based on a recommendation by the CAAMB. 59 The 
recommendation of the CAAMB must in turn be based on grounds specified in the Act. 
Article 42 sets out these grounds: 
1. Acceptance of resignation. 
2. Acceptance of retirement when the member asks for retirement before the age of 
seventy. 
3. During the period of probation, when a member's service can be terminated by a 
decision of CAAMB. It should be noted here that this is a special case where the 
"member" is under probation and not a full member of the Board. 
4. When a member loses the "... trust and esteem required by his position... " 
5. Medical reasons, where the member cannot perform his duties properly. 
6. When a member obtains less than "below average" in the report on efficiency 
on three consecutive occasions. 
7. Where a member is convicted of a disciplinary offence where the punishment is 
to put him on pension by Royal Order. 60 
Article 43 of the 1982 Act reads 
Except for the two cases of death and reaching retirement age, the services 
of a Board member shall terminate by Royal Order, based on a 
recommendation by the Administrative Affairs Committee of Board Members 
59 Inspection in respect of the activities of the members of the Board will be conducted by the President of 
the Board delegating one or more members to conduct the inspection. (Article 22). Article 37 provides 
that a disciplinary committee is to decide in disciplinary actions filed against a member of the Board. 
60 See Article 43. 
161 
Chapter Four The composition and structure of the Board 
This article is misinterpreted by Sfeir (1989) when he states that the CAAMB 
"... could... recommend to the king the termination of the appointment of a member for 
no reason. , 61 
What this article appears intended to do is to emphasise the procedure and instruments 
for the termination of a member's service. This means that, apart from death or 
reaching the age of seventy where, in both cases the termination of the service of the 
member is automatic insofar as it does not need an official instrument to enforce it, the 
service of the member of the Board will be terminated by a Royal Order based on 
advice of the CAAMB, if and only if one of the reasons specified in Article 42 exists. 
Article 42 state: 
Services of a Board Member shall terminate for one of the following reasons: 
(a) Acceptance of resignation. 
(b) Acceptance of his request for retirement in accordance with the Retirement Law. 
(c) Reasons provided for in Articles 14,15,21, and 26. 
(d) Death. 
This Article therefore concerns the agency which has the power to recommend 
termination of appointment. It is not a new open clause allowing dismissal as Sfeir 
suggests. It is not known if anyone has had an appointment terminated. 
4.2.4.5 Discipline 
Just as the member has guarantees which ensure his independence, he should also be 
supervised in order to protect individuals as well the community from injudicious 
61 See Article 40. 
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conduct. As noted earlier, the Board of Grievances Act 1982 requires Board members 
to be of good conduct and behaviour. 62 At the same time the Act states that the member 
is subject to disciplinary supervision in the exercise of his duties and functions. 63 
However, the 1982 Act does guarantee the member's independence by selecting the 
Disciplinary Committee members from within the rank of the members themselves, and 
from the members of the CAAMB in particular. The Disciplinary Committee is formed 
by a decision of the Chairman of the Board. 64 It consists of five members and is 
presided over by the member with the highest rank. If they are all of the same rank, the 
seniority will be decided when considering the selection of the presiding member. 65 
Disciplinary action against a member may be brought by the Chairman of the Board 
either on his own initiative or in accordance with a recommendation from the President 
of the panel to which the member belongs. 66 However, such action should only be 
based on, and taken after, an investigation. 67 The accused member has the right to 
defend himself or be defended by his lawyer before the Disciplinary Committee. 68 If the 
accused member resigns, the disciplinary action will cease, but his resignation will have 
no effect on possible criminal or civil proceedings arising out of the facts of a 
disciplinary investigation or hearing. 
62 Sfer, G. N., "An Islamic Conseil D'Etat: Saudi Arabia's Board of Grievances", Arab Law Quarterly. 
Vol. 4, part 2 (1989), p. 134. 
63 Article 11. 
64 See Articles 29-40. 
65 See Article 30. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Article 31. 
61 Ibid. 
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4.2.5 The advisers 
There is no direct reference to advisers in the Act, but Article 2 refers to "technical 
staff': "... there shall be seconded to [the Board] a sufficient number of technical, 
administrative and other staff. "69 
In practice, all the advisers are foreigners recruited from other Arab countries, 
principally Egypt. 70 They are specialists in administrative law drawn from the members 
of the Council of State in Egypt. Although they are judges in their own country, they do 
not act as judges on the Board 71 and therefore do not usually participate in hearing or 
deciding cases. Instead, they assist the member who has charge of the hearing. 
The main function of the advisers is to give a legal opinion on questions of law. They 
usually present their opinion and refer it to the panel concerned. 72 Moreover, they can 
state their legal opinions in cases or other legal questions referred to them by the 
Deputy Chairman of the Board. 73 Their opinions, however, are not binding, but 
consultative, in that the panel concerned may not implement them. 74 
In the light of the previous discussion on the qualifications and experience of 
membership of the Board, the importance of the advisers can be readily understood. 
Mahassni and Grenley, writing in 1987, anticipated that the role of the Advisers would 
become less important over time: 
69 Article 34,37. 
70 See Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., p. 802. 
71 Mahassini, op. cit., p. 836. 
72 Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit, p. 802. 
73 Conversation with members of the Board 
74 Ibid. 
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... some of the panels still 
have foreign legal advisers ... attached to them as 
advisers and consultant, but not judges. As Saudi judges, with time, become more 
versed in their responsibilities, we expect the role of their remaining legal advisers 
to decrease. 
In practice, however, as confirmed by the writer's personal observation, the advisers 
continue to have an important role in the functioning of the Board. 75 They not only 
provide legal opinions but sometimes prepare the draft of decisions as well. In addition, 
they participate in preparing drafts of regulations delegated to the Chairman under the 
1982 Act or the Rules of Proceeding and procedures of 1989. 
4.3 The structure of the Board 
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 earlier provided a picture of the main personnel and the internal 
organisation of the Board of Grievances. As set out in Figure 4-1, the Board consists of 
general and subsidiary panels, as well as a Review Committee. In addition, there are 
two bodies, one of which, CAAMB, deals with members' affairs, such as appointment 
and removal, and includes the Disciplinary Committee; the other is the General Body of 
the Board. 
By way of introduction to a discussion of the structure, it is useful to mention briefly 
certain other institutions, which are similar to the Board. The French Council of State, 
the Conseil d'Etat, for example, is an administrative court, with consultative and 
75 Ibid. 
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judicial functions reflected in its internal structure. 76 As a result, it is divided into two 
departments, consultative (including the role of advising on legislation) and judicial. 
The Egyptian institution, Majlis Al-Dawlah, has the same functions as the French 
Council of State. Its internal organisation, however, is divided into three departments: 
consultative, legislative, and judicial. 77 
In contrast, the Board of Grievances has judicial functions only. The first article of the 
1982 Act reads "... the Board of Grievances is an independent administrative judicial 
body... 1178 It should be understood here that the terms administrative and judicial do not 
mean that the Board takes decisions in accordance with administrative policy and not 
according to the law. 79 It means that the Board's jurisdiction is administrative in that it 
deals with administrative cases brought by individuals, to which government, and the 
administration, is a party. Its jurisdiction is judicial, in that it deals with these cases in a 
judicial manner. 80 
There are other departments of the Board of an administrative character, which together 
help the judicial section to perform its duties and carry out its objectives, i. e. support 
services. These services include the financial and communications departments, 
secretarial and library sections. This chapter is concerned with the judicial activities of 
the Board only. 
76 M. R. Al-Helw, "Al-Qada a1-Idari' 1985, pp. 121-163. 77 N. Brown, and J. Garner, "French Administrative Law". 1983. pp. 42-56. 
78 Article I of the 1982 Act 
79 M. R. Al-Helw, op. cit. 
80 W. Wade, "Administrative Law". Oxford: Clarendon Press, 6`h ed. 1988. pp. 46. 
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4.3.1 The Committee of Administrative Affairs of the Members of the Board: 
(CAAMB) 
The CAAMB is composed of the President, who is the Chairman of the Board, or his 
representative, and six members whose ranks should not be below that of counsellor 
(b). 8' The Act does not specify a method for selection; this is left to the discretionary 
power of the Chairman of the Board. The CAAMB has authority over the members of 
the Board similar to the power of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) over the ordinary 
judges. 82 
4.3.1.1 The powers of the CAAMB 
The Board of Grievances Act grants the CAAMB wide powers. The Committee has a 
general power to make recommendations to the King through the Chairman of the 
Board regarding appointments and retirements of members. 
83 It has the power to 
appoint, promote, transfer, assign, lend, and recommend the dismissal of any members 
in accordance with prescribed rules. 84 
The CAAMB also has the power to hear complaints from any member who receives an 
adverse assessment in the annual assessment conducted by the Board, "... in which his 
81 Article 4 of the Board of Grievances Act (1982). According to the 1982 Act the members of the Board 
are ranked from Assistant through Counsellor a, b, c, d up to Deputy Chairman. 
82 Ibid 
83 The SJC has five full-time members who have the rank of President of Appeal Courts. These five form 
the permanent Board of the SIC. In addition to these members, there is a member whose rank is also that 
of a President of Appeal Court or his deputy, three members whose rank is that of President of Courts (a) 
who are chosen on the basis of seniority, and the Deputy Ministers of the Justice Ministry. See Judicature 
Act, Article 6 
84 See for example Article 14 and 7. 
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efficiency was entered as below average... " In this instance, the decision of the 
85 CAAMB is considered to be final. 
The Disciplinary Committee is composed of members of the CAAMB. 86 Moreover, in 
the event of a member of the Board being caught red-handed in a criminal offence and 
held in custody, the CAAMB has to be informed within twenty-four hours. It will then 
decide on either "... a continuation of remaining in custody or freedom on bail or 
without bail. "87 With this exception, it is not permitted to arrest a member even if he is 
suspected of a crime, nor is it permitted to investigate him or bring a criminal action 
against him without the permission of CAAMB. 88 This power represents a guarantee of 
independence for members of the Board. Article 41 of the Board of Grievances Act 
1982, in which these provisions are set out, follows the language of the Judicature Act 
1975, Article 84, which vests a similar power in the Supreme Judicial Council. The 
decisions of CAAMB are taken "... by absolute majority of its members. " 
Given the considerable power over the career of panel members, it is submitted that 
there ought to be clearer criteria for the selection of this body's members. There ought 
also to be a requirement for a higher minimum qualification than that of the lower rank 
of counsellor in the hierarchy of members of the Board. However, at present, 
membership and duration of membership are entirely at the discretion of the Chairman 
of the Board. 
85 See Articles 15,17 and 19 of the Board of Grievances Act. 
86 [bid, Article 25. There is an annual assessment to assess the work of the members of the Board. Grades 
are awarded which range from Competent to Weak. 
87 Ibid, Article 30. 
88 Article 41. 
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4.3.2 The General Body 
According to Article 7 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982, there will be a general 
body consisting of the Chairman of the Board and all the Board's members. The 
jurisdiction or functions of this body are not determined in the 1982 Act. Article 7 
invests the authority to determine the jurisdiction and procedure of this body in the 
Council of Ministers. According to a member of the Board, the General Body has a 
power to examine and discuss collectively problems that may face the Board's members 
in practice. 89 
4.3.3 The Board panels. 
The Board's judicial functions are carried out through a number of panels, reflecting the 
different types of jurisdiction given to the institution. 90 
The basic division is into a general and subsidiary panel. Within the division of the 
general panel, there are further divisions; thus, the general panels are administrative, 
commercial, penal, and disciplinary. Each is composed of a president, two members and 
a secretary, as well as a member from another panel who serves as a substitute in the 
absence of one of the main members. 91 In practice, the selection of the president of a 
s9 Ibid. 
90 M. Shaibt Al-Hamd, "Al-Wilaya al-qadaiya Ii Diwan al-Madhalimfil Mamlakah al-A 'arbiah al- 
Sa'udiah". 1989, Ph. D dissertation, pp. 805-806. 
91 See Article 6 of the 1982 Act. Some decisions have been issued by the Chairman of the Board 
concerning the formation of these panels. The most important was Decision No. 1I of 1986 (1406) on the 
organisation of the panels. 
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panel depends on seniority among panel members. The panel adjudicates and decides 
cases referred to it by the Chairman of the Board. 
There are forty subsidiary panels of the Board located at its headquarters and its 
branches. 92 Each is composed of a single judge. The jurisdiction of the subsidiary 
panels is briefly discussed below. 
The general and subsidiary panels can be considered equivalent to courts of first 
instance. Their decisions are subject to appeal within a specific period to a Review 
Committee. The authority to form panels and their work, number, and territorial 
jurisdiction is vested by the 1982 Act in the Chairman of the Board. 93 Some relevant 
decisions issued by the Chairman of the Board on this matter of the panels are discussed 
below. 94 
4.3.3.1 General panels 
According to the Chairman's Decision No. 2 of 1983 (1403) and No 11 of 1986 (1406) 
the administrative panels are vested with the power to try and decide cases where the 
government and its agencies, including public corporations, are a party. 95 Thus, the 
administrative panels have the power to try cases in which an administrative decision is 
challenged, or cases in which an indemnity or compensation is sought arising from 
92 See Decision No. 11 of 1986 (1406), Clause 3. 
93 See Decision No. 12 of 1406 (1986) Clause 5. 
94 See M. Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., pp. 851. 
95 See Decision No. 2,3,18 of 1983 (1403) and No. 6 of 1988 (1408). 
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alleged government responsibility for breaching of contracts or fault, by aggrieved 
96 individuals or parties of contracts. 
With respect to disciplinary panels, Clause 1(e) of Article 8 is the source of the 
jurisdiction of these panels. The Decision of the Board of Grievances No. 3, of 1983 
(1403), provides that the disciplinary panels have the authority to try and decide cases 
that are brought before the Board by the Board of Control and Investigating (BCI) 
against officials of government departments or general corporate bodies which concern 
allegations of violations of financial or administrative regulations. Disciplinary panels 
are also concerned with cases brought by officials challenging disciplinary actions taken 
by a department against them. 
Penal panels' jurisdiction is governed by Clause 1(f) of Article 8 of the Board of 
Grievances Act 1982 and by Decision No. 4 of 1983 (1403) of the Chairman. The penal 
panels have the power to try bribery and forgery cases and, in addition, accusations of 
infringement of the Public Funds Act of 1975. The penal panels have the power to try 
cases which the President of the Council of Ministers, the King, directs the Board to 
try. 97 
Commercial panels have been formed recently in accordance with Council of Ministers' 
Decision No. 241 of 1987 (26/10/f1407) which transfers the jurisdictions of the 
Commercial Dispute Adjudicating Board to the Board of Grievances. 98 As a result, the 
96 In terms of the 1982 Act these panels are concerned therefore with the application of Clauses 1(a), 1(b), 
1(c), and 1(d) of Article 8 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. 
97 See Clauses 1(b) and 1(c) Article 8 of 1982 Act. 
98 See Clause 1(0, Article 8. 
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commercial panels have a general jurisdiction over all commercial disputes, such as 
disputes between companies and disputes between traders. 
4.3.3.2 Subsidiary panels 
The work of the forty subsidiary panels of the Board concerns the following types of 
grievances: 
a) Disputes relating to the rights of government officials and employees and the 
staff of independent public corporate agencies, or their heirs, as prescribed by 
the Civil Service and Retirement Acts. 99 This jurisdiction is also shared with the 
administrative and disciplinary panels. 
b) Enforcement of foreign judgments. 
c) Cases where the aggrieved person has failed to apply within the prescribed time 
over financial rights, but claims a reasonable excuse. 100 
d) Cases which the Chairman of the Board determines are minor matters. 101 
In this brief review of the jurisdiction of the subsidiary panels, two points may be made. 
Firstly, the subsidiary panels are in fact often concerned with administrative cases, that 
is, cases in which the government is a party. These arise, for example, in complaints 
concerning civil servants and cases where the plaintiff wishes to make a claim after the 
expiry of the limitation period. In practice, all minor administrative cases, even if they 
do not relate to what is prescribed in Clause 1(a) of Article 8 of the 1982 Act, are 
99 The Commercial Disputes Adjudicating Board was dissolved by the Royal Decree No. 63 of 1987. 
i°° See Clause 1(a) Article 8, of 1982 Act. 
101 See Decision of the Chairman of the Board No. 18 of 1983 (1403), Article 2, Clause a. 
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usually referred to these panels102. Since 1987 (1407), when jurisdiction over 
commercial cases was vested in the Board, the less important commercial cases have 
also been referred to subsidiary panels. 103 It should be noted that all the previous panels, 
regardless of type, serve as courts of first instance in the Shari'a courts. In other words, 
their decisions are subject to appeal within a specific period. 
4.3.3.3 Appeals: the Review Committee 
When a case is decided by one of the panels discussed above, it will be referred to the 
Chairman of the Board who, acting in accordance with the request of one of the parties 
or according to the Rules concerned' 04, will refer the case to the Review Committee. 
The decision of this Committee on any appeal is final. The Review Committee is 
situated in the Board headquarters in Riyadh. 
The Review Committee was not established under the 1982 Act. It was created by a 
decision of the Chairman of the Board of Grievances in accordance with Article 6 of the 
1982 Act105. The Review Committee consists of four panels, 106 each of which has 
different jurisdiction to review a certain type of case. 
According to the Chairman's Decision no. 11 of 1406, each of the Review Committee 
panels consists of a president, two members and a secretary. The rank of a member 
should not be less than that of counsellor or Mustashar. 
102See Clause 4, Decision of the Chairman No 11 of 1406. 
10s Personal contact with Dr. Fahad. 
304 Decisions No. 12 of 1988 and No. 6 of 1988 issued by the Chairman of the Board, which deal with the 
procedures before the commercial panels, indicate that the subsidiary panels may try and decide 
commercial cases. 
105 There are more details in a later chapter. 
1116 See Decision No. (8) of 1983 (1403) of the Chairman of the Board of Grievances. 
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The Review Committee has the power to review decisions of the general and subsidiary 
panel. It resembles, more or less, the Appeal Court in the ordinary judicial system. 107 
However a position in the Review Committee requires fewer qualifications than a post 
in the Appeal Court. Appointments in the latter are open to candidates of not less than 
forty years of age. The person appointed as an appeal judge should either have spent 
two years in the post of a President of Court (A) or have had eighteen years experience 
in a similar judicial post or eight years teaching Islamic jurisprudence and its 
fundamentals in one of the Shari'a colleges in Saudi Arabia. 108 In contrast, the 
minimum qualification for the Review Committee is the lowest level of counsellor, 
counsellor (d). 
The powers of the Review Committee are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This examination of the composition and structure of the Board has revealed some 
shortcomings. Reforms are needed in order to improve the work of the Board in relation 
to the procedures of appointment, qualifications, removal, and the training of its judicial 
personnel. 
Members of the Board need to be competent as well as independent. The Board's 
judicial personnel for all posts are recruited from among those who graduated from the 
Shari'a colleges. The argument was made that such education on its own leads to 
107 The first two panels were created in 1983 (1403) by the Chairman's Decisions No 9 of 1983 (1403). 
The third was established in 1985 (1406) by the Board's Chairman's Decision No 12 of 1985 (1406). The 
fourth panel was created to review commercial cases, in 1988(1408) by the Chairman's Decision No. 6 of 
1988 (1408). 
108 See Clause (e), Article 37 of Judicature Act 1975. 
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shortcomings. Most Board members do not have an adequate knowledge of laws and 
regulations made by the Council of Ministers. Moreover, new appointees are young and 
lack experience and judicial skills. Training of members should be a priority but the 
Board is not properly organised to provide a programme of training. 
This chapter has also discussed the status of the Board members as administrative 
judicial officers. It has been argued that although not designated `judges' and although 
the title `members' is unsatisfactory, the Board members are nevertheless to be regarded 
as judges on an equal footing with the judges of the Shari'a courts. 
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THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE BOARD OF GRIEVANCES 
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5.1 Introduction 
The development of the Board of Grievances from its establishment to its modern basis 
in the Board of Grievances Act 1982 was examined in Chapter 3. Over time, the 
jurisdiction of the Board underwent a number of significant changes and was vested 
with various new powers. These included penal jurisdiction in cases such as forgery and 
bribery, the enforcement of foreign judgments, and an administrative jurisdiction, in 
cases in which judicial review of administrative actions and the redress of grievances 
against the administration were sought: However, as noted in Chapter 3, with few 
exceptions, the Board's decisions were not final. 
The Board of Grievances Act 1982 consolidated these developments. The Act describes 
the Board as a judicial body. Article 8 lays down the Board's competence. Some areas 
of jurisdiction were completely new, others were taken from the Board and vested in 
other institutions, an example being its investigative powers, which were vested by the 
Act in the Control and Investigating Board. However, in general terms, the present 
jurisdiction of the Board is no more than a reorganization of the Board's pre-1982 
powers. As noted in Chapter 3, the present outline of the Board's competence first 
appeared in a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers, which had contemplated the 
dissolution of the Board of Grievances and its replacement with a Council of 
Grievances. ' 
See the Council of Ministers Decision No. 8 of 1967 (1387 AH). See also Chapter 4. 
177 
Chapter Five The Grievance Board's Jurisdiction 
This chapter aims to throw light on the areas of jurisdiction prescribed by the Board of 
Grievances Act, in order to define the tasks and role of the Board, and also to answer 
the following questions: 
a) What sort of role does the Board have in protecting aggrieved individuals and 
the public interest from abuse by the administration? 
b) When can the Board intervene to control the administration? 
c) On what grounds can such intervention take place? 
d) What restrictions are there on the Board's powers that could affect its 
efficiency? 
e) What is the effect of the legal environment on the jurisdiction of the Board 
and how does the Board deal with new and important issues such as sovereign 
acts, with which the legal environment is not familiar? 
In short, this section deals with the power of the Board, when it can intervene and 
exercise its power, and when it must refrain. 
The Board of Grievances has six main functions: 
1. Dealing with administrative cases 
2. Dealing with penal cases 
3. Dealing with disciplinary cases. 
4. Enforcement of foreign judgments. 
5. Dealing with cases referred to it under special laws and regulations. 
6. Dealing with cases referred to it by the Council of Ministers. 2 
2 See the Board of Grievances Act 1982 (1402 AH), Article 8. 
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5.2 Administrative cases 
Administrative cases are those cases "... where one of the administrative bodies is a 
party... " 3 The Board of Grievances, according to Article 8 of the Act, has general 
jurisdiction over every case to which the administration is a party, except those cases 
which are exempt from its authority as stated in Article 9 (discussed later). According to 
Article 8, clauses 1 (a), 1 (c), 1 (d), and 1 (e), the power of the Board over 
administrative cases includes hearing claims from civil servants, power to annul and 
indemnify, power to hear disputes arising from administrative contracts, and the power 
to hear disciplinary cases. The Board's authority is clarified in the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Act, which states: 
... the jurisdiction enunciated by the Act is so comprehensive that the 
Board has attained a general jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes to which 
the administration is a party, whether such disputes arise out of a 
resolution, a contract or an event.... 
The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to add that: 
... the general nature of the provision relating to the jurisdiction of the 
Board over the adjudication of administrative disputes is not limited 
except by the meaning of Article 9 of the Act, namely the impermissibility 
of adjudicating applications relating to questions of sovereignty or the 
3 See case No. 429/1/Q of 1981, (1401 AH) decision No. 28/86 of 1981 (1401 AH), case No. 2/1/Q of 
1981 (1401 AH) decision No. 4/86 of 1981 (1401 AH) and see also case No. 1274/1/Q of 1990 (1410 
AH), decision No 121/D/TJ/3 of 1990 (1410 AH). 
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decrees or judgments passed by Shari'a' Courts with regards to matters 
falling within their jurisdiction. 
However, contrary to the Act and the Explanatory Memorandum, there are other types 
of case, not mentioned in the Act, that are beyond the Board's authority. These are 
examined below. 
5.2.1 Government employees' claims 
According to Clause 1 (a), the Board has the power to hear cases against the 
Government or against any public corporation wherein the subject matter relates to the 
rights of government or to any public corporation employees prescribed under the Civil 
Service and Retirement Acts: 
1. The Board of Grievances shall have jurisdiction to decide the following: 
(a) Cases related to the rights provided for in the Civil Service and 
Pension Laws for government employees and hired hands, and 
independent public entities and their heirs and claimants. 4 
It is clear from the Act that only those claims and rights that are prescribed under the 
Civil Service and Retirement Acts come within the ambit of the Board. However, this 
raises questions on two important points. Firstly, the Act does not mention claims that 
may be brought before the Board by people working under contract for the government 
° Article 8 of the Act 
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or public corporations. Secondly, the Act does not mention members of the military, the 
police, or other individuals who come within the same category. 
5 
With reference to contractual claims by employees, although these employees are bound 
by contract, unlike other employees whose relationship with the government is 
governed by civil service regulations, their rights are protected under Article 8, clause 1 
(d) of the Board of Grievances Act which refers to: 
(d) Cases filed by parties concerned regarding contract-related 
disputes where the government or an independent public corporate 
entity is a party thereto. 
With reference to the military and others, note that clause 1 (a) of Article 8 of the Act, 
confers upon the Board exclusive and specific jurisdiction. It states "The Board of 
Grievances shall have jurisdiction to decide the following: ... " This 
interpretation is 
reflected in the practice of the Board, in that the Board cannot intervene to try disputes 
other than those it has been explicitly empowered to try. As a result, it would appear 
that as the Act does not clearly mention the members of the military forces, or police 
and security forces, cases involving them cannot be brought before the Board. In reality, 
however, the Board does hear cases involving such claims6 by employees against their 
departments. The number registered with the Board rose from 2,068 in 1989/1990 (1410 
AH), which is far in excess of the total of 901 for all other administrative cases 
registered in the same year. 7 The hearing of cases involving claims against the military, 
the police or the security authorities has been justified by a member of the Review 
s See I. Al-Juhani, "Al-Qada A1-Idart" Alryadh, 1984, p. 123. 
6 See for example, case No. 799/l/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), decision No. 99/T/3 1988 (1408 AH). 
See Appendix 
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Committee of the board who has pointed out that there is no other judicial channel open 
to aggrieved individuals to appeal against violations of their rights by these 
departments. 8 This practice confirms that the Board will extend its power to include 
issues outside its formal remit whenever the need arises. 
There is a lack of clarity and precision in the 1982 Act with regard to jurisdiction over 
certain categories of cases. The Board's interpretation of its jurisdiction to hear cases 
involving rights prescribed under the Civil Service and Retirement Acts is such that 
even the military and police and security members are entitled to bring their grievances 
against their respective departments, particularly where pension claims are concerned. 
The Government would appear to have sanctioned this interpretation by the Board. 
9 
Claims made by government employees involve financial rights such as salary, 
allowances, rewards and pensions. 1° Such claims are subject to prescription. An 
individual cannot generally claim his salary if he does not do so within five years of the 
date of payment. " In cases where there is a legitimate excuse, he may bring the case 
before the Board to prove the excuse that has prevented him from making his rightful 
claim in time from the department concerned. 12 The number of such cases brought 
before the Board has been quite high. From 1985/1986 (1406 AH) to 1989/1990 (1410 
AH), 1,094 cases were registered with the Board. The Rules of Procedures and 
S A. N. A1-Sheail, "The law and practice of the Grievance Board in the Islamic judiciary system of Saudi 
Arabia" LLM dissertation, Warwick University, 1994, pp. 30-39. 
9 The government implements the decisions of the Board concerning the pension cases of the military, 
Police, and security members. 
° See M. Shibat Al-Hamd, "Al-Wilaya al-Qadaiyah Ii Diwan al-Madhalim fi Al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah 
al-Sa'udiah" Ph. D dissertation, 1989, pp. 606-608. 
" The Rules of Procedures and Proceeding before the Board of Grievances (1989), Article 2. 
12 See the Council of Minister Decision No. 990 of 1973 (1396 AH). This Decision is still in force. 
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Proceedings, introduced in 1989, have changed the period of prescription, and there 
ought to be no more cases of this type in the coming years. 13 
YEAR CASES 
1985/1986 (1406 AH) 243 
1986/1987 (1407 AH) 296 
1987/1988 (1408 AH) 213 
1988/1989 1409 AH) 303 
1989/1990 (1410 AH) 41 
Claims by government employees 
Source: "Case Records" 
Other types of claim made by government employees concern promotion, holidays, and 
appointments. The aggrieved person or persons may, for example, challenge a decision 
to promote someone if it creates any distinction between individuals of equal status who 
are thought to be equally deserving of promotion. '4 
This power of the Board resembles the powers of the Madhalim Judge in Islam. The 
Madhalim Judge had the power to hear grievances from government officials regarding 
13 For an example see case No. 1057/l/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), Decision No. 133/T/I of 1985 (1405 AH) 
where the complainant stated that he could not claim his salary from the department concerned because 
he was abroad. The Board decided that this was a legitimate reason. 
14 See F. Al-Dughaither, "Durusfi al-Qada al-Idari al-Sa'udi". Unpublished papers (No date), pp. 112- 
113. 
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their financial rights. The Board of Grievances, however, goes beyond financial matters 
to include issues concerning holidays, appointments, and promotions. 15 
The Board provides judicial protection for government personnel. It has the power to 
hear cases brought by aggrieved persons against their government departments, to 
establish whether the latter have in fact acted in accordance with the law, and the power 
to establish whether the persons making the claim have in fact had rights violated and 
have a valid claim. Hence the power of the Board does not stop at deciding whether the 
decision under challenge is null and void, but goes further to determine whether the 
aggrieved official is entitled, in the first place, to the right under the law and whether or 
not there has been failure on the part of the administration to observe this right. The 
Board performs a double role in respect of this jurisdiction. Firstly, it has the power of 
annulment and secondly, power to restore the aggrieved official's rights once it is 
established that such rights exist in law. 16 
5.2.2 Power to annul 
The Government, including ministries, public corporations and its administrative 
agencies have at their disposal "special instruments", not available to the public, for 
carrying out their duties in the public interest. The Government may, for instance, issue 
unilateral decisions in the course of its administrative activities without the previous 
consent of the citizen. These decisions are enforceable and applicable to all 
15 For more information see M. Y. Guraya, "Judicial System under the Holy Prophet and the first two 
pious Caliphas", Lahore, 1982, p. 119. And see A. Manzooruddian, "The Classical Muslim State", Islamic 
Studies, 1962, Vol. 1, pp. 95-115. See also S. Ulian, "Qada al-Madhlimfi al-Islam", 2"d edition, Riyadh: 
Dar al-Rasheed Linasher wa al-tawze'a, 1980, p. 49. 
16 A. Jeerah, "Nidham al-Qada fi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah", 1988, p. 512. 
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individuals. '? The Government, however, is bound to observe the law and it is the duty 
of the Board of Grievances to ensure that it does so. Article 8 refers to: 
Cases of objection filed by parties concerned against administrative 
decisions where the reason for such objection is lack of jurisdiction, 
a deficiency in the form, a violation or erroneous application or 
interpretation of laws and regulations, or abuse of authority. 18 
Whereas Section 5.2.1 above discussed an aggrieved person seeking to restore rights 
and claims, here he seeks to have the administrative decision quashed on one of the 
grounds stated in Article 8, clause 1 (b). The Board of Grievances Act itself is not clear 
on the competence of the Board in this matter. It states that the Board has the power to 
hear cases challenging administrative decisions, but it does not indicate the remedies the 
Board might provide, such as the annulment of those decisions. The practice of the 
Board, however, indicates that it does assume the power to annul defective 
administrative decisions. 
In case No 172/2/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), with Decision of the Review Committee No. 
54/T/1 of 1985 (1405 AH), the Board stated clearly that the aim of such litigation: 
... is directed to the administrative decision itself to control the application 
of the law and reject any action contrary to law... [In other words] the 
administrative decision ... is the subject matter in this litigation. 
» A. A. Jeerah, "Nidham al-Qadafi Madhalim fi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al sa'udiah" 1988, p. 455. is Article 8, clause 1 (b). 
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When someone challenges an administrative decision before the Board of Grievances, 
the Board examines the decision to determine whether the administration has infringed 
the principle of legality. Administrative bodies as well as public corporations are bound 
to respect any acts, resolutions, and rules in force when they take a decision. Moreover, 
they are bound to respect the hierarchy of these acts. The constitutional rules, for 
instance, 19 may not be infringed by any by-law, act, decision or order, and the Board 
will quash any such decision if it is contrary to the law. 
The Board of Grievances Act does not answer important questions as to the scope of the 
Board's jurisdiction in relation to such administrative cases. In particular it leaves open 
the questions as to whether the Board can examine the merits of the administrative 
decision under scrutiny and whether the Board can substitute its decision for that of the 
administration. It is also unclear whether the Board can order the administration to act 
or take a different decision In order to answer these questions and to assess both the 
Board's capability to deal with administrative cases and the extent to which the Board 
can intervene, it is essential to look briefly at what is meant by `administrative 
decisions' and then to discuss the grounds on which one may be challenged. 20 
5.2.2.1 The scope of the Board's jurisdiction concerning annulment 
The Board of Grievances reviews only administrative decisions. However, what is 
meant by "administrative decisions"? Are there any decisions excluded from the 
jurisdiction to annul of the Board? 
19 See F. Al-Dughaither, op. cit., p. 17 
20 A. Al-Fozan, "Diwan al Madhalim fi Dhil Nidhameh al Jaded", Al-Idarah Al-A'amah. 1982, p. 132. 
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a) Administrative decisions 
The Board defines an administrative decision as "... the open declaration of the binding 
volition of the administration by virtue of its legal power with the intention to create 
possible and legal effect. " , 21 
The Board agrees that there should be a declaration of the volition of the administration, 
but it also regards situations in which the administration does not act or refuses to take 
decisions which it should take, as administrative decisions despite there being no 
explicit declaration of the will of the administration. Article 8 of the Act sets this out as 
a basis for challenging an administrative decision. It reads: 
It is considered as an administrative decision the rejection or 
refusal of an administrative authority to take a decision that it 
should have been taken pursuant to laws and regulations. 22 
The administration, in this case, should make a decision according to the law but fails to 
do so. If, for example, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy refuses to act and 
give an aggrieved individual his legal right, then the aggrieved person can challenge the 
decision by the Ministry to make no decision regarding the specific matter. 23 In addition 
to negative or non-decisions, a refusal by the administration to act is subject to review 
by the Board. 
21 See Case No. 912/l/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), decision No. 32/T/1 of 1984 (1405 AH). 
22 Article 8, clause I (b) of the 1982 Act. 
23 Case No. 736/l/Q of 1980 (1400 AH). Decision of the Review Committee No. 861/T/1 of 1988 (1408 
AH). 
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Decisions that may be reviewed by the Board should be capable of being defined 
exactly. In principle, they should be administrative, i. e., issued by the administration or 
by a public corporation thereby excluding all legislative or judicial decisions. However, 
the problem arises of how to distinguish between legislative and executive 
(administrative) decisions. In the Saudi Arabian political system, as noted in Chapter 2, 
legislative and executive powers are in the hands of the Council of Ministers and the 
King, who are at one and the same time both head of the administration and the 
legislature. It is not obvious how one is to distinguish between legislative and executive 
decisions issued by the Council and the King. 24 
It is known that acts or regulations, for example, must be issued by Royal Decree, based 
on decisions by the Council of Ministers. This means that Royal Decrees, as well as 
Council of Ministers' Resolutions, are not subject to the power of the Board. This 
leaves other decisions of the Council of Ministers to be considered, which deal with 
administrative matters. 
It would seem that the Board, in practice, does not presume to review decisions issued 
by the Council of Ministers, regardless of their nature. According to the Deputy 
Chairman of the Board, the Board considers them to be sovereign acts over which it has 
no jurisdiction. 25 
It is submitted that the Board is concerned with the nature of the body which issues 
orders, rather than the nature and subject-matter of such orders, acts, and decisions. This 
position would be acceptable if there was a proper application of the doctrine of 
24 A. Al-Fozan, op. cit., p. 137. 
25 See M. Shibat Al-Hamd, op. cit. 
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separation of powers. This does not apply in Saudi Arabia, which has no separation of 
powers. Decisions of the Council of Ministers, for example, are not only legislative, but 
contain decisions which are administrative in nature. It is submitted that the approach of 
the Board of Grievances needs to be more precise. The Board should set up and adopt 
criteria for distinguishing between the decisions which are issued by such bodies. 26 
The Board will also not hear cases where the individual challenges an administrative 
decision which is yet to be sanctioned or approved by a higher authority. 27 Tentative or 
provisional decisions, therefore, are not subject to the Board's jurisdiction because they 
are not final. 
The decisions challenged should also be issued by a national authority. Decisions issued 
by other countries or foreign organisations should not be subject to review by the 
Board. 28 Thus, the decisions of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or the Islamic 
World League, which are both located in Saudi Arabia, are not subject to review by the 
Board. 
Finally, the decision involved must not be an internal one. 29 Thus, the Board cannot 
review any decision which has been issued by a consultative section in any government 
department, which usually gives propositions in certain matters, because it is internal 
and does not affect the public interest. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See M. Ja'far, "wilayat al-Madhalimfi al-Islam wa Tatbgaha fi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah" 
1987, pp. 101-102, and A. Al-Fahal "Diwan al-Madhalimfi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah al-Sa'udiah wa al- 
Qada al-Idari" Ph. D dissertation, 1990, pp. 391-392. And see also case No. 108/1/Q of 1985 (1406 AH), 
Decision No. 14/T/1 of 1985 (1406 AH). 
28 M. Ja'far, ibid, pp. 103-105. 
29 Ibid., p. 104. 
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b) Sovereign actions 
In general, the Board of Grievances Act states that the Board has the power to hear 
cases involving challenges to administrative decisions. However, there are some 
decisions which are explicitly exempt from the Board's jurisdiction. The Act states 
clearly in Article 9 that some decisions by government or other bodies are not subject to 
the Board's authority. Article 9 reads: 
The Board of Grievances may not hear requests related to sovereign 
actions, nor objections filed by individuals against judgments or 
decisions issued by courts or legal panels which fall within their 
jurisdiction. 
This Article excludes two types of decision: firstly, decisions of administrative 
agencies which relate to sovereignty (discussed in this section), and secondly, 
decisions or judgments by judicial bodies (examined in c), below). 
A person aggrieved by administrative action relating to the question of sovereignty is 
not therefore entitled to challenge the validity of that action through the Board. The 
Board is explicitly prohibited from reviewing such actions. If a case brought before the 
Board is found to relate to or have some connection with a matter of sovereignty, the 
Board must not intervene and must refuse to adjudicate on the grounds that the matter is 
beyond the scope of its jurisdiction. 30 
30 A. Al-Fozan, op. cit., p. 145. 
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The concept of sovereignty exclusion is new to the Board, and to the constitutional and 
legal environment in which it has developed. There was no exclusion of sovereign acts 
prior to the introduction of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. Moreover, there is no 
reference to a "sovereign act" in any law or regulation in force in Saudi Arabia today. 31 
The Islamic legal system, from which the Board claims to have evolved, does not 
acknowledge such exclusion, and does not, in the first instance, recognise these acts. 
Judges within the Islamic judicial system were allowed to hear and adjudicate any type 
of case, regardless of its nature. 32 
There is no specific historical reason to explain the emergence of the exemption. A 
possible explanation may lie in the fact that the Saudi Legislature has been influenced 
by foreign experience. The Egyptian Council of State, in particular, does not intervene 
in questions of sovereignty. 33 Article 9 of the Board of Grievances Act, which states this 
exemption, is similar to Article No 11 of the Law of the Council of State of Egypt 1972. 
Article 11 reads: 
"... the Council of State will refuse applications relating to acts of 
sovereignty ". 
Other systems recognise this exclusion. For instance, the French Conseil d'Etat does not 
hear acts of government. 34 In English law also, acts of state are not justiciable. 35 
31 See B. Al-Bassam, "Nadhriyat Aa'mal al-Syadah", 1988, unpublished Diploma, Institute of Public 
Administration. 
32 A. M. Ali, "Mabda al-Mashroa'iyah ft al-Nidham al-Islami wa al-Andhimah al-Walla yah a! - Mua'aserh ", 1984, p. 242. See also A. Al-Fahal, op. cit., p. 465, and Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., p. 778. 33 See S. Al-Tamawy, "Al-Qada al-Idari: Qada al-Ilgha", 1986, pp. 387-389, and M. Al-Helw, "Al-Qada 
al-Idari", 1985, p. 48. 
34 See L. Brown, and Garner, "French Administrative Law", London: Butterworths, 1983, p. 100. 
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Although it is understandable that the administration will attempt to exclude certain of 
its decisions from review by the courts, 36 it is not proper that this exclusion should be 
without limitations. In the absence of a specific limitation to eliminate vagueness of 
interpretation, government, in order to protect any illegal decisions, can claim that they 
are sovereign acts. 
Neither the Act of the Board of Grievances 1982 nor the Explanatory Memorandum 
defines exactly what is meant by a sovereign act. Nor does it give examples of such 
acts. Who then has the right to decide which act is sovereign, and which is not, and on 
the basis of what criteria? 
It is submitted that the determination of which act is sovereign and which is not is a 
judicial function, which rests with the Board. 37 However, the 1982 Act does not 
mention any criteria. Thus, the lack of criteria by which sovereign acts may be 
distinguished from other administrative acts allows the Board itself very wide powers to 
determine such issues, and in consequence the Board would appear to have authority to 
prevent the administration from abusing its role in relation to sovereignty. 
Al-Fozan (1982) has commented that this situation can lead to either the Board 
extending its power to cover decisions which are in fact sovereign, or limiting its power 
and using this exclusion to refuse to hear cases that might not in fact be sovereign. 38 
35 De Smith, "Judicial Review ofAdministrative Acts" London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1980, pp. 357- 
364. 
36 De Smith, ibid, p. 357. 
3' AI-Fahal, op. cit., p. 466. 
38 See A. Al-Fozan, op. cit., p. 124. 
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Despite the absence of guidance in the 1982 Act, the Board has evolved guidelines for 
the application of this exclusion. To the best knowledge of the writer, there is no case 
that clearly defines what a sovereign act is. However, a member of the Board has 
adopted a corporeal criterion based on the subject matter and the nature of the 
challenged decision. 39 It follows from this that sovereign acts are those issued by the 
government in the performance of its political function, whereas administrative acts are 
those issued by the government in the furtherance of its administrative function. 40 
However, the criterion is not peremptory and since political and administrative acts are 
issued by the same power, namely the executive, it raises again the problem of the 
distinction between them. 41 As a result, in practice, the Board confuses the two 
functions. For instance, the Board regards every order issued by the King or Council of 
Ministers, as a sovereign act regardless of its nature, despite the fact that the High 
Order, AI-Amr Al-Samy, for example, which is usually issued by the President of the 
Council of Ministers, is of an administrative nature, i. e. performed within the 
administrative function. The Board in fact contradicts its own criterion. Thus, in cases 
which challenge Orders issued by the Council of Ministers, the head of the executive, 
the Board takes the view that because they are usually issued to control and administer 
government departments and agencies, they are sovereign acts and therefore immune 
from review by the Board. 42 
39 Shibat Al-Hamd, op. cit., p. 776. 
40 Ibid. 
41 S. Al-Tamawy, "Al-Nadhriyah al-A'amah Liqrarat al-Idaria: Dirasa Muqarana", 1991, p. 133. 42 An example of the application of this doctrine is focused in case No. 631/l/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), 
Decision of the Review Committee, all members, No. 1/D/M of 1987 (1407 AH). The Board held that the 
dismissal of a member of the military other than on the grounds of discipline is to be considered to be an 
act of sovereignty. 
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Some writers argue that certain acts are sovereign acts. Al-Dughaither and Shaibt A1- 
Hamd, for example, say that specific acts such as foreign acts and some internal affairs 
should be immune from judicial review. Here, foreign affairs are taken to mean 
decisions made by the Government regarding its relations with foreign countries, such 
as the making of treaties, the recognition of newly independent states, or the declaration 
of war. 43 Internal affairs are seen to concern policy making and the taking of vital 
decisions regarding national security, law and order, and declarations of emergency 
laws. 44 
There is good reason for excluding external affairs from the jurisdiction of the Board as 
argued by Al-Dughaither and Shaibt Al-Hamd, for they are concerned with international 
law. However, there is no argument for excluding decisions taken by the administration 
in relation to domestic affairs. It is submitted that, bearing in mind the fact that 
sovereign acts are not justiciable in any court, the administration of domestic affairs 
should not be considered to be the carrying out of sovereign acts. The existence of 
discretionary power of the administration, subject to the limits of the law, should be 
sufficient. The administration would have the power to function appropriately whenever 
necessary while at the same time the rights of the individual would be protected by the 
Board against any possible infringement. 
Finally, if this principle of exclusion of sovereign acts is to continue, it should be 
defined and circumscribed so that aggrieved individuals and their legal representatives 
may seek relief in the event of the administration claiming that its decisions are 
sovereign, or in the event of the Board refusing to hear cases challenging administrative 
43 Al-Dughaither, op. cit., pp. 40-44; Shaibat Al-Hamd, op. cit., p. 776. 
44 Ibid. 
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decisions on the basis that they are sovereign. Unless the principle of sovereignty is 
defined and circumscribed more clearly, individuals may be prevented from obtaining 
their rights and may not be properly protected against government actions. Moreover, 
such vague exclusions may considerably contribute to the limitations of the power of 
the Board and subsequently to its efficiency as an instrument at the disposal of 
individuals to challenge government departments' decisions. 
c) Decisions and judgements of judicial bodies 
According to Article 9, the Board will not hear appeals against the decisions or 
judgements of the Courts or of any other judicial body. The application of this Article 
may be seen in case No. 625/l/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), decision of the Review 
Committee No. 134/T/1 of 1985 (1405 AH), when the claimant challenged a judgment 
issued by the Shari 'a Court. The Board dismissed the appeal, noting that: 
... the Panel makes mention of the fact that the Shari'a' judgment 
which was issued against the claimant is final ... and the Panel 
has 
no right to examine it again.... 
The reason for this exclusion may be attributed, in the first place, to the fact that the 
Shari'a court is on an equal footing with the Board of Grievances and has the same 
powers. Secondly, an appeal against a judgement of the Shari'a court is already 
available through the hierarchy of the Shari 'a court. If a person wishes to appeal against 
a first instance judgement, he can appeal to the Cassation Court, the Tamyeez Court. 
Thirdly, the Board is given a specific administrative jurisdiction, as stated in its Act, 
whereas the Shari'a court has a general judicial jurisdiction. As a result, any 
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examination of judgements made by the Shari 'a court by the Board would lead to a 
conflict between the two. 
Appeals from decisions issued by other bodies given judicial powers are also outside 
the competence of the Board. 45 According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the Board 
is not concerned with administrative decisions taken in cases which are heard by a: 
... Committee 
formed under a legal provision, a decision of the 
Council of Ministers or a High Order [an order from the President 
of the Council of Ministers or his deputies] which stipulates that the 
decision of said committees shall be final; then such decisions shall 
be final unless amended in such a way so as to render the 
adjudication of a grievance there within the jurisdiction of the Board 
of Grievances... 
These committees include, for instance, Appellate Custom Committees and the Appeal 
Committee of Disputes created by the Act of Mining, which covers concession 
contracts. 46 In addition, finality means that decisions issued by these committees are 
immune from judicial review. Such exclusion can be criticised from the point of view of 
the principle of legality. Bearing in mind the fact that there is no appeal to a higher 
authority, which could examine the rulings of these committees to determine whether 
they have been made in accordance with the law and within the proper jurisdiction, the 
exclusion of the Board can lead to these committees making decisions arbitrarily and 
without accountability. On the other hand, in the English legal system, if any statutes 
as See case No. 1274/1/Q of 1990 (1410 AH), Decision No. 12/D/TJ/3 of 1990 (1410 AH). 
46 See Al-Dughaither, op. cit., p. 1 14. These bodies are considered to be judicial. For more details about 
these tribunals see Jeerah, op. cit., pp. 198-253. 
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declare that a decision "... shall be final... " it does not mean that it is not reviewable by 
court. Rather it is "... final on facts but not final on law... ", and therefore the court may 
examine them47 
Administrative decisions regarding lands and estates are also outside the Board's 
jurisdiction. If a dispute about land, to which the administration is a party, is brought 
before the Board, it is bound to reject the case. These cases came within the jurisdiction 
of the Shari'a court. For example, in case no. 613/l/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), Decision No. 
123/T/1 of 1985 (1405 AH), the complainants claimed that the Administration had 
distributed land which was theirs. They brought their complaint before the Board but 
the latter rejected the case on the basis that this particular dispute came under the 
Fallow Lands Act 1968 and such disputes are heard before an ordinary judge appointed 
by the Minister of Justice. 48 
5.2.2.2 Grounds for review 
The Board authority to challenge an administrative decision or public corporation 
must always rest on the grounds stated in clause I (b), Article 8, of the Board of 
Grievances Act. 
These grounds are derived from the concept of infringement of the principle of legality 
by the administration. The administration should observe the law or "the principle of 
legality, " the rule of law as it is known in England. In other words, the acts or decisions 
of the administration should be legal, otherwise they will be considered contrary to the 
47 See Case: R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal; ex p Gilmore, [ 1957] 1 Q. B. 574. And see also H. W. R. 
Wade, and C. F. Forsyth, "Administrative Law", 9`h edition, Oxford University Press, 2004, P. 701. 48 See Royal Decree No. 26 of 1968 (1388 AH). 
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law. This is what is meant by the principle of legality. The sources of legality in Saudi 
Arabia are: 1) Shari'a Rules, 2) Acts, 3) Delegated Regulations, 4) The general 
principles of law, and 5) Ijtehad. Consequently, the power of the Board to review a 
decision of an administrative body should be based on a proper allegation that the 
relevant administrative department or public corporation has taken a decision which: 
a) is out of its jurisdiction, i. e. lack of jurisdiction or power 
b) has a defect in the formal or procedural requirements 
c) is contrary to the law 
d) contains an abuse of power. 
These grounds are examined in further detail. 
a) Lack of power or jurisdiction 
The allocation of jurisdiction and competence between administrative agencies, as well 
as among the members of each authority, is important. Because of this allocation of 
power, the work and the performance of the administration should be conducted so that 
the administrative body acts within the boundaries of its prescribed jurisdiction. Lack of 
jurisdiction means the taking of decisions by officials or the administrative body which 
are not competent according to the law. 49 It means that an official who has authority 
within a certain area of jurisdiction, which is determined by the law, is bound not to 
exceed the limits of this area. For example, if an administrative department issues a 
"judicial" decision, which is of course only within the jurisdiction of the courts, the 
decision will be quashed on the basis of lack of competence. Likewise, if an official 
49 AI-Fozan, op. cit., p. 130. According to Brown and Garner, "... if an official acts completely without 
authority, his decision will be declared void for incompetence", p. 145. 
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takes a decision on a matter that does not come within his jurisdiction, but falls within 
the jurisdiction of another person, it will also be quashed on the same grounds. 5° 
There are two forms of lack of jurisdiction. First, there is a substantive lack of 
jurisdiction, 51 as when an administrative agency exercises the jurisdiction of other 
powers of the state such as the legislative, or when an unqualified person takes an 
administrative decision. 52 There was one case brought to the Board in which the Board 
stated that the Act of Fallow Lands determined the judicial body that might decide 
disputes arising from fallow land, so when the administration took the decision to set up 
a committee to adjudicate in a dispute between itself and individuals, its decision here 
was illegal, void from the start. The administration exercised the power of the judiciary 
where it had no jurisdiction to deal with such matters. 53 
The second form is an insubstantial lack of jurisdiction. 54 This applies when, for 
instance, one official encroaches upon another's jurisdiction or take decisions on 
matters outside his territorial jurisdiction, 55 acts after he has been dismissed, transferred, 
or retired. 56 An example of this is a case brought before the Board in which the 
aggrieved person, employed at a University, challenged the decision of the Chancellor 
of the University to dismiss him. The Board held that the disciplinary decision taken by 
the Chancellor of the University was void, as the Chancellor had no authority to make 
such a decision according to the Regulations of the University. The Board went on to 
so For more detail see Ja'far, op. cit., pp. 109-144, and Brown, op. cit., p. 130. 
" Ja'far, op. cit., pp. 461-462, and see Helmy, M. Al-qada Al-Idari. 1977, p. 134. 
sz Ibid 
S' Case No. 613/l/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 76/T/I of 1986 (1406 
AH). 
54 Ja'far, op. cit., and Helmy, op. cit., pp. 144-147 
ss See case No. 751/l/Q of 1984 (1404 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 60/1/I of 1985 
(1405 AH), and case No. 23/2/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 48/1/1 of 
1986 (1406 AH). 
56 Ja'far, op. cit., pp. 461-462. 
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state that such decisions, according to the Regulation, can only be taken by the 
Disciplinary Council of the University. As a result, the Board annulled the decision on a 
number of grounds, one of which was that the Chancellor lacked competence. 57 
b) Defects in the formal or procedural requirements 
Where relevant acts or regulations are set down to determine specific forms or 
procedures that have to be observed by an administration in the process of issuing an 
administrative decision, the administration must respect the act or regulations and act 
accordingly, otherwise its decision will be void. 58 If, for example, the law requires that 
certain decisions must be written, there will be a defect of form if the administration 
does not act as required by the law, and its decisions will be void. Or, if the law requires 
that certain decisions may be issued only after consultation with specific bodies, the 
administration must seek this consultation; otherwise its decisions will be quashed. 
Moreover, if the law requires that the administration state the reasons for its decisions, 
the latter must do so. 59 In addition, the 1982 Act does not give details of the procedural 
errors that may empower the Board to intervene and quash a challenged administrative 
decision. This means that the Board has the power to determine the procedural error in 
form that may lead to the annulment of the administrative decision. 
Some procedures which have to be followed by the administration in the process of the 
issuing of an administrative decision are substantial; such as procedures laid down to 
57 Case No. 751/l/Q of 1984 (1404 AH), Decision No. 60/T/1 of 1985 (1405 AH). No damages were 
awarded to the plaintiff in this case. The plaintiff needed another claim for compensation. As in English 
law, an applicant does not get damages awarded in public law unless there is a private right. 
58 Ja'far, op. cit., pp. 115-116. 
59 Ibid., op. cit., pp. 562-463. 
200 
Chapter Five The Grievance Board's Jurisdiction 
protect the individual interest. 60 If for example, prior to issuing a decision to dismiss an 
official, the case has to be referred to the disciplinary panel concerned, and the 
administration fails to do this, it will lead to the decision being made void when 
challenged before the Board. This procedure, which is substantive, is imposed as an 
obligation by the law and the administration is bound to observe it. 
61 
Where minor or insubstantial defects of procedure occur, the administration's decision 
will still be valid. 62 Such minor defects are, usually, stated in the interest of the 
administration and not in the interest of the individual. For instance, the Regulations of 
the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) state that the SIDF should obtain a 
financial guarantee from the owner of a project who applies for a loan from the SIDF. If 
the latter does not comply with this formality, this act will not be illegal because the 
63 
requirement is one only provided for the benefit of the administration, that is, SIDF. 
The importance of procedural requirement lies in the fact that when the law requires a 
certain procedural requirement from the administration, the purpose is to protect 
individuals and their rights and interest against the administration, which may abuse its 
unilateral power, and at the same time to improve the quality of the administrative 
performance. 64 For example, when an employee was dismissed without an investigation 
of the facts, and without being given the opportunity to defend himself as the 
procedures required, the administrative decision was deemed defective and void. 65 The 
60 Ibid. 
61 See case No. 625/1/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 134/1'/I of 1985 
(1405 AH). 
62Ja'far, op. cit., and see Al-Fahal, op. cit., p. 404. 
63 See case No. 912/l/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 32/T/I of 1984 
(1405 AH). 
64 See case No. 80/1/Q of 1988 (1408 AH), Decision No. 15/D/F/2 of 1988 (1408 AH). 
65 See case No 751/I/Q of 1984 (1404 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 60/T/1 of 1985 (1405 
AH). 
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department concerned violated the right of the person concerned to be heard. However, 
the administration, in general, is not bound to observe certain procedures or formalities 
when it takes a decision to act, unless the acts or regulations require it to act in 
accordance with certain procedures. 
c) Acts contrary to the law 
On the face of it, one may consider that a defect in form or lack of jurisdiction may 
come within a defect of law. For instance, whenever the law imposes an obligation upon 
the administration to issue certain decision in a specific manner, such as that the 
decision should be in writing, the administration has to conform with the law 
prescribed, otherwise its decisions will be quashed on the grounds of defect in form. 
Equally, the Board will deem the act to be contrary to the law. 
The same applies to the defect of lack of jurisdiction. 66 An administrative body cannot 
act without jurisdiction, or again if so doing, the Board of Grievances will intervene. 
However, in the case of the defect of contradicting the law, where the administrative 
department has jurisdiction and issues the decision properly according to the procedures 
required by the law, the decision itself may still be contrary to the law if, for example, 
no rule exists under the law to allow the administration to effect the particular legal 
consequence of its decision or if the administrative act is in contradiction to the exact 
requirements of the law. In other words, this defect is directed at the subject matter of 
the administrative decision and whether or not the result, or the legal effect which the 
administration has achieved, violates the law or the regulations. 67 
66 Brown and Garner, op. cit., p. 147. 
67 See Al-Fozan, op. cit., p. 130, and see Helmy, op. cit., p. 155 and pp. 167-170. 
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It is not, then, a question of the administration possessing or not possessing the 
authority to do or not, but whether it was, in law, right or erroneous in acting as it did. 
This defect in fact includes three forms: i) direct violation of the law, ii) error in the 
interpretation of the law, and iii) error in the application of the law. 
i) Direct violation of the law 
In this case, the administrative body ignores or disregards the law in force when it deals 
with or decides a matter in which the law must be observed. 68 The Board here will 
intervene and quash the decision or act on the grounds that it is contrary to the law. For 
instance, if a department decides to impose taxes that are not prescribed by law, its 
decision will be annulled on the basis that the administrative act is contrary to the law. 
If the Ministry of Health appoints an unqualified person to be a surgeon, this 
appointment will be invalid, and will be annulled accordingly, on the grounds that it 
constitutes a violation of the law. Moreover, if the administration fails to take a decision 
it is supposed to take, the act of failing to take action, will in the first instance be held to 
be an administrative decision, that is, a negative decision, and will be annulled on the 
basis that it is contrary to the law. 69 This point may be illustrated by case No. 19/7/Q of 
1983 (1403 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 88/T/3 of 1989 (1410 AH). In 
this case, the administration ordered the plaintiffs to work overtime for an hour each 
day and for sixteen hours at the weekends. Although the minister concerned, and under 
whose authority the administration functioned, refused to take a decision whereby they, 
the claimants, could obtain their financial rights, the Board held that the administration 
68 Ja'far, op. cit., p. 122. 
69 See clause 1 (c) of Article 8 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. See further, Brown and Garner, op. 
cit., p. 147, and Ja'far, op. cit., p. 122, and Al-Helw, M., op. cit., pp. 402-403. 
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had to pay the plaintiffs a sum of money for their overtime, and this quashed the 
Minister's negative decision. 
As noted earlier, it may be questioned whether, since the Board was not intended to 
substitute for the administration and exercise its power or order the administration to 
take a particular decision, the Board can intervene to order the administration to act? 
This issue was not raised in these circumstances, because the Board in this case 
intervened when the administration refused to take a decision on matters for which the 
law had imposed the obligation on it to do so. The administration here does not have a 
discretionary power in order to determine whether it takes a decision or not. The law is 
clear: if certain facts occur, the administration should act. 
ii) Error in the interpretation of law 
Contradiction of the law may occur not only when the administration does not act 
according to the law as mentioned above, but also when the administration misinterprets 
the law. 70 The administration may recognize the law, but it may interpret it in such a 
way as to be contrary to the intention of the legislature . 
71 The situation may occur when 
the rules are not clear. 72 
The wrong interpretation of the law may be deliberate and can occur when the law 
concerning the matter is so clear that it is not possible to interpret it otherwise. 73 This 
70 See Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., p. 601. 
71 Ibid. 
72 For example see case No. 736/l/Q of 1987 (1407 AH), Decision No. 86/T/3 of 1988 (1408 AH). 73Helmy, op. cit., p. 168. 
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may be a presumption of misuse of power, and as a result, the Board may examine the 
motives and purpose of the administration behind the wrongful interpretation. 
iii) Misapplication of the law 
It may be also considered as contrary to law in so far as the administration misapplies 
the law. The Board will intervene to examine the facts on which the administration has 
based its decision, in order to see whether the facts exist or not. This leads to the 
examination of the reasons for the administrative decision which leads the 
administration to act. 
The Board defines the reason as "a factual or legal state which induces the 
administration to intervene with the intention of creating a legal effect in the public 
interest". 74 For example, if a riot breaks out, it is a factual state which leads the 
administration to act in order to preserve law and order. Therefore the reason here for 
the administrative decision is the riot. 
The administration is not bound to give a reason for its decision unless the law requires 
it. 75 If the administration does not state the reason when it has an obligation under the 
law to state the reason for the decision, the Board will be empowered to intervene and 
quash the administrative decision on the grounds that the latter has defect in form. 
However, where the administration is not required to give reasons, there will not only 
be lack of improvement of quality of decision making, but also the aggrieved person 
will not be able to know whether it is possible to challenge the decision; and judicial 
74 Case No. 535/1/Q of 1980 (1400 AH). 
73 Case No. 1141/l/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 2/D/3/1 of 1987 (1408 
AH). 
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review may be impossible. If the aggrieved person claims that the administrative 
decision is based on no reason or insufficient reason and he, "the plaintiff' raises strong 
presumptions about the validity of the administrative decision, then the Board may ask 
the administration to give reasons for its decision. 76 In one case, the plaintiff challenged 
a government department which had transferred him to another in a different location. 
The plaintiff argued that prior to being transferred, he had held a senior position in his 
department - reason perhaps for the decision by the other officials to transfer him from 
that position. The plaintiff also claimed that there was no justifiable reason for his 
transfer nor for why he had been singled out from among the hundreds of officials 
working with him for transfer. In addition he claimed that as an investigator, his role 
was important in the fight against corruption and those who benefited from that 
corruption may well have sought to have had him transferred. The administrative 
department rejected these allegations and claimed that the decision to transfer the 
plaintiff had been taken in accordance with the law and was an independent decision. 
They said that they had used their discretionary powers to arrive at the decision to 
transfer the plaintiff in the public interest. 
The panel which heard the case asked the department concerned to give reasons for 
using its discretionary powers to transfer the plaintiff. The department replied that the 
reasons were contained in the (written) decision. 
The Board decided that the administration could not be forced to state reasons for its 
decision and it had the right not to specify them unless the law required it to do so, as 
every decision has legal reasons which may be deduced from the presumptions 
surrounding it. Any person who claims otherwise must prove it. However, where the 
76 Ibid., and Al-Tamawy, op. cit., p. 220. 
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administration states the reason for its decision, as in this case, the reasons will then be 
subject to review. The Board has to be sure that reasons exist, and if it becomes evident 
to the Board that the given reasons are not proper or not in existence, it may annul the 
decision. 
The panel went on to say that although the reasons advanced for the transfer was that it 
was in the public interest, the circumstances that surrounded the case, according to the 
case file, showed that the administrative decision to transfer the plaintiff was based on 
reasons other than the public interest, such as the plaintiff's incompetence and his 
questionable conduct. Thus, the reason for the decision was disciplinary and 
consequently the challenged decision was not based on any proper reason and was 
therefore contrary to the law. 77 
The absence of any requirement to give reasons for an administrative decision does not, 
therefore, mean that the administration has an absolute freedom of decision. The Board 
has a power to examine the facts on which the administration has based its decision and 
to decide whether there was, in fact, any proper legal basis on which the administration 
could act to take this particular decision. The Board has stated that: 
... the administrative court has the power to review the facts and 
whether they exist and to assess them in the light of the law. This 
power of review ... is 
limited, as a judicial review, to ascertaining 
whether the conclusion arrived at in the decision is derived from 
existing sources [facts) or not, and whether this conclusion is 
" Case No. 1141/l/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), Decision of the Third Administrative Panel No. 2/D/3/1 of 
1987 (1408 AH) 
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properly deduced from these sources. Accordingly, if the 
conclusion arrived at by the administrative decision is deduced 
from sources which cannot lead to the same decision or if the 
adjustment of the facts, on the assumption that they exist, does not 
reveal the same result achieved by the decision, then the decision 
is defective because one of its pillars is missing: which is the 
"reason ", and the decision is therefore contradicting the law. 78 
Therefore the power of the Board to examine the facts involves three matters: 
ascertaining the existence of the facts, reviewing the legal interpretation of the facts, 
and reviewing the proportionality of the facts for taking a decision. 
- Ascertaining the existence of the facts 
The Board can extend its power to review the administrative decision to ascertain 
whether the facts upon which the administration has acted upon are existent or not. 79 
This means that the power of the Board does not stop at reviewing the jurisdiction of the 
administrator or in deciding whether he has acted in due form or contrary to the law, but 
extends to examining the facts on which the administration bases its own conclusions. If 
it appears that the administrative decision is based on no facts, the Board may quash 
that decision. The following case may illustrate this point. The governor of the province 
of Jazan dismissed an official, "the plaintiff', who worked for him, because he was no 
longer competent for the post. He based his decision on inferences he drew from a 
decision made by the Shari 'a court of Jazan. That judgment as understood by the 
78 See case No. 535/l/Q of 1980 (1400 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 2/86 of 1981 (1401 
AH). 
79 Ja'far, op. cit., p. 126. 
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administration, stated that the plaintiff and another person opened fire on a car which 
passed along a road during the night thereby causing damage to the car. The Shari'a 
court, after examining the evidence, ruled that only the person who was with the 
plaintiff should be imprisoned for five months. The Board however, stated that the 
judgment had not sentenced the plaintiff and held that he was innocent because there 
was not enough evidence against him and, consequently, the conclusion that had been 
drawn by the governor justifying the dismissal was not based on any established fact. 
The decision under challenge was therefore illegal. 80 
The Board held that if the facts do not exist, one pillar of the administrative decision is 
lacking. On this basis, the Board can intervene and annul the decision being challenged. 
It should be noted here that the power of the Board to examine the facts is limited to 
ascertaining whether the conclusion that has been drawn is deduced from facts in 
existence that could lead to such a conclusion being deduced by the administration. The 
Board will not intervene and annul the challenged decision if the conclusion on which 
the administrative decision is based has been drawn or deduced from existing facts 
which should, on the assumption of their existence, have led to the same conclusion. 
Otherwise, the Board has the power to quash the administrative decision. 
81 
80 Similarly, the English legal system requires the existence of certain "jurisdictional facts". An 
administrative agency or administrator has no power to make certain decisions unless certain facts are 
existent. See Schwartz, B. Lions over the Throne, 1987, pp. 127-128, Regina v. Home Secretary; ex parte 
Khawaja, [1984] 1 A. C. 74, and see also Administrative Justice some Necessary Reforms. Report of the 
Committee of the JUSTICE-All Souls Review of Administrative Law in the United Kingdom, 1988, 
171. 
Case No. 535/1/Q of 1980 (1400 AH), op. cit. 
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- Reviewing the legal interpretation of the facts 
On the assumption that the facts behind the complaint are actually true, the Board can 
still intervene to examine whether the administration has properly appreciated these 
facts to legally justify a decision. 82 In case No. 15/4/Q of 1987 (1408 AH), Decision of 
the Review Committee No. 138/T/3 of 1988 (1408 AH), the plaintiff claimed that the 
department concerned deducted a day's salary. The administrative department based its 
decision on the fact that he was absent on that day. The plaintiff argued that he was on 
holiday. The Board said that the validity of the disciplinary administrative decision had 
to be based on valid fact. Furthermore, such facts should constitute error in order that 
the administration could apply the law to them. The Board, ruling in favour of the 
plaintiff added that although the fact actually existed, it did not constitute an error 
because the official was actually on holiday. 
It is relevant to note that where the assessment of technical facts is involved, the Board 
is not in a position to adjust a decision. Thus the Board may not intervene and review 
factual conclusions of a technical character such as those arising out of medical cases. 83 
In such cases, the Board confines itself to ascertaining whether the facts exist or not. 
- Reviewing the proportionality of the facts for taking a decision 
Finally, it should be mentioned here that while the Board has the power to examine the 
facts according to which the administrative decision has been taken in order to see 
whether such facts are subject to the law which has been applied by the administration, 
82 Ja'far, op. cit., pp. 127-128. 
83 Ibid 
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the Board has no power to examine the proportionality of the administrative decision 
itself. In other words, the Board has no power to examine the significance of the facts 
and whether they are proportional or expedient with the decision which is based on 
them. It should be taken into account that the administration is in a position to assess the 
facts and circumstances so that it can decide whether a decision ought to be taken or 
not. Despite this, the administrative decision should be based on valid and firm facts 
which conform to the objectives of the decision. 84 
The Board has stated this clearly in case No. 912/l/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), Decision 
No. 32/T/l of 1984 (1405 AH). In this case, the complainant challenged the decision of 
the administration of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) which had refused 
to grant him a project loan. He was asked to submit a bank guarantee, a condition 
which, according to the complainant, was not required of others. Despite the point 
raised by the complainant concerning the decision, the Board quoted the Regulations 
which had been laid down to determine how the administration should exercise its 
power: "... the Fund administration must receive financial guarantee from those 
involved in industrial projects, equivalent to the amount of finance given by the Fund". 
The regulations required that the Fund administration should receive satisfactory 
financial guarantee. But the regulations did not provide details of the nature of the 
financial guarantee required. The administration had a discretionary power to assess the 
nature of the guarantee according to the circumstances of each project, taking all the 
relevant factors into account, and also taking into account what the Fund administration 
saw as expedient and in the public interest, that being the ultimate purpose of the Fund. 
The Board adds that the "... Fund is not liable to the control of the Board [in this matter] 
84 Al-Helw, op. cit., p. 437, and Ja'far, pp. 128-131. 
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unless there is an abuse of power". It seems that in this case, the administrative 
department applied the same criteria as in other cases. Although the Fund is supposed to 
give equal consideration of cases, it is not under any obligation to treat them in the same 
way. In other words, it is not a matter of the application of the principle of equality, 
rather a question of the Fund exercising its discretionary power in the light of the 
regulations. 
The Board's approach of not intervening in proportionality questions, and the 
assessment of the significance of facts in order to arrive at decision can be explained as 
follows. Firstly, the administration should have some freedom to assess and weigh 
certain administrative issues which it is impossible for the judge to do, owing to his 
being distanced in time, place and circumstance from the facts surrounding the case and 
from when the administration took that decision. It is impossible to lay down specific 
rules for each possible case in order to control the administration. 85 It should be given 
some freedom to manoeuvre in order to deal with new cases which may arise, 
presenting different circumstances. 86 
Secondly, the Board's attitude may be influenced by the doctrine of the separation of 
powers. This principle, as has been discussed in Chapter 1, does not apply to the 
constitution in general, but concerns the relationship between the executive and the 
judiciary, insofar as the court (judges) will not trespass into the executive domain, and 
as long as the public authority acts within its jurisdiction. The executive must act in 
good faith, exercise powers for the purpose for which they were given, and take into 
85 Cf Davis, K. C. Discretionary justice, a preliminary inquiry, 1977, pp. 15-18. 
86 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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consideration relevant matters and exclude irrelevant ones. 87 Thus, if the Board attempts 
to intervene and examine the proportionality of an administrative decision, it means that 
it assumes a position of authority over the administration concerned, or at the very least 
it substitutes for that administration in its functions and issues a new decision. The 
Board itself insists that it has no power to replace the administration or perform its 
functions. 88 
Although the Board should not intervene to examine the proportionality of the fact and 
the administrative decision, the Board, in reality, attempts to limit the freedom of the 
administration by curtailing some of the latter's power by reviewing, for example, the 
lack of evident proportionality between the fact and the decision that has been taken by 
the administrative department. The Board says that even if the decision is based on facts 
which exist and which lead to the same conclusion as deduced by the administration, 
there should be an evident proportionality and expediency in the administrative 
decision. 89 In case No 189/2/Q of 1987 (1407 AH), Decision of the Review Committee 
No. 100/T/4 of 1990 (1410 AH), a disciplinary case, the Board added that the 
punishment should be appropriate to the offence committed: it should be just and free 
from extravagance in severity or diligence in mercy. 90 
87 Vile, M. J. C, Constitutionalism and the separation of power, 1967, pp. ]-20, and see Foulkes, D. 
Administrative Law, 1990,70i ed., pp. 4-5. 
88 For example, case No. 912/1/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No 32/T/1 of 
1984 (1405 AH). 
89 Case No. 189/2/Q of 1987 (1407 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 1601T/4 of 1990 (1410 
AH). 
90 Ibid. 
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d) Abuse of power91 
In cases involving the abuse of power, the administration acts in due form, within its 
jurisdiction and according to the law, but the purpose behind its decision is different 
from that which the law states or allows. In the French legal system, for example, it will 
be an abuse of power when "... an administrative power of discretion has been exercised 
for some object other than that for which power or discretion was conferred by the 
statute... "92 This defect tends to appear most when the administration has a discretionary 
power to act or not to act. 93 
Grounds for abuse of power here are different from other grounds because, as Auby 
(1970), says 
The other defects of administrative orders have an objective character; 
they concern only the elements of the order itself, or the rules which 
govern it. The abuse of power, on the other hand, cannot be discerned 
except by examining the subjective motives of the actor. 94 
Instances of abuse of power may arise, in practice, in many forms. For example, an 
official may take a decision which serves his own private interests, or which benefits a 
certain person, or he may be motivated by political considerations. 95 
91 For further detail about the abuse of power see Auby, Jean M. "The abuse of power in French 
administrative law, " The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1970, Vol. 18, pp. 549-563, and Brown 
& Gamer, op. cit., pp. 147-150; Al-Tamawy, op. cit., pp. 861-936. 
92 Brown, op. cit., p. 148. 
93A1-Tamawy, op. cit., p. 863, and Al-Fozan, op. cit., p. 131. 
94 Auby, op. cit., p. 552. 
95 Auby, op. cit., pp. 556-557, and see also Al-Tamawy, pp. 873-897, and see Al-Fahal, op. cit., p. 412. 
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Here, the Board's scope of review extends to cover questions of motive and purpose. 
This "authorizes the judge to examine the actual content of the act of the 
administration. "96 However, this power is limited, due to the fact that a defect on the 
grounds of abuse of power is hard for complainants to prove and difficult for the 
member of the Board to discover. 97 This is because it is linked with the intent of the 
administration issuing the decision. 
The Board can intervene on these grounds when the intent of the administration does 
not conform with the intent stated by the law. The Board has to determine the intent 
behind the decision of the department using such presumptions as may assist in 
identifying it, and then compare the intent of the law in order to see whether or not they 
are compatible. 98 However, there is an absence of parliamentary debates on legislation 
from which the Board might infer its purposes from what has been said in the process of 
the promulgation of that specific legislation or any other travaux preparatoires. This 
increases the difficulty of discovering an abuse of power. 99 
Evidence of the abuse of power may occasionally be reflected in the reason stated for 
the decision being challenged. Thus, discovering the reasoning on which the 
administrative decision was based may ease the task of the Board in determining the 
question of motive. This will be difficult for the Board if the law or the statutes do not 
require that the administration give reasons for its decisions. However, as stated earlier, 
96Brown, N. and Garner, op. cit., p. 147. 
97 Al-Fozan, op. cit., p. 131. 
98 Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., p. 604. 
99 See Brown, op. cit., p. 148. 
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if the Board considers that the assumed reason behind a decision is invalid or in doubt, 
then it can ask the department itself to provide reason. 100 
The reason may not always help the judge to discover whether or not there has been an 
abuse of power. The reasons which appear in the decisions or those given by the 
administration may be relevant and proper, and not in contradiction with the law. The 
Board will scrutinise all the circumstances that surround the matter of the challenged 
decision and which may undermine its validity. Such an approach was adopted in case 
No. 1141/1/F of 1985 (1405 AH). The Board panel concluded that 
... after the examination of the 
facts of the case, it would appear that 
there is no proper reason to justify [the administration] transferring 
the aggrieved person as stated in the decision ... it is evident to the 
panel that, contrary to the reasons given in the decision, the 
circumstances and the facts surrounding the issue on which the 
administration took its decision confirm that the purpose of 
transferring the aggrieved was not to uphold the public interest but to 
discipline him. 
The panel went on to note that the disciplining of civil servants should be undertaken 
according to established procedures. 
The Board's practice does come across examples of abuse of power. Case No. 631/1/Q 
of 1985 (1405 AH), in which all the Members of the Review Committee panels took a 
ioo See case No. 1141/l/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), Decision of the Third Administrative Panel No. 21D/3/1 of 
1987 (1408 AH). 
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unanimous decision (No. 1/D/M of 1978 (1407 AH)), illustrates this area of jurisdiction. 
The aggrieved person had been accused of attempted theft. He was convicted and 
punished by an ordinary court. However, as the aggrieved person worked as a 
policeman in the General Traffic Administration (GTA) which falls under the General 
Security Department, the case was referred to the Military Disciplinary Council (MDC). 
The MDC decided to suspend the officer for a month and without his salary during the 
period of trial in the Shari 'a Court. However, the president of the GTA believed the 
MDC's decision to be inadequate. He referred the case to the Head of General Security 
with a request to dismiss the officer. The Head of General Security agreed and an 
administrative decision was issued whereby the aggrieved person was duly dismissed. 
When the aggrieved officer sought review of the decision before the Board, it held that 
the decision to dismiss violated the law, because the Department concerned had not 
followed the prescribed procedures. There was also an abuse of power in that the 
department concerned had disciplined the person by using an exceptional power which 
was not vested in it to be used in disciplinary action but only when there was a need to 
fulfil a public interest. The decision added that punishing a single individual, in the 
circumstances mentioned in the case, could not possibly be considered in the public 
interest. Therefore, the official who issued the challenged decision used his power for 
purposes other than those stated in the law. 
5.2.3 Power to indemnify 
According to Article 8, clause 1 (c), the Board has the power to order compensation to 
an aggrieved person who has suffered hardship as a result of an act of government or a 
public corporation. In such a case, the Board may not only set aside the administrative 
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act, but also award compensation if the quashed decision has led to damage to the 
aggrieved person. It also means that the administration will be held liable if its acts 
cause hardship to individuals. This damage or hardship should be evaluated 
financially. 101 In this respect, the Board will intervene to order the administration to 
compensate if, for example, there is evidence of any physical damage or financial loss. 
However, the Board will not intervene if only emotional or mental suffering are caused, 
neither of which can be evaluated financially. 102 This jurisdiction is based on the 
omissive liability of the administration. In other words, the fault of the administration 
which caused the hardship to the individual is not derived from a contract, but is the 
direct result of the administrative decision or act. 103 
Article 8, clause 1 (c) refers to: 
... suits for indemnification presented by those concerned to the 
Government and persons of independent and general character by 
reason of their acts. 
This Article raises three points. Firstly, indemnification cases may only be persons who 
have an interest, i. e. persons who have suffered from the act of the administration. 
Secondly, the Article is, to some extent, misleading because it implies that the 
aggrieved person should bring his case "... to the Government... ", which may be taken 
to mean that the person should first present his case to the Government in order to 
obtain compensation directly. In the case of refusal, he may have recourse to the Board, 
101 Shaibt AI-Hamd, op. cit., p. 615. 102 Ibid. 
103 Jeerah, op. cit., p. 466. 
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which would mean that there should be prior decision from the administration to enable 
the Board to examine such cases. In France, for example, 
A right to bring an action for damages against the administration 
does not occur simply because some event (e. g. the explosion of a 
munitions dump) has happened; there must first be a decision (such 
as to pay the victim no damages which he deems inadequate), and it 
is then against this decision that the victim seeks redress from the 
administrative judge. '°4 
The question is how does this work in Saudi Arabia? The above mentioned Article 8 
might have caused problems before the introduction of the "Rules of Proceedings and 
Procedures before the Board" in 1989. These Rules have made it clear that there is no 
need, as a first step, to ask the Government for indemnification. In other words it is not 
necessary for the aggrieved person to get a decision from a department to seek redress 
from the Board according to such a decision. Rather he (the aggrieved person) can bring 
his case directly before the Board. 
Finally, the Article states that compensation may be awarded because of the acts of 
Government or persons of independent and public corporation i. e. damages may be 
awarded as a result of administrative acts. It implies that there should be fault, damage, 
and a connection between the fault and the damage, i. e. a causality relationship. 105 
104 Brown and Gamer, op. cit., p. 101. 
105 Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., pp. 614-617. 
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The question may be raised about damages or hardship which may occur to individuals 
where there is neither fault nor a defective act causing such damages. Brown and Garner 
(1998), observed: 
... The activities of the state, even when conducted without 
fault, may 
in certain circumstances constitute the creation of a risk; if the risk 
materializes and an individual is occasioned injury or loss it is only 
just that the state should indemnify him. 106 
The Board of Grievances Act 1982 does not mention such jurisdiction with respect to the 
Board. What it does state is that the Board may intervene and order indemnity for the 
injured person if the injury happened as a result of an administrative act. However, where 
the theory of risk is concerned, when there is no fault or defective act, the Board cannot, 
theoretically speaking, intervene. Yet, according to Shibt AI-Hamd, the Board may 
consider cases where there is no fault from the administration. Here it usually bases its 
decision on the theory of risk involved in, for example, labour injuries, the construction 
of roads, and the construction of bridges, which may result in the violation of the 
individual's rights and occasional damages. 107 This view is questionable. The Board, in 
practice, has extended its powers to order compensation to cover only part of that theory. 
In other words, it may compensate for some damages that may occur to individuals but 
not all. In case No. 81/1/Q of 1986 (1410 AH), Decision of the Review committee No. 
66/T/3 of 1989 (1410 AH), the Board stated that 
[the Review Committee] would like to highlight one of the accepted 
rules relating to liability of the administration in the process of 
106 Brown and Garner, op. cit., p. 121. 
107 Ibid., see for example case No. 81/1/Q of 1986 (1407 AH), Decision of the Review Committee No. 
66/T/3 of 1989 (1410 AH). 
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carrying out public services or projects, in the interest of the public, 
there is an obligation on the part of individuals involved to bear 
some of the burden of any insubstantial damages that they may suffer 
as a result of carrying out such services, provided that the burden is 
not of such grave consequences that it is beyond the individuals' 
capacity to bear. 
The French Conseil d'Etat, for example, will impose compensation on the part of the 
administration if a particular individual is injured, even if the activities of the 
administration were lawful. Unlike French law, it could be inferred from the above- 
mentioned case that the Board differentiates between substantial and insubstantial 
damages which may result from a legal act of the administration. This leaves the 
questions, what are substantial and insubstantial damages, and do they differ from case to 
case and from individual to individual? 
It is submitted that the Board ought to order the administration to compensate injured 
individuals even for minor damages suffered. The activities of the administration are 
carried out on behalf of all members of society, and the obligations that may result out of 
these activities, i. e. damages suffered by only a few citizens, should not be shouldered 
just by particular citizens. 108 The administration should compensate fully those citizens 
who bear the public burden. 
Compensation may be based on the annulment of an illegal administrative decision which 
results in damages to the aggrieved person, or on an act by the administration which is 
1° Ibid. 
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legal and where the administration is not at fault, for example, in major construction 
projects. 109 
5.2.4 Administrative contracts 
According to clause 1 (d) of Article 8, the Board has the power to decide cases 
involving disputes between the Government or persons of public corporations and 
others. According to this Article, any contract is subject to the authority of the Board as 
long as the Government or persons of public character are a party. The Explanatory 
Memorandum supports this when it says that "... the (word) contract means an absolute 
contract, whether an administrative contract in the legal sense or a special contract, 
including labour contracts. " 
This is unlike French and Egyptian law. ' 10 According to French administrative law, the 
Council of State makes a distinction between contracts to which the government is a 
party. There are some contracts which are not subject to the power of the Council of 
State, despite the fact that the government is a party. I 11 
This raises the question as to why the Board has been given this power over 
administrative contracts. 
'09 Ibid. 
110 Egyptian Law also does not consider all contracts where the administration is a party to be 
administrative. See M. Helmy, "Al-Qada Al-Idari", 1977, pp. 284-308. 
See Brown, op. cit. p. 125. 
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The reason for this may be that the legislature would like to exclude the Shari'a courts 
from trying disputes arising out of contracts in which the administration is a party. 
112 
Historically, during the 1960s, the Shari 'a Court was prevented from hearing any case 
to which the Government was a party, as a result of a particular dispute over a contract 
between the government and a contractor. 113 
Although the 1982 Act as well as its Explanatory Memorandum make it clear that all 
contracts of government come within the authority of the Board, in practice there are 
exceptions. The Board holds the view that labour contracts between the Government 
and individuals do not come within the Board's jurisdiction. 
114 This decision was based 
on the fact that the rules stated in the Act concerning the Board's jurisdiction are 
restricted by legal rules stated in the Labour and Labourers Act (LLA) of 1969 (1389 
AH). Moreover, the Decision of the Council of Ministers No. 212 of 1986 (1406 AH) 
states that disputes arising from government contracts with labourers are not subject to 
the Board but come within the jurisdiction of the Labour Committees. 
The Board's position regarding labour contracts with the Government may be 
questioned. Firstly, the Board holds the view that the rules of the Board of Grievances 
Act 1982 are limited by the LLA of 1969. However, this is hardly accurate, because the 
Board of Grievances Act was issued after that legislation. Clause 1 (d) of Article 8 of 
the Act gives jurisdiction to the Board without any exception, over all "... contracts to 
which the government or a general corporate person is party". Secondly, in so far as the 
Board's position is based on the Decision of the Council of Ministers cited above (No. 
112 See A. Al- Hussayan, "The Grievances Board in Islamic Judiciary System and its practice in Saudi 
Arabia", LLM. dissertation, Harvard University, 1985, p. 41. 
113 For further detail see Chapter 3, and see also, the High Order No. 1049 of 1967 (1387 AH). 
114 Decision of all Members of the Review Committee No. 3/D/M of 1987 (1407 AH) in cases Nos. 
186/l/Q of 1985 (1405 AH) 98/2/Q of 1984 (1404 AH), and 118/I/Q of 1984 (1404 AH). 
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212,1986), it ignores the important point that such a decision cannot amend legislation. 
Legislation may only be amended by Royal Decree, Marsum Malaki, based on a 
decision by the Council of Ministers. The Board of Grievances Act 1982 has not been 
amended. Decision No. 212 therefore cannot exclude any labour dispute or any contract 
involving government from the jurisdiction of the Board. Although there is a hierarchy 
of sources of law, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, there is no obvious reason why 
the Board takes such an attitude except for the tendency of the latter to limit its powers 
over the administration, when possible. ' 15 
With regard to administrative contracts, the Board takes the view that it should never try 
contract cases if the dispute involved concerns the implementation of the contract; for 
example, if the cost of materials rises during the period the contract is carried out. The 
Board will only try disputes arising from administrative contracts if there is negligence 
or dereliction on the part of the Government, such as delay in making the location of the 
project available, or stopping the contractors in the process of their work. The Board 
takes this approach from the Decision of the Council of Ministers, No. 818 of 1976 
(1396 Al-i) which limited the power of the Board to the hearing of cases in which there 
is negligence or dereliction on the part of the Government unless there is permission to 
do so from the King or from the Council of Ministers. 116 
It is submitted, however, that the Board, in maintaining this exclusion of cases 
concerning implementation, is acting wrongly. It is based on a decision, i. e., the Council 
of Ministers Decision No. 818, which has itself been annulled. Decision No. 818 was 
issued under earlier regulations. In view of the fact that Article 50 of the Act repeals the 
its A. Al-Fozan, op. cit. 
116 For example case No. 385/2/Q of 1988 (1408 AH), decision of the Review Committee (First Panel) 
No. 261T/1 of 1988 (1409 AH). 
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old regulations and all "... implementing decisions thereof; ... " the Decision of the 
Council of Ministers No 818 is also repealed. Clauses 1 (c) and 1 (d) of Article 8 
provide for no restrictions or conditions whatsoever on the Board regarding disputes 
arising out of administrative contracts of whatever nature, including disputes alleging 
negligence by the Government or delay in honouring a contract in, for example, 
unexpected circumstances. To argue otherwise is to ignore the terms of clause I (d) of 
Article 8. It is submitted that the legislature aims to confer jurisdiction on the Board in 
respect of administrative contracts. If this had not been the intention of the legislation, it 
would have included the content of the Council of Ministers Decision No. 818 in the 
new Act. Moreover, taking into account the fact that the Shari 'a court will never 
adjudicate any case where the government is a party, where otherwise would an 
aggrieved contractor have recourse to justice? As in the case of labour contacts with the 
government, the Board seems, with no clear reasons, to restrict its own powers of 
jurisdiction in order not to intervene and review cases in which a government 
department is a party. This self-limitation may be ascribed to a wish to avoid clashes 
with the government. 
5.3 Disciplinary power 
The Board has the authority to hear disciplinary actions brought by the Board of Control 
and Investigation (BCI) against government employees. "? This jurisdiction was a part 
of the power of the Disciplinary Committee, which was dissolved by the introduction of 
the Board of Grievances Act 1982 and transferred to the Board. ' 18 In disciplinary cases, 
1 17 See clause 1 (e) of Article 8 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. 
118 See the Council of Ministers decision No. 95 in 1982 (25/6/1402) which contained the draft of the 
Board of Grievances Act 1982. 
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the Board applies the sanctions that are stated in the Regulations for the Discipline of 
Officials. 119 
According to the jurisdiction of the Board prior to 1982, it used to have two specific 
powers concerning these cases, i. e. investigation and trial. Now, however, the Board of 
Control and Investigation deals with the investigation of disciplinary offences as well as 
bringing accusations before the Board against any official or government employee. 
120 
As a result of this transfer of power, the Board is the body which reserves the right to 
pass sanctions on accused officials when they infringe the law. 
5.4 Penal jurisdiction 
The Board is vested with the power to try certain crimes, such as bribery. The common 
characteristic of these crimes is that they are what is called in Islamic Shari'a law 
"Ta'zir crimes"121 Ta'zir is a disciplinary punishment for sins (offences) for which there 
is no prescribed punishment in Shari 'a and which are not specified in Islamic Shari 'a as 
are other crimes. 122 Rather, they are defined as sins only at the discretion of Islamic 
jurists and scholars and punished in the public interest. 123 
There are different laws issued in relation to these offences. The Board has the power to 
apply these acts and to pass sentences accordingly. 
19 See Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., p. 646. 
120 See Article 8 of the Act and for further detail on the disciplinary power of the Board see Shaibt Al- 
Hamd, op. cit., pp. 628-650, Ja'far, op. cit., pp. 143-146, M. Y. Mustafa, "Wilayat al-Madhalim: Dirasa 
Muqarana", pp. 221-227, and Al-Dughaither, op. cit., pp. 118-119. 
121 Ta'zir means chastisement or castigation. There are three types of crimes in Islamic Shari'a. a) Hudud 
or "prescribed punishment" which is determined and fixed, as in the case of adultery and theft, b) Qesas 
or retaliation and blood money crimes such as murder and homicide, and c) Ta'zir crimes 
122 A. Odah. "Al-Tshria' al-Jenaay al-Islami Muqaranan bil Qanun al- WadaVy', pp. 131-133 
123Ibid. 
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Before examining the penal jurisdiction of the Board, an initial question must be asked 
about the Board itself. The Board of Grievances Act 1982 states in its first article that 
the Board is a "... Judicial administrative body... " Why then does it have penal 
jurisdiction? 
Penal jurisdiction is not new to the Board. It was part of the jurisdiction of the Board 
before the promulgation of the 1982 legislation and has existed since 1962 when the 
Anti-Bribery Act was introduced. 124 The Board of Grievances Act 1982 states explicitly 
in Article 8, clause 1 (f) that the Board has jurisdiction over some penal cases. 
However, examination of the Explanatory Memorandum suggests that the legislators 
consider penal jurisdiction to be exceptional and, as it were, appropriated from the 
Shari'a Courts which has the general jurisdiction. The Explanatory Memorandum 
states: 
... as the Board is a 
body of administrative law, then its penal jurisdiction 
is temporary until the necessary arrangements have been made for the 
courts to adjudicate such cases in accordance with the judiciary law. 
Sfeir (1989) points out that the Saudi legislature considered that it was obliged to lay 
down such jurisdiction: 
The Saudi legislature must have acted reluctantly in either case since 
criminal law matters were and still are the province of he Shari'a courts. 
124 See Chapter 3 of this study. 
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In fact he found it necessary to justify this action in the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the law. 125 
The Act is somewhat vague in this respect. It states that this jurisdiction is temporary 
and at the same time it leaves clause 1 (f) of Article 8 open for any case to be referred to 
the Board by the President of the Council of Ministers. As the Board, until now, has not 
refused such cases, ' 26 it would appear unnecessary to state that this jurisdiction is 
temporary. Moreover, if this jurisdiction was intended to have been temporary, it should 
have been for a short time. The Board has already been vested with this jurisdiction for 
twelve years, and it had this jurisdiction before 1982 i. e., for more than thirty years, so 
what does "temporary" in the context of the Act really mean? 
A number of different Acts have been passed in which certain crimes and their 
respective punishments are specified. According to the Act, the Board may try five 
types of penal case, namely, a) forgery b) bribery c) crimes listed in Royal Decree No. 
43 of 1956 (1377 AH), d) crimes specified in the Managing Public Finance Act, and e) 
crimes defined in different Acts referred to the Board by an order from the President of 
the Council of Ministers. 127 
As has been noted, some elements of criminal jurisdiction, such as bribery, were under 
the power of the Board before the introduction of the 1982 Act. 128 However, whereas 
the Board according to the old regulations had two powers in respect of crimes coming 
125 George. N. Sfeir, "An Islamic Conseil D'Etat: Saudi Arabian's Board of Grievances" Arab Law 
uarterl . 
Vol. 4, part 2,1989, pp. 128-137. 
)26 One of the latest additional jurisdictions was conferred by the Act of the Protection of the Public 
Services (1985). 
127 See clause 1 (f) of Article 8 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. 
128 See Chapter 3. 
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within its jurisdiction, namely investigation and adjudication, the new Act excluded the 
power to investigate from the Board and gave it in the Board of Control and 
Investigation (BCI). 
5.4.1 Forgery 
The anti-forgery act 1980 (first promulgated in 1960) described those crimes considered 
to be forgery and prescribed the sentences for each. These are: 
a) imitation and forgery of documents or signatures of His Majesty the King or 
the President of the Council of Ministers, or official governmental documents, 
b) imitation or forgery of any stamps or distinguishing mark of any government 
department, 
c) imitation or forgery of documents or making or possessing any equipment 
moulded for the purpose of imitating or forgery, and 
d) forgery of any official documents. 
The Board has the power to apply the rules of the above-mentioned Act and to pass 
sentence. These sentences depend on the crime committed. Sentences range from 
imprisonment for between one and ten years, or a fine ranging from three thousand to 
ten thousand Riyals, depending on the particular type of forgery. 
5.4.2 Bribery 
According to the Anti-Bribery Act 1962, amended in 1982, the Board usually deals only 
with government officials who accept bribes from others. The accused person must be 
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an official who has abused his position. 129 The Act defines an official subject to this 
section as a government employee, whether he or she works temporarily or permanently 
for the government or any public corporation. 130 
The Act also states the form that accepting bribes must take before the official may be 
punished for the offence of bribery. 
If the allegation is proved, the Board may pass sentence, which, depending on the type 
of bribery, can be imprisonment, a fine, or both. The sentence of imprisonment ranges 
from one to five years, and the fine should not exceed one hundred thousand Riyals. 131 
5.4.3 Royal Decree No. 43 of 1957 (1377 AH) 
The common characteristic of the crime referred to in the Royal Decree lies in the fact 
that the accused person is a government official and the crime has some relationship to 
his governmental position. This fact leads some authorities to argue that these cases 
should have been included in the disciplinary cases since they involve government 
officials. 132 However, this argument overlooks the fact that this Decree covers crimes 
such as bribery which the Act regards as penal cases and not disciplinary, despite the 
fact that they involve governmental officials. 
129 For a more detailed treatment, see Al-Sayfy, A. Al-Nidham al-Jasaaifi al-Mamlakah al-A'rabiah a! - 
Sa'udiah, 1987, cited in Ja'far, op. cit., p. 160. 
130 Ibid 
131 Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
132 See Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit, p. 688, Ja'far, op. cit, pp. 163-164 
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When the above-mentioned decree was first promulgated, it did not name any judicial 
body by which its rules could be applied or sentence could be passed., 33 The 
Government Employees Disciplinary Act, however, stated in Article 49 that the King 
had a discretionary power to entrust either the BCI or the Disciplinary Committee with 
the application of the rules of Decree No. 43.134 After a considerable period, the Council 
of Ministers issued a decision whereby the application of that Decree was the Act 
vested in the Disciplinary Committee. 135 However, when the Act of the Board of 
Grievances came into effect, the Disciplinary Committee was dissolved and this area of 
jurisdiction among others was transferred to the Board (Article 8, clause I (f)). 
The Decree established eleven crimes with their respective penalties. The Decree, for 
example, prohibits any official, acting in his official capacity, from mistreating others 
by torture or appropriating the personal freedom of others. '36 
Some of these offences were repealed by the Anti-Bribery Act of 1962 (1382 AH), such 
as acceptance of gifts from individuals. Moreover, some cases which the Decree 
considered to be a crime now come under clause I (b) of Article 8 of the Board of 
Grievances Act. These include where the official abuses his power or refuses to take a 
decision he is supposed to take. This overlapping could make the allocation of cases 
difficult as there could be a conflict of jurisdiction between the administrative and penal 
panels of the Board. 
133 Shaibt AI-Hamd, op. cit, p. 688. 
134 Ibid 
135 Decision No. 677 of 1975 (1395 AH). 
136 See Al-Fahal, op. cit., pp. 446-447. 
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5.4.4 Mismanagement under the Public Finance Act 1975 
These crimes, as stated in Royal Decree No. 77 of 1975 (1395 AH) and amended in 
1980 (1400 AH), are associated with the management and abuse of public finance. 
Thus, if an official misuses or misappropriates public finance, he will be sentenced by 
the Board of Grievances according to the rules laid down by the Decree. 137 The Board 
has the power to pass sentence of imprisonment up to a maximum of ten years, or a fine 
of not more than one hundred thousand Riyals, or both. 
5.4.5 Criminal cases referred by the Council of Ministers 
Clause 1 (f) of Article 8 of the Act states that at the discretion of the President of the 
Council of Ministers, any penal case concerning crimes that are specified in law may be 
referred to the Board. However, no specific judicial body is here vested with the 
authority to pass the sentences prescribed by these Acts. 
This means that the President of the Council of Ministers has discretionary power with 
regard to crimes stated in these Acts, and clause 1(f) of Article 8 opens the door to 
jurisdiction in respect of the Board. This article 
... refers to existing and 
future regulations which designate the Board 
as the appropriate forum, other than those mentioned in the law. 
(sfeir)138 
137 Ibid., p. 448. 
138 Sfeir, G., "An Islamic Council D'Etat: Saudi Arabia's Board of Grievances", Arab Law Quarterly, 
Vol. 4, Part 2, p. 133. 
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Accordingly, the Board has the power to try cases brought against those who violate the 
Regulations of the Accountants Act 1974 (1394 AH), and the Telephone Service 
Regulations. Indeed these powers were already under the Board's jurisdiction before 
1982 and remained under its power after 1982. The Board was again vested with this 
jurisdiction and recently added to it, with the authority to hear cases against those 
accused of violation of the Trade Marks Act 1985 (1404 AH) and the Protection of 
Public Services Act 1985 (1405 AH). 
In summing up this brief examination of the penal jurisdiction of the Board, it may be 
useful to emphasise some of the more significant points. The Board is a body with 
judicial power to control possible corruption among officials, and to this end it is given 
the power to pass sentences which may involve imprisonment. Secondly, the common 
factor of the Board's penal jurisdiction, apart from the fact that the offences are Ta'zir 
crimes, is that the offences are prescribed in laws and regulations issued and codified by 
Royal Decree and through the due procedures of law making in Saudi Arabia. Finally, 
although the Explanatory Memorandum stated that these jurisdictions are temporary, 
the Act leaves it open for more penal cases to be referred to the Board. Further penal 
jurisdiction has been conferred on the Board since 1982, which must raise a doubt about 
the "temporary" nature of this jurisdiction. 
5.5 Enforcement of foreign judgments 
According to clause I (g) of Article 8 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982, the Board 
has the power to examine the enforcement of judgments issued by foreign courts. This 
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jurisdiction was exercised by the Board prior to the 1982 Act in accordance with the 
Council of Ministers order No. 250 of 1960 (1379 AH). However, the previous 
Jurisdiction of the Board was exclusive in so far as the Board had power only for those 
judgment which were issued by courts within the member states of the Arab League. 
The present Act gives the Board wider power to examine any foreign judgments 
regardless of origin. 139 
The question that may be asked here is why this jurisdiction was vested in the Board, 
when it might have been thought appropriate to the Shari'a Courts, which have general 
jurisdiction? 
Some writers believe that the Shari'a Court does not hear applications for the execution 
of foreign judgements because Shari 'a Courts will never agree to enforce judgements 
which are contrary to Islamic Law. As a consequence, the legislature has vested this 
power in the Board. Al-Juhani, for example, confirms that most foreign judgements are 
not in accordance with Islamic Shari 'a and as a result the Shari 'a Courts may "find it 
difficult to agree to enforce such Judgements". Hence the jurisdiction was vested in the 
Board. 140 
According to a second writer, the reason for investing the Board with this jurisdiction 
... is that the 
Shari 'a court does not under any circumstances feel 
obliged to honor a decree from a foreign country. The Shari 'a 
Court passes judgement according to the Shari 'a Law.... 141 
139 Ibid 
140 AI-Juhani, op. cit., pp. 114-115. 
141 A1-Hussayan, op. cit., p. 42. 
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Both writers have concluded that the Board was empowered with this jurisdiction 
because Shari 'a courts will never execute any foreign judgments unless they are 
according to Shari'a. However, regardless of this point, both writers fail to recognize 
the constitutional framework aspects of the Board. The Board of Grievances, as in the 
case of Shari 'a Court, will also reject any foreign judgment if it contradicts Islamic 
Shari 'a. 
The Chairman of the Board has issued a circular in which he lays down the principles 
that have to be taken into consideration in the examination of the Board's judgments, 
one of which is that a foreign judgment under examination should not be enforced if it 
is contrary to the Islamic Shari 'a. 142 
Consequently, if a foreign judgement involves Riba or usury, it will never be 
executed. 143 The writer was told that a judgment was brought before the Board which 
forced the defendant to pay a certain amount of money as interest. However, the 
claimant, knowing that the Board would reject his case on the grounds that it was in 
conflict with Islamic Law, waived all claim to the interest and applied for the 
enforcement of the judgement without interest. As a result, the jurisdiction was accepted 
as it did not conflict with the rules of Shari 'a, although the case was finally rejected on 
the basis of reciprocity. 144 
There would appear to be little point in vesting the Board with this jurisdiction apart 
from the fact that the Board will apply the rules of the Enforcement of Judgements 
142 Circular No. 7 of 15/8/1405 (1985). 
143 See Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., p. 731. 
144 Conversation with a Member of the Board in the Jeddah branch. The facts of this case were not 
disclosed. 
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Agreement of the members of the Arab League and therefore it will not examine the 
facts of the case again, as a Shari'a court would do. '45 
5.6 Actions which come under the Board's authority according to special legal 
texts 
"Legal texts" are taken to mean, as the Explanatory Memorandum explains, those laws 
and regulations which are issued by Royal Decree or order, orders of the Council of 
Ministers or High Orders. Consequently, the Board has the power try any dispute 
arising as a result of the application of any law or regulation, as long as the latter states 
that the Board has the power to do so. 
The Board, as explained in Chapter 3, had this power prior to the Board of Grievances 
Act 1982 and still retains this power, so there are laws and regulations which were 
issued before 1982 which refer to the Board as the judicial body which may try any 
dispute arising out of the application of the regulations. However, some further 
jurisdiction, including the Protection of the Public Services Act 1985 (1405 AH) has 
been added to the Board. 
The most important cases which have been referred to the Board recently are 
commercial cases. This jurisdiction originally came under the Commercial Dispute 
Settlement Committee (CDSC). However, in 1987 the CDSC was dissolved and its 
jurisdiction was transferred to the Board. As a result the Board has the power to 
adjudicate in all commercial cases between merchants or companies. 146 
145 For the procedure for examining a foreign judgement in the Board see Shaibt Al-Hamd, op. cit., 
pp. 712-734, the Enforcement of Judgement Agreement of the Members of the Arab League, and Al- 
Hussayan, op. cit. 
146 See the Council of Ministers order No. 241 of 1987 (26/10/1407). 
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According to the records of the Board, commercial disputes head the list of cases with 
2,738 registered in 1988/1989 (1409 AH) (i. e. 47%). In 1989/1990 (1410 AH) 
commercial cases amounted to 1,690 (i. e. 29%). In 1990/1991 (1411 AH) commercial 
cases totalled 1,976 (i. e. 47.5%). 147 
5.7 Cases referred to the Board by the Council of Ministers 
Clause 2 of Article 8 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982 reads: 
With consideration to the rules of jurisdiction set forth by law, the 
Council of Ministers may, at its discretion, refer any matters and 
cases to the Board of Grievances for hearing. 
The Council of Ministers, according to this article, has the discretionary power to refer 
any subject or case to the Board, but this power would seem to be restricted by the rules 
of jurisdiction which are prescribed by the law. This particular point, however, has been 
the subject of debate. 
Shaibt Al-Hamd (1989), who is a Member of the Board of Grievances, argues that the 
first part of this clause, i. e. "subject to the rules of jurisdiction prescribed legally, ... ", 
means that the Council of Ministers may refer any case or subject which does not come 
within the jurisdiction of the Board according to the first clause of Article 8, but which 
at the same time may come within the jurisdiction of another judicial body such as the 
Shari'a Court. He adds that with due respect to the jurisdiction of other judicial bodies 
147 See Appendix 5. 
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it is still permissible for the Council of Ministers to refer to the Board, in particular, any 
matter or any case for hearing. The writer goes on to say that it is not possible to 
interpret this article as if the Council of Ministers had to consider the rules of 
jurisdiction as prescribed by the law in force. So according to him, the Council of 
Ministers would be able to refer any case or matter, regardless of whether any other 
judicial body had this particular jurisdiction. 
Objections can be raised to Shaibt AI-Hamd's thesis. First, the legislature might have 
had no intention of giving the Council of Ministers the power which the writer gives it. 
If this is so, it could mean that two different judgments could effectively be passed in 
two very similar cases, resulting in a clear violation of the principle of equality of the 
individual before the law. In certain cases which come within the jurisdiction of the 
Shari'a Courts, it would be unfair and unjust to withdraw a particular case arbitrarily 
and transfer it to the Board or to any other judicial body. It is highly unlikely that this 
possibility represents the intention of the legislature. 
Second, Shaibt Al-Hamd's argument suggests by implication that the executive would 
have the power to intervene in the work of the judiciary by withdrawing particular cases 
and directing that they be heard by the Board, thereby ignoring the rules of jurisdiction. 
However this is, also, highly unlikely. It would mean the executive would infringe the 
independence of the judiciary. 
Finally, if the argument were correct, there would definitely be a conflict of jurisdiction 
between the Shari'a courts which enjoy the original jurisdiction and the Board to which 
the case is referred. 
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It is submitted that the clause "subject to the rules of jurisdiction prescribed legally" is 
intended to mean that the Council of Ministers should observe the rules of jurisdiction 
when it proposes to refer any case to the Board of Grievances. Case number 1034/l/Q 
of 1984 (1404 AH) would support this argument. This case concerned a dispute over 
"bounced" cheques (cheques without sufficient covering funds) submitted by the 
complainant to the defendant, who were partners. As a consequence, the Committee of 
Commercial Papers issued a decision whereby it obliged the complainant to pay the 
amount of money for which the cheques were issued. At the same time, the Commercial 
Dispute Settlement Committee issued a decision to liquidate the partnership between 
the two adversaries. The complainant petitioned the King and the Council of Ministers 
who then referred the case to the Board. 
The Board, however, held that the case was outside its jurisdiction, and gave several 
reasons for the decision, one of which was that it could not deal with commercial 
disputes. 148 It stated: 
... 
hearing disputes between partners regarding a company, its 
liquidation, and their respective rights, and hearing cases arising 
from commercial dealings with that company ... 
falls within the 
jurisdiction of the Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee in 
accordance with the regulations issued to that effect:... the Board of 
Grievances is not permitted to deal with a commercial dispute... as 
that is beyond its jurisdiction which is specified in its Act. This 
jurisdiction comes within the jurisdiction of CBSC according to the 
laws in force issued by the Ruler in this respect. Supporting this is 
148 This case was heard before the transfer of commercial cases to the Board. 
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the fact that when clause 2 of Article 8 of the Act of the Board of 
Grievances allowed the Council of Ministers to refer whatever 
subject and cases it deems fit to be heard by the Board of 
Grievances, it imposes as a condition for that the necessity to respect 
the lawfully established jurisdiction. 
5.8 The legal characteristics of the Board of Grievances 
Having discussed the development of the Board of Grievances, its present composition, 
membership and jurisdiction, the purpose of this section is to examine the legal 
character of the Board within the judiciary. 
It is generally understood that the judicial system in Saudi Arabia is dual. In other 
words, apart from the Shari 'a courts there is an administrative court, which is the Board 
of Grievances. AI-Fahal and others hold that the existence of an established and 
independent body known as an administrative court (i. e. the Board of Grievances) is 
neither controversial nor does it raise any doubt as to its nature as an administrative 
court. Al-Fahal adds that the Board commands both a distinguished jurisdiction and a 
special composition. It is neither subject to the Supreme Judicial Council which is at the 
highest level of the judiciary, nor are its decisions subject to appeal before the Cassation 
court. 149 Al-Juhani (1984), Musa (1982), and Rasslan (1989) also argued that the Board 
of Grievances is an administrative judicature in the full sense of word. They agree that 
with the establishment of the Board, Saudi Arabia has adopted a dual judicial system. 
149 Conversation with Dr. A. Al-Fahal and other staff members of the Law Department in King Abdul- 
Aziz University. 
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The above opinions, which define the Board as an administrative court, rely on three 
main factors. First, that the first article of the Act obviates any need for argument and 
makes it clear that the Board is an "... independent administrative judicial body. " In 
other words, as long as the Act itself has so defined the Board there is no reason to 
argue otherwise. '5° Secondly, the Explanatory Memorandum of the Act also indicates 
that the Board is an administrative court. It says that 
The provision that the Board is an independent body of administrative 
law is a clarification of its capacity as it exercises judicial 
functions. 151 
Finally, the jurisdiction of the Board laid down in Article 8 (clauses 1 a, 1 b, 1 c, and 1 d) 
is indicated without any doubt to be an administrative judicature, with similar 
jurisdiction to other administrative judicatures in other countries. 
However, while these writers admit that there is a conflict between the legal status of 
the Board as an administrative court and its penal jurisdiction, they argue that the penal 
jurisdiction is only temporary and that it will be transferred to the Shari 'a court in due 
course, as suggested in the Explanatory Memorandum. 
Three important points on the legal status of the Board have been overlooked: the 
historical development of the Board, the nature of its jurisdiction, and the Board in 
practice. 
150 Ibid., and conversations with Al-Fahal, op. cit. and with some members of the Board, namely A. Al- 
Dhalia, and Al-Sea'wi. 
151 See Rasslan, op. cit., p. 38. 
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The Board, as discussed in Chapter 3, had considerable jurisdiction which has become 
wider over a period of years. During the 1960s and 1970s, and up to the present day, 
many laws and regulations were laid down by the legislature, the Council of Ministers. 
The Shari 'a courts refused to apply these laws and regulations on the grounds that they 
were not established according to Islamic Shari 'a. 152 In this respect the Chief Judge 
said "... the courts of this Kingdom are not bound by any positive law, rather they judge 
in accordance with what Islamic Shari 'a orders ... ". 
153 These circumstances led first to 
the establishment of judicial tribunals to deal with disputes arising from the application 
of these laws, and secondly this was followed by the transfer of jurisdiction over these 
disputes to the Board of Grievances. The jurisdiction of the Board thereby become 
wider. It could be deduced that the Board was established not only to deal with 
administrative cases but also to absorb the disputes arising from the application of such 
laws and regulations, in which cases the Board could not be described simply as an 
administrative court. 
As has been stated earlier, the Board not only hears cases where the administration is a 
party, but also tries cases between individuals in matters such as commercial cases and 
the enforcement of foreign judgments. Moreover, clauses I (e) and 2 of Article 8 are 
open for any case to be referred by the Council of Ministers. These cases might not 
necessarily be administrative. 
Regardless of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Act, which would support the 
argument that the Board is not an administrative court, there are two points which 
152 Mohammed, M. A. Al-Tatawwur al-Tashrai fi al-Mamlakah al-A 'rabiah al-Sa'udiah, 1977, pp. 118- 
119. 
153 See Bin Gasim, M. A. Fatawa wa Rasail al- Shaikh Mohammed bin Ibraheem bin Abdulateef Al- 
Ashaikh, 1979, p. 248. 
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confirm that the argument that the penal jurisdiction is only temporary has no basis 
whatsoever in reality. First of all, apart from being vested in the Board as described 
above, the Board has enjoyed this jurisdiction for more than thirty years, including 
twenty years before the actual introduction of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. The 
Act then confirmed this jurisdiction by stating it clearly in Article 8. Moreover, 
according to clause I (f) of Article 8 there are penal cases other than those which, as 
stated in the Act, were specifically invested in the Board. Apart from this, the word 
"temporary" is of little significance so long as the Board still continues to receive penal 
cases. Overall, therefore, it would appear that the argument that the Board's penal 
jurisdiction is only temporary has no basis in reality. 
The composition and the structure of the Board contribute to undermining claims that it 
is solely an administrative court. The Board, as earlier discussed in this chapter, has 
penal and commercial panels apart from the administrative panels. Therefore, if the 
Board is to be described as an administrative court, there is no good reason it might not 
also be termed a penal or commercial court. 
Finally, it is submitted that the actual practice of the Board should not be ignored when 
determining its legal character. The submission that the Board of Grievances is an 
administrative court contradicts the reality as seen in Figure 5-2 below. The number of 
penal and other cases registered with the Board in 1984/85 (1405 AH) was 1,073, while 
the number of administrative cases registered in the same year was 643. In 1985/1986 
(1406 AH) the number of penal and other cases was 1,273, while administrative cases 
were 1,033, i. e. 40% of all registered cases. In 1990 the number of penal, commercial, 
and other cases was 2,890, while the number of administrative cases was 2,969. The 
number of administrative cases in 1990 and 1991 does not indicate the true number of 
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administrative cases, due to the fact that there was one dominant type of administrative 
case, namely, the retirement of members of the military forces and police. When it was 
realised that the Board had adjudicated in a case concerning one such case concerning 
an individual, this resulted in an increase in the number of administrative cases by 
2,068. If those cases are excluded from the number of administrative cases, the latter 
total 902, which is far fewer than the penal and commercial cases. 
Figure 2 
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Taking the above-mentioned points into consideration, it would seem that the Board of 
Grievances is merely an ordinary court in addition to the Shari 'a courts. However, 
although it has the power to deal with cases in which the government or its agencies are 
a party, it still cannot be defined purely as an administrative court. Consequently, there 
are two judiciaries in Saudi Arabia which have the same features and with their 
members having more or less the same qualifications: one encompasses the Shari'a 
courts with the Supreme Judicial Council occupying the highest level of its hierarchy, 
and the other is the Board of Grievances which is directly affiliated to the King. 
5.9 Conclusion 
Having discussed the jurisdictions of the Board there are two important points that 
should be mentioned here, one of which has regard to the influence of the environment 
on the Board, and the other is the power of Board to deal with administrative cases. 
In relation to the former, it would seem that the constitutional and legal dimensions of 
the country have their effect on the Board. As has been noted above, the Shari'a court 
does not feel obliged to apply laws enacted by the legislature, that is the King and the 
Council of Ministers, for the reasons stated earlier. This situation has induced the 
legislature to find other judicial channels to deal with such acts. As a result, the Board 
has become the "heir" to these jurisdictions. Moreover, as the legislature and the 
executive are one body, the latter has wide powers afforded to it to refer cases which 
are not originally within the Board's jurisdiction. There is an open-ended article, 
particularly clauses 1 (f) and 2, Article 8, which allows the Council of Ministers to 
invest the Board with jurisdiction which is not necessarily administrative. In addition, 
the Board is given the power to deal with non-administrative cases such as penal cases. 
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Consequently, it could be said that the Board has contributed to the erosion of the 
power of the Shari 'a. 
This expandable jurisdiction, as well as the non-administrative jurisdiction of the 
Board, has, in fact, influenced its legal characteristics, as has been argued. This may 
affect the functioning of the Board in respect of its original jurisdiction, which is 
dealing with administrative cases. The involvement of the Board with non- 
administrative cases may lead to less efficiency on the part of the Board in dealing with 
those administrative cases and this may be reflected in the huge number of other cases 
the Board has to deal with in comparison to administrative cases (see Appendix 4). 
The second point relates to the administrative jurisdiction of the Board as an 
administrative court. The Board can control the administration in respect of its 
decisions and acts. It can intervene to examine whether or not an administrative 
department has really acted in accordance with the law, and in exercising this power, 
the Board applies certain criteria in order to examine the legality of the challenged 
decision. The Board can also order the administration to compensate injured citizens 
who might have suffered as a result of the fault of the bureaucracy. 
However, the Board has no absolute control over the administration. The Board cannot 
order the administration to do something, or to take a decision in certain matters or 
substitute for the administration and perform its functions on its behalf. However, the 
Board can order the administration not to carry out its decision in the case of an 
application for a stay of execution, examined in the next chapter. The administration 
can also deal with matters without any challenge from individuals and the Board has no 
power of review over such actions. This occurs when the administration invokes 
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sovereignty, and here the Board will not intervene at all. In addition, the Board will not 
intervene in the exercise of discretion by the administration. 
However, the Board can intervene in discretionary matters if there is an abuse of 
power. The administration has the power when making decisions to find facts and 
apply the law to them. The administration also has the power to assess the facts and the 
proportionality of making a decision. Nevertheless, the Board can extend its power to 
review the appreciation of or the balancing of the facts by the administration and, as 
has been discussed earlier, the Board will quash the challenged administrative decision 
if it lacks manifest proportionality. The Board will also examine whether or not the 
facts on which the administration has based its decision are really existent and it will 
examine the conclusions the administration has drawn from such facts. 
In addition, the administration is not obliged to give reasons for its decisions unless the 
law requires it specifically to do so. Yet, as this chapter has shown, the Board has 
attempted to restrict the discretionary territory of the administration, and to expand its 
own power to cover such matters. 
In general, the Board showed reluctance in intervening in and reviewing specific cases 
especially those involving labour contracts with the government and the applications of 
contracts asking the Board to apply risk theory, which may result in compensation 
awarded to them against the government. The Board of Grievances Act 1982, as a 
result, was interpreted by the Board in order to wrongly exclude such important issues. 
This self-constraining attitude may eventually affect and restrict the Board's power to 
very limited issues. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Substantive law requires proper procedures if justice is to prevail. The efficacy of 
the Board of Grievances depends on the quality of such procedures, as well as on 
their proper application. Article 49 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982 
provided that the rules of procedures and proceedings of the Board would be 
issued through a resolution of the Council of Ministers. Such rules, however, 
took about seven years to be promulgated; only coming into force from the 
beginning of August 1989 (1410 AH). 1 Meanwhile, different panels of the Board 
complied with procedural rules issued in a circular by the Chairman of the 
Board. 2 This circular set out general principles for dealing with cases, including 
hearings, the absence of the parties concerned, and the recording of cases. 
The new rules of procedures and proceedings of the Board (hereinafter `the 
Rules') are divided into five chapters. 3 The first is devoted to matters relating to 
administrative cases such as applications for review, conditions prior to 
application, and preparation of cases. The second chapter deals with penal and 
disciplinary cases and who can bring an accusation. The third is devoted to the 
rules governing hearings. The fourth focuses on methods for reviewing the 
decisions of the Board, and the final chapter deals with general rules. 
There are three characteristics that distinguish the procedures of the board from 
those of other courts and judicial bodies in Saudi Arabia. First, as the Board 
deals with various types of jurisdiction, the rules provide different procedures for 
each type. Second, procedures before administrative panels in particular are both 
inquisitorial and adversarial. This dual character is worthy of emphasis. The 
1 Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 190 of June 1989 (16/11/1409 AH), see Umm AL- 
QURA the official paper No. 3266, July 1989 (4/12/1409 AH). 
2 See Circular 3 of 1984 (13/5/1404 AH). 
3 The official title is 2Ouwa'id al-Murafa'at wa al-Ijraat Amam Diwan al-Madhalim " 
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member or members of the administrative panel concerned are not restricted to 
the documents and claims provided by the parties involved. They themselves 
play an active role in the conduct of the trial of sessions. Thus, Article 18 of the 
Rules states that if the defendant (the government department) does not appear 
before the Board after the second notification, the panel concerned may decided 
the case and the Rules lay down that the decision will not be a decision in 
default. The burden of preparing the case for decision, controlling the hearing, 
and following its progress lies with the members thus reducing the effect of the 
absence of either party. On the other hand, the procedures before the 
administrative panels of the board are also adversarial, and the Rules ensure that 
each party to the cases has the right to submit his rebuttal either in writing or viva 
voce during a session. 4 
A third characteristic of the procedures is that in common with the UK 
administrative court, the principle medium for the conduct of proceedings before 
the administrative panels of the Board is in writing, with the exchange of briefs 
and briefs in rebuttal defining the process. This does not mean that there are no 
oral exchanges in the procedure. The Rules make it clear that the parties to the 
case may submit their claims either orally or in writing. ' 
Unfortunately there is no detailed study devoted to the operation of the 1989 
Rules of the Board. As far as the writer can determine, only one article has been 
written on this subject. 6 This chapter is intended to provide a critical examination 
of the procedures of the Board, in particular the way in which the Board deals 
with administrative cases. This examination combines both analysis of the Rules 
See Article 19 of the Rules of Procedures and Proceedings of the Board. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See Abu Sa'ad, M. S., "Qwa ' id al-Ijraat wa al-_Murafa 'at al-Idariah Amam Diwan al- 
Madhalim", Al-ldarah A1-A'amah, 1990, No. 68, pp. 97-151. 
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themselves along with information gathered through interviews with members of 
the Board and lawyers practicing before it. 
6.2 Pre-hearing procedures 
The rules for the preliminary steps prior to a hearing depend on whether a case 
falls within the Board's administrative, penal, or disciplinary jurisdictions. 
6.2.1 Administrative cases 
As discussed in Chapter 5, different types of action may be taken against the 
administration including annulling and indemnifying actions. 7 
In respect of actions of annulment, which aim at challenging defective decisions 
of the administration on the basis of ultra vires or other grounds, certain 
conditions must be satisfied before the complainant can bring a case before the 
Board. As noted in Chapter 5, the nature of the decision in question must be 
properly classified as an administrative decision. 8 Moreover, in respect of 
indemnifying actions, the claimant must show fault on the part of the 
administrative department and consequential damage to him. In addition to the 
jurisdiction conditions, there are three procedural conditions that must be 
satisfied before bringing any dispute before the Board: the applicant must have a 
sufficient interest, he must have petitioned the relevant administrative 
department, and he must have observed the time limit clauses. 
See Chapter Five, Section 5.2. 
8 Ibid. 
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6.2.1.1 The complainant's interest 
Complainants should have some connection with the issue under adjudication in 
order to pursue the case. 9 The complainant should be able to show that the 
decision under challenge has affected his interest. Accordingly, the complaint 
can be refused for lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff; if there is no 
interest, there is no litigation. 10 
What is the position of the Board on the question of litigants' interest? First, it 
should be noted that a complainant, in claims brought according to clause 1 (c) 
and 1 (d) of Article 8 (indemnification and administrative contracts cases), 
should have an interest in maintaining an action against the administration. This 
is because such cases concern only the aggrieved party or parties personally and 
the remedy sought will not really affect others. The standing of the aggrieved 
person in such a case is clear. The impugning decision or action is made directly 
against him and this is the basis of his standing. In claims by civil servants, such 
as salary claims, the aggrieved person could challenge a decision directed against 
him, which has affected his own salary and no-one else's. A contractor also has 
similar clear standing by virtue of the contract between him and the 
administration. In one case, No 944/1/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), decided in 1988, 
when a subcontractor sued the administration, the Board refused to hear the case 
9 In English Law, for example, the complainant should have "a sufficient connection (sufficient 
interest) with the matter in issue to qualify him to pursue the remedy", see Administrative Justice: 
some Necessary Reforms. Reports of the Committee of Justice-All Souls Review of 
Administrative Law in the United Kingdom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 178. 
10 Ibid., and see in Egyptian law Al-Tamawy, S., "AI-Qada al-Idari: Qada al-Ilgha ", 1986, Vol. 
1, pp. 499-560. 
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on the grounds that he had no interest because there was no contract between him 
and the administration . 
11 
The question of standing in an annulment action, in which the complaint 
challenges an administrative decision, raises a question of interpretation of the 
Board of Grievances Act 1982. Clause 1 (b) refers to "... Cases of objection filed 
by [parties concerned] against administrative decisions ... 
" The term "parties 
concerned" is ambiguous and the Act does not offer any clarification. Does this 
term mean that the plaintiff should have "objective concern" or "subjective 
concern"? Does the plaintiff have to have a direct interest in bringing a case in 
the sense that he is directly affected by a decision, or is it enough that he has a 
general but not personal interest? This is an important issue since it concerns the 
Board's role, as well as its power to intervene and examine the legality of the 
actions of government, and generally concerns the scope of its power over the 
administration. The question of standing or interest is thus closely connected 
with the Board's relationship with the administration. 
There are different views of the interpretation of clause 1 (b). Al-Fozan (1982) 
states that the term "parties concerned" implies that the right to challenge an 
administrative decision is limited to those who can show the Board that the 
challenged decision has affected their interests. However, Al-Fozan also argues 
that there is no need for the plaintiff to have an interest in the matter under 
adjudication by the Board. He states that it is permitted for every citizen, whether 
11 Case No. 944/1/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 116/T/1 of 1988 
(1408 AH). 
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or not he has interest in the action, to bring such a case before the Board because, 
in his view, the annulment action is usually connected with the public interest. 
The judge himself has a discretionary power to decide on questions of interest 
and whether or not he can accept them. The writer goes on to say that the 
expression "if there is no interest there is no litigation " refers to those cases 
which relate to personal claims and rights which only concern certain individuals 
and their private interest. 12 
Jeerah (1988) also argues that the term "parties concerned" is general and 
unrestricted. Consequently, he says, it can be taken to include every person who 
has interest whatever his relationship to the administration. 13 These writers 
support the view that the Board should act as a controller. 
There is, however, a different point of view, which favours a more restrictive 
approach. According to Shaibt Al-hamd (1989), a member of one of the 
administrative panels of the Board, the complainant is required to show that he 
has an interest in the action. He argues that proving the existence of personal 
interest in order to get an administrative action review by the Board is 
fundamental to having an action accepted by the Board. He goes on to say that if 
a case is registered and the defendant shows that the plaintiff has no direct and 
personal interest in the case under review, the Board should decide not to accept 
that particular case on the grounds that there is no interest. Moreover, if the 
administrative panel concerned discovers that the plaintiff has no interest, it 
12 Al-Fozan, A., "Diwan al-Madjalim fi Dhil Nidhamed al-Jadeed", Al-Idarah AI-A'amah, No. 
35,1982, p. 132. 
13 Jeerah, A., "Nidham al-Qadafi al-Mamlakah al -A'rabiah al Sa'udiah",. 1988, p. 456. 
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should immediately decide not to try the case. Shaibt Al-Hamd bases his 
argument on the principle that if there is no interest there is no litigation. 14 In the 
context of the practice of the Board, it would seem that the Board has adopted 
Shaibt Al-hama's view. It will not admit the liberal approach in relation to 
standing and the Board will not accept any case if the applicant has no personal 
interest. Thus in one of the cases decided by the Board, the Review Committee 
held: 
... the condition of interest in proceeding with a case is that the claimant 
should be the one who has the right to claim his case or a legal 
representative in accordance with rules of attorneyship. The rebuttal of 
the claimant's interest is a rebuttal to reject the case. Therefore, the panel 
may activate this rebuttal because it is related to the public policy. For a 
case to be valid, it should be claimed by a person himself concerned or 
his representative. '5 
It may be posited that the question of a litigant's interest is an important 
determent in respect to the Board's operation and its relationship with 
government departments. It will in fact determine the boundaries of the Board's 
powers over the administration. Thus if the role of the Board of Grievances is 
merely that of a "judge" whereby "disputes" between the administration and 
citizens may be tried, then the concept of "dispute" presupposes a "narrow 
" Shabit Al-Hamd, M., "Al-Wilaya al-Qadaiyah li Diwan al Madhalirn flu Mamlakah al - 
A'rabiah a1-Sa'udiah" 1989, pp. 594-595. 
15 Case No. 944/1/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 116/T/1 of 1988 
(1408 AH). 
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requirement of interest" because the Board will adjudicate a dispute which 
necessarily requires a party who has interest. In this sense, there will be no 
litigation without an interest, because the concept of litigation is a concept of 
dispute. Therefore there will be no dispute without litigation: the two are 
inextricably related. 
If, however, the role of the Board of Grievances is to control government 
departments, it acts as a "controller" of the acts and decision of the departments, 
rather than resolving disputes. Therefore, there will be no need for a narrow 
standing requirement. In this case the role of the Board might be presented as 
being to enforce the principle of legality upon the government and its department 
on behalf of the general public. 
This distinction between "dispute" and "control" reflect more general problems 
of public law systems evident elsewhere. 16 Namely, should standing or interest 
requirements be restrictive or liberal? As discussed below, this issue has led to 
controversy. In essence, two positions may be contrasted. One seeks to argue that 
applicants should always have a specific interest. The other argues that courts 
should be able to intervene in issues of government illegality even when 
particular applicants do not have a specific interest. 
This distinction between "dispute" and "control" is therefore not unique. It was 
adopted, for instance, by Thio (1971) under two different terms. The first is 
16 P Cane "Standing Up for the Public" [1995] Public Law. 276, and See for example Thio, S., 
"Locus Standi and the Judicial Review". Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1971. 
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jurisdiction de droit objectif. The role of the judiciary in this case is to maintain 
"... the legal order by confining the legislative and executive organs of 
government within their power in the interest of the public... ". The second is 
jurisdiction de droit subjectif. The aim of the judiciary here is merely to protect 
the private rights of individuals from illegal violation. As a result, the power of 
the judiciary is restricted to cases where individual rights are violated. If there is 
no violation the judiciary cannot intervene. '7 This distinction in judicial roles has 
been explained by Schiemann (1990) using the concept of open and closed 
systems. 
The requirement for the plaintiff to show that his personal interest is affected by 
unfavourable administrative decision, i. e. a restrictive or closed system, finds its 
justification in the following factors: 
a) The jurisdiction of judicial review may force the administrative court 
to examine matters over which it has no "... special competence and 
hence are better left to the experts to whom the matters have been 
entrusted'. 18 In other words judges are not prepared to adjudicate in 
matters that are not familiar to them. A closed system ensures that 
judges deal with disputes of the type for which they are equipped to 
deal. 19 
17 Ibid., p. 3. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Schiemann, K., "Locus Stand? ', Public law. 1990, p. 348. 
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b) It is a well established judicial principle that a judge cannot start the 
process of litigation on his own initiative. Thus, if anyone is 
permitted to challenge the administration on any issue whether or not 
he has interest distinguishing him from others, he will not be regarded 
as the "real litigant". It would appear that the judge is bringing the 
litigation on his own initiative and consequently the judge would be 
seen to be violating the above mentioned principle. 20 
c) Bringing a case involves financial cost not only to the plaintiff, the 
court or the administration, but also to general citizens; for substantial 
cost will affect the public treasury. 21 Moreover, if there is no 
limitation on judicial intervention there will be an increase in the 
number of cases registered with the court and subsequent delays in 
hearing other cases. 
d) The requirement of standing as a prerequisite to hearing any 
challenge to an administrative decision operates to control the volume 
of cases being brought against the administration and thereby limit 
the amount of time-consuming or vexatious litigation against the 
administration. 22 
20 Al-Tamawy, S., p. 502. 
21 Schiemann, op. cit., p. 348 
22 Al-Shobaji, 0., "Ragabh al-Oada a' la Oararat al- Idarah al-A ' amah fi Ingeltera ma' al- 
Mugarana bi al-Nidham al-Urduuni". unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Cairo University, 1988, pp. 427- 
428. 
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e) By leaving the door open to everyone to challenge the acts or decision 
of the administration, officials would be liable to be challenged about 
their decision at any moment and their work would suffer. Further it 
is argued that they would tend to concentrate their efforts on 
protecting themselves from possible judicial challenge. 
f) Ignoring the requirement of standing in an annulment action would 
effectively change the role of the "court" from judicial to 
administrative. 
Another approach supports the actio popularis or open system as it is called by 
Schiemann (or, as defined by Thio, a jurisdiction de droit objectij). The 
justification for the open system may be said to rest on the following factors: 
a) An annulment action is an action that deals with the legality of an 
administrative decision. In other words it is an "objective action" 
which aims at quashing the illegal administrative act or decision. 
There is no need therefore for the plaintiff to establish that he has an 
interest because he does not approach the court for his own interest; 
he does so in the interest of the public. 23 
b) The aim of an annulment action is to vindicate the principle of 
legality or the rule of law by reviewing administrative decisions. 
Consequently, if the plaintiff in an annulment action is refused the 
23 Al-Tamawy, , op. cit., 
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right to sue the administration on the grounds that he has no interest 
in the litigation, it means that the court will not be able to maintain 
the rule of law and keep the administration within the boundaries of 
the principle of legality. 24 
c) An annulment action also aims at setting aside illegal decisions or 
acts, and, at the same time, improving the future performance of the 
administration by controlling it. If administrators are given to 
understand that they may be questioned by anybody about their 
decisions and acts before the court, they will avoid taking illegal 
decision or acting contrary to the law. 25 
d) As stated earlier, the court will not take the initiative in examining 
any administrative action. Moreover, the administrators will not "put 
the court in action" either because they believe that they have acted in 
accordance with the law or because they believe that they have acted 
contrary to the law and do not want their action to be publicised. 26 
Therefore, it is essential to open the doors of the courts to anyone to 
challenge administrative decisions which are believed to be illegal. 
e) Finally it could also happen that although some individuals have an 
interest and therefore standing, they will not challenge the 
24 See Lord Diplock, cited in Schiemann, K., op. cit., p. 46. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Schiemann, op. cit. 
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administration because of apathy. 27 In such a case, it is not proper to 
leave the administration unchallenged in the court. 
With reference to the Board of Grievances, it would appear that the tension 
between restrictive and unrestricted requirements of interest will not be settled 
unless the Board adopts a clear view as to the role it should play. In particular, it 
needs to decide whether its role is to act principally as a judge adjudicating upon 
disputes between citizens or whether its role is primarily to control government 
departments as a protector of the principle of legality. 
It is submitted that under the 1982 Act, the question of standing is a matter of 
discretion. It would appear that the legislature, in using the term "parties 
concerned", has invested a discretionary power in the Board to decide on this 
matter. It has not given the Board a list of the criteria or interests which may be 
taken into consideration to help it determine when to accept a case. It is 
submitted that since there is no clear criterion the burden upon the Board is to 
establish its own measures and criteria upon which its discretion is exercised. 
The question now is who decides whether a complainant has interest or not? In 
other words, is the decision supposed to be administratively taken by the 
Chairman of the Board or his deputy, or is it a legal question for the board panels 
during a hearing? Neither the Board of Grievances Act 1982 nor the Rules of 
Procedures and Proceedings determine who has the power to decide this 
important issue. The practice of the Board is unclear. The Chairman has wide 
power to examine and assign a case to a panel and to contact a government 
27 Ibid. 
261 
Chapter Six The rules of procedure 
department, but it is not clear whether or not he can reject a case on the grounds 
that the complainant has no interest. This is an important issue, because if the 
matter is to be decided by the Chairman, as an administrative matter, the latter's 
decisions are not subject to review by the review committee (as discussed below) 
and therefore the claimant may lose his right. But if the issue is a matter to be 
decided by the Board panels, as a legal decision, their decisions are subject to 
review. 
It is submitted that whatever approach the Board decides to adopt on the question 
of standing, it is a legal matter to be decided by the Board panels. The Chairman 
does not have the competence to decide, as he does not have the details of the 
case as do the Board panels. 
6.2.1.2 The petition submitted to the department concerned 
In some disputes involving the administration, unlike disputes between other 
parties, the aggrieved person must first ask the department concerned to 
reconsider its decision. This precondition is applicable only to annulment actions 
and to civil servants' claims, cases which are included in clauses 1 (a) and I (b) 
of Article 8 of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. Cases involving 
indemnification and administrative contracts are not subject to this requirement. 
With respect to indemnification cases in particular, it is unclear why the 
Regulations do not require the aggrieved person to exhaust such internal 
administrative channels as are available to him before resorting to the judicial 
remedy before the Board. Indemnification cases may be divided into two types, 
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the first being those which arise as a result of a fault on the part of the 
administration or a defective administrative decision which causes damage. This 
type of indemnification case is possibly covered by the requirement that the 
aggrieved party must exhaust internal administrative channels. The second type 
arises where the administration is obliged to compensate any person or persons 
injured as a result of actions taken in the public interest and where there is no 
question of fault or a defective decision that may give rise to a right to 
compensation. In such a case it is submitted that there is no justification for not 
requiring the aggrieved party to seek a remedy from the relevant department 
before resorting to judicial solution, thus putting this type of case on the same 
footing as others. 
With respect to administrative contracts, their exclusion from the need to petition 
the department in question may be attributed to the fact that a contract, whatever 
its type, usually establishes a relationship between the parties, each agreeing to 
be bound by its stipulations and provisions. In other words, the contract is the 
law of the parties. Moreover, unlike private contracts or other administrative 
cases, the rules which control administrative contracts are different from those 
which control other private contracts. As is the case with French law, the 
administration in Saudi law has the power to amend the terms of its contracts 
with anybody, as long as its aim is to protect the public interest. 28 Consequently, 
there is no need for the Rules to specify certain measures to delineate such a 
relationship, as is the case with other administrative cases. 
28 Brown, N. and Garner, J. "French Administrative Law", 1983, pp. 123-4 
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In an annulment action where the aggrieved person attacks an administrative 
decision, the department concerned must be petitioned before bringing the case 
before the Board for hearing. Article 3 states as a prerequisite, that the 
complainant must petition the administrative department which issued the 
decision within sixty days. This time limit commences from the date on which 
the person concerned is notified of the decision. This prior condition is 
obligatory for any person wanting to challenge an administrative decision and 
failure to do so may result in the Board refusing to accept the case. 
For civil servants' claims, the Rules stipulate certain conditions prior to pursuing 
a claim before the Board. 29 The claimant must try to satisfy his claim first with 
the department concerned, within five years beginning from the existence of that 
right. The department concerned should examine the claim and make a decision 
regarding it within ninety days. If the department concerned fails to act, or 
refuses to consider the claim, the complainant must then complain to the General 
Board of the Civil Service (GBCS), within a period of sixty days, before 
resorting to the Board of Grievances. The sixty day period should begin from the 
date of notification of the decision by the administrative department, if the period 
expires without action being taken by the department concerned. The GBCS 
should take a decision within sixty days. If the GBCS fails to act within the 
prescribed time or supports the decision of the administrative department, the 
claimant then has the right to bring his case before the Board after a maximum 
period of five months. 30 
29 These claims are stated in clause I (a), Article 8, of the Board of Grievances Act 1982. 
30 See Article 2 of the Rules. 
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On the face of it, this requirement appears merely to be a statutory obstacle 
delaying justice to the advantage of the administration. However, this procedural 
precondition is important and may, in fact, serve the interest of all parties 
concerned - the administration, the Board, and the aggrieved person. To be 
required to reconsider its decision is essential for the administration, since it is 
the body which carries out public services on behalf of all of society. In the first 
instance, the attention of the administration will be drawn to the illegality of the 
decision taken if such is the case, and given the opportunity to reconsider and 
modify it without resort to judicial means. Second, in cases where a department 
believes its decision to be legal and without defect, an opportunity is given to it 
to prepare itself for the consequences of a challenge before the Board. 31 It may 
for example delay implementing its decision until a judicial solution is secured. 
From the Board's point of view, the requirement helps to reduce its case-load and 
maintain its efficiency. 32 It is undoubtedly desirable that the time of the Board 
and its panels should not be wasted on adjudicating disputes that could be solved 
more easily at preliminary stages. 
It might seem that the precondition of resort to the department can be of no 
advantage to an aggrieved individual. Nonetheless, the individual claimant may 
benefit. As mentioned earlier, there is a chance that the administration may 
31 Cf Le Sueur, A. P. and Sunkin, M., "Application for judicial review: the requirement of leave ", 
Public Law, 1992, pp. 102-129. 
32 See case No . 564/l/Q of 1983, decision of the Review Committee No. 96/t/1 of 1985 (1405 AH), 
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reconsider its "illegal decision" and meet the demands of the aggrieved party, 
thereby saving individuals the financial cost and effort in going to court. 
The advantages to all parties of the petitioning requirement could be enhanced by 
reforms. The prescribed period within which to petition for an annulment action 
could be reduced, thereby reducing delay in the process of justice. Moreover 
there may be undue suffering caused to the aggrieved person if the Board were 
not to intervene in good time. The Rules appear to be unclear as to whether 
petitioning the administrative department concerned is required in such urgent 
cases and there is no clear answer in the practice of the Board. In order to avoid 
unfair consequences from this requirement, it is submitted that it should not be 
applied to decisions which require an immediate stay of execution. Bearing in 
mind the fact that the Board will not decide on the case but will only examine the 
urgency of the case for a stay of execution and, in the event, use its discretion, it 
would be convenient for individuals to have direct access to the Board to seek a 
stay of execution. 
In relation to civil servants' claims, the operation of the current petition 
procedure has a number of shortcomings. First, the various time periods are 
confusing, making the procedures unnecessarily complex, as a result of which 
the aggrieved person may easily lose his rights. Second, these conditions may 
delay the process of justice. The aggrieved person must wait five months to 
qualify for the right to seek a judicial remedy -a considerable delay. Third, the 
fulfilment of time periods is also a burden on the Board itself. It has to satisfy 
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itself that the prerequisites have been fulfilled before a panel adjudicates a case. 
This may also lead to delay in the adjudication of such cases. 
It is submitted that an improvement would result from reducing the periods for 
petitioning. Moreover, the rules requiring a civil servant to complain to the 
GBCS lack any clear purpose. Clause 4 of Article 2 of the Rules states that 
If the decision of the General Board of Civil Service affirms the right of 
the plaintiff to his claims, and the administrative body fails to execute it 
within thirty days from the date of notification thereof, the case may be 
filed with the Board of Grievances within sixty days subsequent to such 
period, or within the remaining period of the five years stipulated in the 
first paragraph of this Article, whichever is longer. 
So what need is there for resorting to the GBCS when it has no power to force 
the administrative department concerned to alter its decision? 
6.2.1.3 Limitation period for bringing a case before the Board 
The Board's Rules state that disputes involving civil servants' claims, indemnity 
cases, and contractual claims against government departments will not be heard 
by the Board after a period of five years from the time the right or claim first 
come into existence. However, the Rules provide that the Board can intervene if 
the claimant has a legitimate excuse for any delay which prevented him from 
applying within the prescribed period of time. The Board has the power therefore 
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to examine the excuse or excuses given by the plaintiff, and to decide whether 
the excuse constitutes a legitimate one. 33 
In relation to actions where the aggrieved person challenges an administrative 
decision, the aggrieved, as stated earlier, must appeal to the administrative 
department within sixty days to reconsider its decision. The department 
concerned should reply within ninety days of the aggrieved person's application. 
Should the administration fail to act or refuse to reconsider the decision, the 
aggrieved person should bring his case before the Board within sixty days 
starting from the day on which the department concerned refused to act, or when 
the ninety-day period has expired. 34 
There are thus two situations in which the aggrieved person may lose the right to 
challenge an administrative decision. The first is when he fails to appeal to the 
administrative department concerned within the sixty days following the issue of 
the decision. This means that he will be unable to appeal to the administrative 
department concerned and that he will be unable to bring his case before the 
Board, the second is when he actually appeals to the administrative department 
and it rejects his appeal, and he then fails to appeal to the Board within the sixty 
days specified in the Rules. Unlike civil servants' claims and compensation 
cases, which the Board can hear if the plaintiff has a legitimate excuse, the Board 
here has no power to intervene once the time limit has elapsed. In such a 
situation, the aggrieved is under undue pressure from the complexity of the 
33 Articles 2 and 4 of the Rules. 
34 Article 3 of the Rules. 
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limitation periods and their length that the Rules require. Moreover, the negative 
consequences of this pressure are intensified, particularly when the aggrieved 
person is a layman who has no basic knowledge of the law. Therefore there must 
be doubts as to the desirability of the time limit requirement or, at least, its 
length. 
The limitation requirement, it can be argued, affords immunity to illegal 
administrative decisions. At the same time it allows any illegality to continue. 35 
Another view holds that the limitation on marking a claim is essential to ensure 
the stability of the administration's work and procedure and avoids confusion and 
disorder arising from the quashing of administrative decision after a long period. 
The Board has held that the time limitation in the case of annulment action is 
required by public policy. It has stated: 
It has been established in administrative judiciary that the time limit for 
annulment action belongs to public policy. When time limits are 
specified by law, administrative decisions will be non-annullable. This 
is done only with the highest regard for the public interest which may 
be realized in the stability of administrative activities ... observing such 
time limits is a considered part of public policy. Therefore the court or 
the panel which considers the case should reject the case if a challenge 
to an administrative decision is brought after the expiry of the 
prescribed time limit. 36 
35 Cf Schiemann, op. cit., p. 342. 
36 Case No. 564/1/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), cfde Smith, op. cit., pp. 374-375 
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This view arose out of a case where a company (the plaintiff) appealed against a 
number of administrative penal decisions (made against it by a particular 
ministry) for damage caused to telephone cables. The plaintiff claimed that it was 
not responsible for the damage to the cables. The fault was that of the ministry, 
as the latter had not co-operated with the company in locating the said cables 
before starting the job, although it had promised to do so. Moreover the depth of 
the cables under the ground was in breach of the law. The ministry rejected the 
claim on the ground that it was out of time. 
The Board refused to allow some of the appeals lodged because the company had 
challenged them after the legal time limit had expired. The other appeals were 
allowed by the Board. 
It is submitted that the position adopted by the Board is the preferable one. If the 
decisions of the administration remain vulnerable to challenge at any time the 
public services and activities which are carried out by the administration in the 
interest of the public will always be subject to interruption. Further, the 
administration will always be under pressure from possible legal challenge to 
decisions that may well have been issued for a long time and which may have 
become the grounds for further decisions. 
However, while this requirement is desirable in principle, it would appear that 
the period stated by the Rules to enable an aggrieved person to challenge a 
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defective administrative decision - 60 days - is too short. The invalidity of the 
administrative decision may appear some time after when the aggrieved person 
comes to realise that the decision is illegal and may affect his interest. 
37 
6.2.2 Penal and disciplinary cases 
Prior to 1982, the Board had the power to undertake necessary pre-trial 
proceedings such as the investigation of different crimes like bribery and forgery, 
and at the same time to adjudicate upon such cases. 38 However, after 1982 the 
responsibility for proceedings before trial, including investigation and 
preparation of the indictments, was removed from the Board and vested in the 
Bureau of Control and Investigation (BCI). Article 10 of the Board of 
Grievances Act 1982 reads: 
The Bureau of Control and Investigation shall prosecute before the 
competent circuit the crimes and offences which the Bureau 
investigates. 
The reason for this lies in the fact that judicial and prosecutorial functions cannot 
be vested in one and the same body. The Explanatory Memorandum clarifies this 
point: 
37 Cf "Administrative Justice, some necessary reforms", Report of the Committee of the 
JUSTICE- All Souls Review of Administrative Law in the United Kingdom, 1988, pp. 155-157. 
38 See Chapter Three. 
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... as the 
functions of the Board of Grievances have, by virtue of this 
Act, become judicial only, investigation has become [the function] of 
another independent body ... 
39 
With regard to the appearance of an accused before the Board, the Rules state 
that the accused must be notified of the date of trial. If he fails to appear he will 
again be summoned. If he does not appear on this occasion the panel has the 
power to try the case and take action in default. 40 Furthermore, the Rules give the 
panel, before whom the case is brought, the right to order the accused to be 
brought before it; 41 but the Rules do not specify the means by which he may be 
brought, that is, whether by force or by some other means. However, Article 19 
of the Rules implies that in the event of the accused not appearing after the 
second summons, the Board has the choice of either trying the case and taking a 
default judgment or compelling the accused to appear before the panel by force. 
Finally, it should be noted here that in the event of the death of the accused, the 
prosecution ceases in those cases, falling within clause 1 (f) of Article 8 of the 
1982 Act. 42 In such an event, any monies and financial assets illegally acquired 
by the accused, however, will be confiscated by the State. 43 This Article raises 
the question of how the State confiscates monies or financial assets from the 
accused after his death while he was still a suspect. It may be suggested that the 
justification for this is to return those monies and financial assets by which the 
39 The methods by which the BCI carries out its investigations into the right of accused persons in 
respect of these measures is not examined here as the present study is concerned primarily with 
the Board of Grievances. 
40 Article 19 of the Rules. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Article 12 of the Rules. 
43 Ibid. 
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accused became illegally wealthy. This still leaves the question of how the 
illegality of this wealth could be proved when the accused is dead. The Rules are 
silent in this respect. 
6.3 The instigation of cases 
In cases to which the administration is a party, the complainant may begin his 
case by submitting a citation, Istida'a, or an application addressed to the Board's 
Chairman or a person delegated by the Chairman. 44 This means that the Istida'a, 
must be submitted directly by hand to the headquarters of the Board in Riyadh, 
or by post or telegram. 45 The question here is whether it is also possible to 
submit complaints to one of the Board's branches if more convenient for the 
aggrieved person. Theoretically, and according to Article 1 of the Rules, the 
complaint should be directed only to the Chairman of the Board or to a person 
authorised by him. This means that the Rules give the Chairman of the Board 
wide power to authorise any person to deal with this formality. In practice, 
however, the three branches of the Board do accept complaints from individuals, 
but they will immediately refer them to the Chairman of the Board who 
determines how they are to be allocated. 
The complaint, as the Rules state, should be brought by "the plaintiff' and 
generally speaking this can be either a citizen or a legal body. Article 8 of the 
44 Article I of the Rules. 
45 See case No . 252/l/Q of 1988 (1408 AH), decision of the Third Panel of the Review Committee No. 84/T/3 of 1990 (1410 AH). 
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Board of Grievances Act 1982 defines the plaintiff as having a dispute with the 
administration or appealing to quash an administrative decision relating either to 
the right prescribed under the Civil Service and Pension Laws or relating to 
administrative contracts. In all cases, the implication appears to be that the action 
is brought by individuals. Can the administration bring cases against individuals 
and therefore become a plaintiff before the Board? According to the Rules and 
the Board of Grievances Act 1982, the administration cannot bring cases against 
individuals and in principle such a possibility should not admitted. The 
administration is in a strong position vis-ä-vis administrative matters. It can take 
decisions unilaterally without consulting the citizens affected. Moreover, in the 
case of administrative contracts, for example, the administration can alter the 
terms and has discretionary power to do so insofar as it serves the public interest 
and provided that it gives proper compensation to the contractor. As a result, it 
would seem that the administration has no need to act as plaintiff. However, 
occasionally the administration has initiated action against an individual. 
The author has come across three cases of this type, two of which were brought 
initially to the Board for consultation; these were later registered as cases against 
individuals. 46 In the first, the claimant had asked the relevant government 
department to pay him his salary for ten months in which he was absent from 
work. As the time limit for making a claim had elapsed the head of that particular 
department asked the Board for its views on the matter. The Board registered the 
matter as a case and held that the claimant was eligible to receive his salary for 
46 See case No. 1057/l/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), decision of the First Panel of the Review 
Committee No. 133/T/1 of 1985 (1405 AH); Ind Case No. 42/2/Q of 1982 (1403 AH), decision 
of the First Panel of the Review Committee No. 63/T/1 of 1985 (1405 AH). 
274 
Chapter Six The rules of procedure 
the period claimed. In the second case, the administrative department paid the 
claimant his salary which the claimant had not claimed for more than two years 
and long after the time-limit had elapsed. This decision came to the attention of 
the General Control Board (GCB) which is concerned with financial control of 
the state. This Board asked the government department to refer the matter to the 
Board of Grievances for its opinion. 
The third case was against a foreigner who was not resident in Saudi Arabia. 
This person had a contract with a government department which he had failed to 
carry out. The department brought an action before the Board. As the other party 
was a foreigner who lived abroad and the project had to be carried out abroad, 
the administration had no power over the other party. In this instance the 
administration could act to secure its right either to bring the other party before 
the Board or, if he did not appear, to at least obtain a default action which might 
be implemented in the country where the defendant resided. 
As the complaint must be brought by Istida'a or action it should be written, as 
the Rules require. The Rules state that the complaint or citation should include 
information about the plaintiff and the defendant. In other words, the complaint 
should specify the parties to the case, their authority and their addresses. 47 The 
complaint should also state the subject matter of the litigation. The Rules, 
however, do not state how detailed the statement should be, or whether there 
should be a full statement of the facts and the law, or whether any documents 
relevant to the case should be filed. In practice, however, the Istida'a contains at 
47 Abu Sa'ad , op. cit., pp. 101-102, and see Article I of the Rules. 
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a minimum, the grounds for the complaint, the damage that has occurred, and 
what sort of remedy the complainant is seeking from the Board. 48 Where the 
complaint relates to civil servants and pension rights, the Istida'a should contain 
the date on which the aggrieved person appealed to the administrative 
department concerned to obtain his or her rights, and the result of that appeal. 
If the aggrieved person is asking for the annulment of an administrative decision 
affecting him, his complaint should contain the date on which he petitioned the 
administration asking it to reconsider its decision. 49 
6.3.1 Stay of Execution 
As a general rule, the implementation of an administrative decision will not be 
restrained simply because it is challenged before the Board. 50 However, the panel 
may order a stay of execution by the department. It can also issue an urgent and 
temporary precautionary measure within twenty-four hours of an urgent 
application from the plaintiff or as soon as the case is referred to it. This 
procedure will be initiated whenever the panel feels that a suspension is 
necessary and implementation of the decision would case irreparable damage and 
effects on the plaintiff. 51 As far as the writer is aware, no application of a stay of 
execution has yet been made in practice. 
4s Review by the writer of some Istida'a to the Board, see Mahassni, H. and Grenley, N. F., 
"Public Sector Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia's Administrative Court ", The International 
Lawyer. 1987, Vol . 21, No. 3, pp. 836-837. 49 Article 1. 
so Article 7 of the Rules. 
51 Ibid. 
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6.3.2 Allocation of cases 
The Rules of Procedures do not contain details as to the allocation of cases 
among the different panels of the Board. This power is vested in the Chairman of 
the Board. The Rules add that the Chairman will allocate a registered case to the 
panel which is located in the territorial area where the headquarters of the 
administrative department concerned is situated. 
In practice, the Chairman of the Board, in exercising this power, acts through an 
office called "The Chairman's Office" which consists of secretaries and other 
staff. As soon as the case is referred to the Chairman's Office it is registered in a 
"Cases Record ". An "Allocation Card" is completed for referral to one of the 
Board's panels and the Chairman of the Board or his deputy then approves the 
allocation. The Rules give the Chairman a discretionary power to allocate cases 
and this is only limited by circulars that define some of the grounds for 
allocation. 52 
In practice, apart from the territorial jurisdiction of the administrative panels, the 
allocation of cases takes into account the question of subject matter. There are 
general administrative and subsidiary panels, each type invested with particular 
jurisdiction. For example, the general administrative panels, consisting of three 
members each, have authority to deal with cases involving large amounts of 
money, whereas the subsidiary panels deal with cases involving lesser amounts. 53 
52 See Circular 11, of 1985 (1406 AH). 
53 See Circular of the Chairman of the Board, No. II of 1985 (1406 AH). 
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As the Rules lack a well-defined method of allocating cases and as there are 
more than five thousand cases registered with the Board every year, 54 it would 
appear essential that proper rules be laid down regarding allocation in order to 
improve the work of the Board. Although abuse of power has not occurred, the 
current practice of the Board in relation to allocation could invite abuse. Apart 
from this, the improper allocation of cases to panels that do not have jurisdiction 
could occur and in such cases there would be delay in adjudicating. 55 
In order to improve the procedures within the Board and the same time reduce 
the risk of error in the allocation of cases, it submitted that there should, first of 
all, be a panel consisting of some experienced members whose function it is to 
examine a case, without looking too deeply into the facts or law, and then to 
allocate it on the basis of the information available in the case file. Secondly, 
there should be some explicit criteria on which to base the allocation. 
The Rules do not specify any time limit between the registration and allocation 
of cases. In practice this may take anything from one day to several months. For 
example, in case No. 564/1/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), decision of the Review 
Committee No. 96/T/1 of 1985 (1405 AH), the period between registration of the 
Istida'a, and allocation took only two days, from 7/3/1983 to 9/3/1983. In 
another case, however, it took four months. 56 The reason for such variation is 
attributed to the fact that the Chairman or his deputy will initiate contact with the 
5' See the Appendix. 
55 See for example decision No. 121/DTTG 13 of 1990 (1410 AH), case No. 1274/l/Q of 1990 
(1410 AH). 
56 See case No . 
1161/1/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 53/T/1 of 
1986 (1406 AH), the case was registered on 30/07/1985 (12/11/1405 AH) and the allocation was 
on 24/11/1985 (11/3/1406 AH). 
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administrative department in order to provide the Board with any relevant 
documents or information before referring the case to the panel concerned. 57 This 
procedure is improper since a panel has the duty to prepare a case for 
adjudication, and it can cause delay in referring to a panel. 
6.3.3 Penal and disciplinary cases 
Penal and disciplinary cases are brought by the Board of Control and 
Investigation (BCI). The indictment should contain the name of the accused 
person or persons, their positions, addresses, the accusation made against them, 
the place of crime, evidence of accusation, and the law that the BCI would wish 
to have applied. 58 The case will then be registered. After, as in administrative 
cases, the Chairman or person authorised by him will allocate the case to one of 
the various penal or disciplinary panels. 59 
6.4 The preparation of the case 
Article I of the Rules states that the panel in charge of a case can request 
assistance in its preparation from specialists. This raises question about the 
Article and its application in practice. First, what is meant by "specialists" and 
57 Interview with the Deputy Chairman, 18/1/2007 and 9/2/2007. 
58 Article 8 of the Rules. 
59 Applications for enforcement of foreign judgments have the same procedure as administrative 
cases. See Article 8. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Rules do not mention commercial 
cases. 
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secondly, what exactly is meant by "the preparation of the case"? Is it 
preparation for the hearing or for the final decision? 
The Deputy Chairman of the Board, referring to the actual practice of the Board, 
argues that "the preparation of the case" refers to preparation for the final session 
of the hearing, that is the sessions at which the final decision of the panel is 
made. The specialist must be a member of the Panel. In preparing the case the 
member of the panel writes to the relevant government department asking them 
to provide him with evidence and document relating to the case. He hears both 
parties and enters into the record any oral or other evidence taken at the hearing. 
Finally he gives all other members of the Panel a copy of the dossier of the case 
to examine and prepare for the final session of the hearing and for the final 
determination. These final hearing sessions in which the members of the panel as 
well as the parties of the case are present are those which are referred to in 
Article 15 of the Rules. This states that all members of the panel must be present 
at the hearing sessions. 60 
It is submitted that this approach involves the application of a wrong 
interpretation of the Rules of Procedures and Proceedings. First it does not 
distinguish between the preparation of a case and its hearing. In fact it confuses 
the two. For instance, taking evidence and hearing the parties to the case should 
be undertaken during a hearing session at which all the members are present and 
should not be undertaken during the preparation of the case. A second 
60 Interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board, op. cit. 
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questionable aspect is the interpretation of "specialist" as one of the panel 
members. The Rules state that ".... the panel concerned can get assistance from 
one of the specialists to prepare the case under its supervision". The Article 
clearly implies that the panel can seek assistance from a person outside the panel 
itself. This approach would appear clear and evident when a panel which consists 
of a single member requests assistance. In such a case, the specialist could hardly 
be the panel member himself. It is submitted that the specialists mentioned in 
Article I refer to the advisers who are attached to the Board and who have 
experience in administrative law. As discussed in Chapter 4, some of the Board 
members are not experienced in administrative law or in the day to day working 
of the Board of Grievances. Advisers, who are drawn from the Egyptian Council 
of State, are available to assist such Board members with any legal question that 
may arise. They should represent the "specialists" referred to in the Rules. 
It is submitted that "the preparation of the case" in Article I of the Rules refers to 
the preparation of the case prior to hearings. The purpose of this stage is to 
examine the plaintiffs application and declaration in order to clarify any 
ambiguity or vagueness in the application and to examine the subject matter of 
the case to see whether it falls within the jurisdiction of the panel. This stage may 
also include notifying the department concerned and checking whether the 
plaintiff has followed the requirements or not, such as petitioning a particular 
department. The view of the Deputy Chairman of the Board on the nature of the 
preparatory stage of a case is not supported by the Rules. 
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When a case is referred to the administrative panel, the President of the panel 
should fix a date for the hearing and notify both parties concerned. The period 
between notification and the date of the first hearing should not be less than 
thirty days. 61 
Unlike the procedures before 1989, the Board must notify the department with 
which the plaintiff has the dispute and the Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy (MFNE), the General Control Board (GCB), and the General Board of 
Civil Service (GBCS) in cases involving disputes over civil servants' rights. 62 
Most of the administrative cases involve financial matters and as such concern 
both the department involved and also the other departments that deal with 
financial matters within the state. This Article has lead to some controversy. In 
interviews with the author, some lawyers state that they believe that imposing 
such conditions will lead to delay in hearing cases by the Board as there will be 
four different parties involved and the administrative panel will not hear a case 
unless all the parties are present. 63 Consequently, it has been argued that the 
procedures should be changed in favour of an arrangement whereby the 
departments concerned meet before with the administrative department against 
whom the case is brought and this department alone should attend the Board 
hearing. 
However such a change is unlikely to be acceptable to other departments 
concerned with the final implication of any decision by the Board. Thus, in an 
61 Article 5 of the Rules. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Interviews with T. Al-Ibraheen. on 7/12/2006. Jeddah. 
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interview with the author, the president of the Legal Affairs Department in the 
MFNE pointed out that some departments are not as eager as others to defend the 
position of the administration. 64 
A solution to the problem may lie in the creation of a single government agency 
to deal with all cases before the Board of Grievances to which the administration 
is party. All department concerned, such as MFNE, would be represented by this 
department. This solution would ease the task of the Board and, at the same time, 
the administration would be adequately represented. In addition, a body of 
trained and experienced staff would develop which could deal with cases before 
the Board. A possible disadvantage is that there might still be delay in dealing 
with cases as the new agency would still need to check and examine the position 
of the administrative department involved in the case under adjudication. 
6.5 The hearing 
As already noted, the Rules require that all the members of the panel must be 
present throughout all sessions that make up the hearing. According to Article 15 
of the Rules, a session of the panel will be invalid if any of the three members is 
not present. If one member fails to attend the session for any particular reason 
another member from another panel should be appointed. This rule of course, 
applies only to those panels which consist of more than one member. It is not 
applicable to subsidiary panels composed of a single judge. The practice, 
64 The president of the Legal Affairs Department showed the writer some counterclaims of the 
administrative department to prove the need for the member of the fourth administrative panel. 
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however, is different from the theory. Once the President of certain panels 
receives a case he assigns a member to deal with this case from the members of 
the panel. This member, contrary to what the Rules stipulate, will be the sole 
member in most sessions of the case. During the discussion of the facts and the 
law, however, and when taking the final decision, all three members of the 
particular panel are present. 
The incompatibility of the Board's practice with the rules in force is explained by 
some members of the Board as a consequence of the large number of cases 
referred each year, in addition to a backlog of cases. 65 The work load makes it 
very difficult to implement the Rules properly. 
However, if the Rules were properly adhered to, the problem would be less 
severe. As already noted, the Board is confusing the preparation of a case with 
the hearing, the consequence of which is that the Board's practice operates 
differently from the Rules. Distinguishing clearly between the preparation and 
hearing of cases would save the panel time and might reduce the length of the 
actual hearing sessions. 
In the course of both hearing and preparing a case for a final decision, panel 
members play an active role. Because of the Board's inquisitorial nature in 
relation to administrative cases, the Board has the right to pursue its own 
investigation of facts and law, and not simply rely on the briefs or arguments of 
65 Conversation with the members of the fourth administrative panel. 
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the parties involved. 66 Should the defendant department fail to appear before the 
panel after the second notification, adjudication can proceed on the case and a 
decision be reached despite the absence of a party. 
The procedures are also adversarial insofar as each of the parties has the chance 
to address the panel and to contradict other parties in oral submissions. 
According to Mahassni and Grenley (1987), there are no special rules or 
procedures governing the exclusion, suppression, or discovery of evidence. 
67 The 
new Rules are silent on rules of evidence. The law of evidence applied by the 
Board follow the general rules as practised in the ordinary courts. 
68 
When the hearing starts, the secretary of the panel (Amin As'ser) enters the name 
of those present at that particular session into the record of the case (Ad' dhabt). 
The names include those of the plaintiff, defendant, and the members of the 
panel present, as well as the name of the secretary. 69 The proceedings before the 
administrative panel are usually in writing. There is an exchange of arguments 
and briefs between the parties through the members of the Panel and each party 
has to provide two copies or more of his brief depending on the number of 
parties to the case under adjudication. It is highly likely that at this first session 
the defendant will ask the panel to adjourn the hearing in order to give his 
66 See case No. 625/1/Q OF 1985 (1405 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 134/T/1 of 
1985 (1405 AH). The Board has stated in this case that the panel concerned pursued its own 
investigation by contacting administrative department. 
67 Mahassni and Grenley , op. cit. p. 
838. 
68 See, for further detail on the law of evidence in Saudi Arabia, Al-Rasheed, M., Criminal 
Procedures in Saudi Arabian Judicial Institutions", Ph. D thesis, University of Durham , 1973 , 
pp. 155-207 
69 Interview with H. Mansoor on 20/1/2007 and Munifi, op. cit; and interview with A. Al-Dala' 
on 21/1/2007, a member of one of the Board's panels. 
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evidence and to rebut the claim of the other party. 70 If the panel accepts that a 
request from either party to adjourn the hearing is not simply sought to gain 
tactical advantage, the panel will often adjourn the hearing without asking the 
party calling for adjournment to provide any compelling reason. 
71 However, 
having heard the submissions, if the panel believes there is no need to adjourn 
the hearing; it may ask the party requesting the postponement of the hearing to 
provide the panel with convincing reason. It may also refuse the party's 
request. 72 The intervals between sessions of the panel will depend on a number 
of factors, for example the backlog of cases, or the complexity of the cases, some 
of which may need full and detailed examination, all of which takes time, or the 
case may be referred to an expert who may obviously take much longer to 
examine it and give evidence. On average, a case can take from four weeks to six 
months. 73 
When any party to the case presents briefs or documents, the panel should enable 
the other party to examine them so that he may give his response. The Rules state 
that the panel must not rely on briefs or documents which are presented by one 
side of the case, if the other party has not been enabled to examine them. 
74 The 
Rules, however, do not specify the meaning of "enabled". Does it mean, for 
example, allowing the other party to read and examine only, or does it mean to 
provide them with copies? It would seem that the panel should provide the other 
parties with copies of briefs, but the panel may refuse photocopies of some the 
70 Mansoor, Ibid. 
71 Mahassni and Grenley, op. cit., p 839. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., and see also Turck, N. "Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia" , The International Law 1988, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 420, and Interview with Mansoor, op. cit. 
74 Article 17 of the Rules. 
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government documents, although it may enable a party to have sight of them at 
the Board and take notes. 75 Whether such documents are given to the other side 
or not depends on the discretionary power of the members of the panel. 76 
However, taking into account the position of the Board's members in other 
respects, this situation could result in the fact that the members may restrict the 
appropriate rules and refuse to provide governmental documents to the other 
party, although the Rules imply that the panel should provide the other side with 
any brief or document to examine and the opportunity to rebut. 
The administrative panel, which deals with administrative cases, can ask the 
department concerned to provide it with any document relevant to the case under 
adjudication. If it is made clear to the panel that there are documents vital to the 
case in the possession of the administrative department concerned, and the latter 
refuses to provide the panel with them then the panel is entitled to draw its own 
conclusions. According to Al-Dala, a member of the Board, the panel has the 
right to force the department to submit such documents provided that the plaintiff 
can prove that there are documents in the possession of the administration and 
relevant to the case. The decision of the panel is rendered defective by the 
exclusion of relevant documents from the Board. 77 
This raises the question of "confidential" documents. The Rules do not specify 
how the Board should deal with these. However according to Munifi, a well- 
75 Mahassni, op. cit., p. 838. The author was told, in conversation with some members of the 
Board, that they, the members, will not provide any government document to the other parties if, 
according to their discretionary power, they regard this document as confidential. 
76 Ibid. 
77 An interview with Al-Dala', a member of the Board, on 21/1/2007. 
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known lawyer and former vice-president of the Bureau of Experts of the Council 
of Ministers, a Board member should examine any document he feels to be 
relevant to the case and has the authority to decide whether or not to provide the 
other side with it. But the question here is, if the Board is in fact invested with 
this power, on what basis can the Board insist on providing the plaintiff with 
such documents? In other words, on what grounds can the Board decide to order 
the administration to disclose such documents? 
Al-Masoud, a lawyer and former civil servant, believes that the administration 
should provide the panel with any document that it deems relevant, except for 
those documents which may involve the security of the state. 78 Again, this raises 
the question as to what constitutes security and what does not. 
There is very little evidence of the nature of the actual practice of the Board. It 
may be assumed that those views represent normal procedure. However, there is 
some anecdotal evidence that in different cases, full disclosure is not made. A 
case was related by Mahassin and Grenley (1987) in which the Board refused to 
allow the contractor's lawyer to examine government documents, although they 
did not involve state security. Later, however, the Board allowed just the lawyer 
to read and take notes from the documents, but not to photocopy them. 
In the first place it is submitted that the panel should be trusted to decide whether 
any question of state secrecy is involved. By vesting this power in the panel the 
ability of the administration to refuse to provide the Board with documents 
78 Interview with Al-Masoud , 
19/1/2007. 
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because they are secret would be curtailed. Even if the panel decides that the 
matter before it does, indeed, involve state security, the administration should not 
keep documents from the Board member. The member should assess the 
importance of a document and its relevance, then taking the public interest as a 
criterion and, balancing the interest of the plaintiff against this, he should take 
the decision whether or not to disclose. 79 
The administrative panel should have a record or Ad'dhabt1 in which all 
statements, briefs and documents will be entered. This record, as Article 21 of 
the Rules state, will be kept by the secretary of the panel, Amin As' sera under the 
supervision of the President of the panel. If the panel has no secretary, as is the 
case with most of the subsidiary panels, the member himself will take care of the 
record. This raises the question as to the legality of the record written by the 
member himself. It may be said that although the member is considered to be 
impartial, he is still human and can make mistakes and may not always be 
impartial. Consequently, the record may be subject to the member's own 
subjectivity. It would seem, however, that such problems would be minimal and 
would not arise for two reasons. First, most of the proceedings are written. 
Secondly, the member will read out what is written in the record and if any party 
feels that there is any alteration to his oral statement he may request the member 
of the panel to correct it. The record should also contain the name of the 
members of the panel present at the hearing, the venue and the time of the 
session, the names of the parties of the case and their representatives. 80 
79 Cf Conway v. Rimmer [ 1968] A. C. 910. 
80 Article 21 of the Rules. 
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The record details all the procedures that are followed by the panel during the 
hearing of the case from the initial examination, including the discussion of the 
statements, and the briefs that are submitted to the panel. 81 
It should also contain the statements of the parties concerned, the statement of 
claim and remedy sought by the plaintiff, any rebuttals of the defendant, and any 
testimony that is given during the proceedings. 82 The record should be signed by 
the member(s) of the panel, the secretary and the parties to the case. 83 The record 
will also contain the date of the next hearing. 
If the panel fails to observe these formalities, in principle, the case will be 
returned to it by the Review Committee for re-hearing because of a defect in 
form. 84 However, as noted earlier, defects of form occur in practice. Thus there 
may only be one member present at a hearing, and the other members will not 
85 sign their names to the record of the hearing until later. 
8' See case No. 226/l/Q of 1984 (1405 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 45/t/1 of 
1986 (1406 AH), and see also case No. 554/1/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), decision of the Review 
Committee No. 28/T/I of 1986 (1406 AH). 
82 Article 21 of the Rules. 
&3 Ibid. 
84 See case No. 2/l/Q of 1985 (1406 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 29/T/1 of 1986 
(1406 AH), case No. 1161/1/Q 1985 (1405 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 53 /T/1 
1986 (1406 AH), case No . 
226/l/Q 1984 (1405 AH), op. cit., and case No 554/ 1/Qof 1985 
(1405 AH), op. cit. 
s5 Interview with member of the Board. 
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6.6 Seeking help from experts 
Unlike the situation before 1982, the Board now has the power to examine and 
adjudicate technical and legal issues. 86 As a result the panel may encounter in 
those cases involving administrative contracts, technical questions with which 
the member or members of the Board are not familiar or have no expertise. The 
panel can then call in assistance from outside experts. 87 
Although the use of experts is allowed, it is restricted to technical matters. In one 
of its decisions the Review Committee said : 
It is only acceptable that a judge seek the use of experts to solve problems 
which are of a technical nature and beyond the scope of his ability, 
knowledge and specialty. However, it is neither acceptable for the court 
to seek the use of an expert if solving these problems falls within the 
scope of its own specialty, nor is it acceptable for the panel to seek the 
use of an expert in understanding legal matters and in interpreting 
contracts as its own knowledge of these matters should be sufficient to 
perform its judicial tasks "88 
Consequently, if the panel orders an expert to decide issues relating to law its 
decision will be defective and may be set aside by the Review Committee. In 
case No. 437/1/Q of 1982 (1402 AH), decided in 1986, a company was in 
86 Mahassni and Grenley, op. cit., p. 339 
87 Article 24 of the Rules. 
8s Case No. 437/l/Q of 1982 (1402 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 89/T/1 of 1986 
(1406 AH). 
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dispute with a ministry regarding equipment, including vehicles, camp 
equipment and utensils, which were confiscated by that ministry. The issue was 
whether the ministry owned the equipment and simply allowed the company to 
use it to carry out a project between them, or whether the equipment was owned 
by the company. The administrative panel which heard the case considered that 
there were some technical issues to be settled about the ownership of the 
equipment. As a result it referred the case to an expert. However, the Review 
Committee set the decision aside, on the basis that there was no technical 
question requiring an expert opinion; there was a determination involving facts 
and law about the ownership of the equipment which was the subject matter of 
the case according to the evidence submitted by the parties, and arising from the 
interpretation of the contract between them. It went on to state that this task 
should be performed by the panel itself and the panel was not permitted to seek 
assistance from experts on such issues. 89 
When a panel needs to refer the case to an expert it should issue a provisional 
decision whereby it orders an expert. The decision should state exactly and in 
full the function and mandate of the expert, the date by which he should hand in 
his report, and date of next hearing when the expert report will be examined. 90 
The panel may call the expert to give his evidence viva voce which will then be 
entered into record. 91 The cost of experts is not regulated in the Rules, and in 
practice the regulation of costs is left to the Chairman of the Board. 92 Moreover, 
the Rules do not state who will pay the cost of the expert in the first instance, 
89 Ibid. 
90 Article 24 of the Rules. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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whether the plaintiff or defendant or both. The plaintiff of the moving party must 
bear the cost in advance. 93 However, on the completion of the case, the cost of 
the expert will be paid by the losing party, and a successful plaintiff will recover 
any expert costs. 94 
The Rules do not specify any person, body or committee that may be used as an 
expert to the Board. It is left to the Board to decide according to the issue under 
adjudication. In practice, however, the Board refers questions about 
administrative contracts to the Saudi House for Consultative Services (SHCS). 
The SHCS however is owned by the Government and this raises doubts as to its 
impartiality and neutrality. Al-Masoud believes that it is improper for the SHCE 
to function as an expert to the Board in cases where the government itself is a 
party, when the SHCS is considered to be a government organ. 95 Mahassni, 
however, believes that although the SHCS's policy is controlled by the Council 
of Ministers, it is "... highly competent and impartial". 96 Nevertheless, 
international standards of fair trial and due process would suggest that as long as 
the SHCS is owned and its staff are paid by the government, the Board should 
not refer any case to it. It is open to the Board, for example, to refer the case to 
experts in the universities. 97 According to Mahassni and Grenley, practicing 
lawyers in Saudi Arabia, the Board does this occasionally. 
93 See for example case No. 617/l/Q of 1981 (1401 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 
91/T/I of 1986 (1406 AH). 
94 Ibid. 
95 Interview on 19/1/2007. 
96 Mahassni and Grenley, op. cit., p. 340. 
97 Ibid. 
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If the panel feels that during the proceedings it is necessary to go to the site of 
the dispute for inspection, the rules empower it to do so. It also has competence 
to undertake a supplementary investigation if needed, and the panel may carry 
this out itself or direct one of its members to do so. 98 
6.7 The Judgment 
The Rules do not specify when proceedings may be ended However, as soon as 
the panel concerned is satisfied that both sides have stated their cases and 
adduced their evidence, and the panel thinks that the issues and questions of fact 
and law have been sufficiently examined and ventilated, it has the right to end 
the hearing and the exchange of briefs and documents. Deliberation then starts 
between the members of the panel and all briefs and documents contained in the 
dossier of the case are thoroughly examined. 99 
The Rules state that the deliberation should be in secret between all the members 
where the panel consists of more than one member. 100 During the deliberation, 
the members of the Board examine the briefs and documents tendered during the 
sessions of hearing and they may need to consult the laws and regulations in 
force. However, in practice the members of the Board find it difficult to obtain 
and examine the laws and regulations in force, as the Board lacks a document 
centre and the library of the Board has few reference materials or books. 101 As 
well as this drawback the administration of the Board rarely distributes new laws 
98 Article 23 of the Rules. 
99 Interview with A. Ali , op. cit. 100 Article 30 of the Rules. 
101 The writer personally visited the library. It has few books and the shelves are quite empty. 
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and regulations. 102 Faced with these obstacles, the members themselves buy the 
laws and regulations at their own expense, lend them to each other or contact the 
administrative department concerned to provide them with the laws and 
regulations which they need. 103 Obtaining information depends ultimately 
therefore on the member and on his own efforts to obtain the laws and 
regulations. 104 Lack of a document centre may eventually affect the efficiency of 
the work of the Board, and may prolong the time taken in deciding cases. 
The period involved in deliberation and the taking of a final decision varies from 
one case to another, depending on the case load of the panel. According to 
Mahassin, it takes months even years depending on the case load and the 
complexity of the specific case. 105 If the panel needs further documents, 
evidence, or clarification of the case, it may re-open the hearing and re-call both 
parties. 106 
According to the Rules, the decision or judgment will be made by a majority on 
administrative panels which comprise more than one member. The decision will 
be that of the panel, although there may be a member who does not agree. 107 
However, the member who differs in his opinion has the right to state his own 
view and the reasons for his dissent will be noted in the record of the case. 
Moreover, the majority can also give their comments on the other member's 
102 Interview with Al-Dala', op. cit. 
101 Ibid., and interview with Al-Wahaiby, a member of the Board, Dammam Branch , on 27/1/2007, Al-Daweesh, who is a member of an administrative panel on 27/1/2007, and other 
member such as Dr. A. AI-Ali, a member of the second administrative panel. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Mahassni, op. cit., p. 842. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Article 30 of the Rules. 
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dissent and these too will be entered in the record. Finally the record will be 
signed by all members of the panel as well as by its secretary. 108 
The final decision of the panel should contain the name of the panel concerned, 
the date, place of issue, and type of case, (administrative, panel, or disciplinary), 
the names of the members present at the proceedings, the names of the parties 
and their positions, their status, and their address. It should also contain the 
reasons, demands, rebuttals, evidence, ' 09 the reasons supporting the decision, the 
facts, and the law. ' 10 Knowing that they must eventually state their reasons for 
their decision obliges the panel to examine their reasoning very closely and 
consider it in the context of the evidence before arriving at a decision. ''' 
The pronouncement of the panel's final decision should be in open court even if 
the hearings were in camera, 112 But the Rules do not state any conditions to be 
observed by a panel of the Board when a decision is pronounced, such as the 
appearance of the parties to the case, or what will happen if they do not appear 
before the panel. Again it would appear that such details are left for the 
Chairman of the Board to decide in accordance with Article 44 of the Rules. 
Moreover, the Rules do not state what the effect would be if the decision were to 
be pronounced in private, and whether such action renders the whole trial void or 
not. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Article 31 of the Rules. 
11° Ibid. 
111 Abu Ssa'ad, M., op. cit., p. 138. 
112 Article 15 of the Rules. 
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The original copy of the final decision should be signed by the President of the 
Panel, its members and secretary within fifteen days of the pronouncement. 
However, as is the case with other articles of the Rules which have been referred 
to here, Article 31 does not state what the effect would be if the member of the 
Panel do not sign within the prescribed period. According to other comparable 
legal systems, such as Egyptian law, if the judgment has not been signed within 
the period prescribed by the law, the judgment will be rendered void. 
113 Each 
member of the panel will then receive a copy of the decision. 
Following the pronouncement of the decision the panel must inform the 
judgment debtor, or the person who has lost the case, that he has the right to ask 
for the decision to be reviewed. Article 31 of the Rules determines that the period 
within which a review must be sought is not more than thirty days. The decision 
of the panel will, after the prescribed period has elapsed, be sent to the Chairman 
of the Board. ' 14 
6.8 Review of the panel's iudgment 
The Rules state that a person who feels aggrieved by the decision of a first 
instance panel has the right to request a review of the decision by a higher panel 
of the Board, the Review Committee. Chapter Four of the Rules lays down the 
117 Obaid, R., "Mabadi al-Ijraat al-Jenaayh fi al-Qanun al-Masry", no date, pp. 755-756. 
114 Every decision which the writer examined was accompanied by a letter addressed to the 
Chairman of the Board in which the Presidents of the administrative or subsidiary panels states 
that he encloses the file of the case, and the decision that is taken by the panel. See, for example, 
case No. 138 of 1982 (1402 AH), decision of the Third Administrative Panel No. 4/3 of 1988 
(1408 AH) , and case 
No. 115 /2/Q of 1985 (1405 AH). 
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rules for review. ' 15 A party who wishes to take the matter further must file an 
appeal within the fixed period of thirty days as determined by Article 31 of the 
Rules, starting from the date on which the appellant received a copy of the final 
decision. These rules governing the period of review apply to all cases regardless 
of their type. Should the party concerned fail to request review within the 
prescribed timescale, the decision will automatically be final and enforceable. 116 
Applications for review will be referred to the Chairman of the Board, who in 
turn will refer the complete case-file together with the panel's decision, to the 
Review Committee. Applications for review should contain information about 
the parties to the case, the decision under appeal, the date of notification of that 
decision, and the legal grounds on which the challenge is based. "7 In practice, 
the appellant may include any new evidence or briefs relating to the case but is 
not allowed to present new requests other than those which were presented to the 
first panel. The Chairman will then refer the file of the case to the Review 
Committee. 118 
Unlike the situation prior to 1982, the decisions of the Review Committee are 
final. However, decisions issued by the Board to dismiss senior civil servants of 
Grade 14 and above or equivalent are not final until they are sanctioned by the 
President of the Council of Ministers. 119 This may be attributed to the fact that 
115 Articles 34 - 42 of the Rules. 116 Article 31 of the Rules. 
117 Article 37 of the Rules. 
118 The Review Committee consists of four panels, each of which is concerned with specific 
jurisdictions. See Chapter Five. 
119 Article 37 of the Rules. 
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civil service appointments are made by the President of the Council, thus any 
dismissal of these officials must be approved by him. It would seem, however, 
that there is no need for this exception, which effectively withholds the decision 
of the Board. It is in fact a sort of justice retinue which was practiced by the 
Board before the Board of Grievance Act 1982 was introduced. In relation to 
this, it is significant that although the Board is described as an independent 
judicial body, competent to issue judgments without the approval of anyone 
whatsoever, it does not, in practice, have that independence. 
6.8.1 Objections and reviews of judgments 
For administrative cases there are two methods of objection or review, ordinary 
and automatic. The latter applies to any decision issued in relation to 
administrative cases involving indemnity or administrative contract cases, that is 
cases covered by clauses 1 (c) and 1 (d) of Article 8 of the 1982 Act. 
Consequently, any decision issued against a department and not in its favour will 
not be final and enforceable until it is reviewed. 
This raises the question of why such decisions must be reviewed automatically 
without appeal from either of the parties? Here the legislation may be taking into 
account the fact that decisions of this type force the administration to pay 
indemnification and compensation to the other party and this payment must be 
taken from the public purse. Consequently, this rule would appear to have been 
laid down to protect the public treasury by taking further steps to ensure 
adequacy and accuracy of decision making. 
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The ordinary review procedures apply to all other types of administrative cases, 
that is cases covered by clauses 1 (a) and I (b) of Article 8 of the Board of 
Grievances Act 1982. Each party, be it the MFNE, GCB, the administrative 
department which is the original party, or the aggrieved person, may demand 
review of the panel's decision. Moreover, the GBCS also has the right to seek 
review in cases which concern public services. 120 
6.8.2 The scope of review 
Generally speaking, all the decisions of the general and subsidiary panels are 
reviewable. The Rules allows for no exclusion in the matter of review regardless 
of whether the case is disciplinary, penal, administrative, or concerns the 
enforcement of foreign judgements. Provisional decisions, and decisions taken 
by the Chairman of the Board at the beginning of the case and before he refers 
them to a panel, are not subject to review. Thus, the Rules provide that decisions 
that are reviewable are those which have involved the final decision of the panel 
. The Rules also state that after receiving his copy of the panel's decision, the 
party who wants to appeal must be informed by the relevant panel that he has the 
right to request review of the decision. 121 It follows therefore that provisional 
decisions are not reviewable since they lack finality. 
In case No: 631/T/I of 1985 (1405 AH), the Review Committee stated that: 
120 Article 35 of the Rules. 
121 Article 3 1. 
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... the 
Review Committee of the Board is a judicial review body which is 
empowered by law to review legal decisions taken by panels and 
committees of the Board regarding disputes brought before them. 
Accordingly, the Review Committee has the discretion to conduct a 
substantive evaluation of all elements of the disputes if it is related to 
the legal adjustment of claims and their evidence. Therefore, it has the 
power to request the panel which issued the decision under review to 
submit what is necessary for adjudication of the case in accordance 
with the legal adjustment of claims of the Review committee ... whose 
decisions are not reviewable .... 
Here, the Review Committee argues that although it does not in theory have 
jurisdiction over provisional decisions, in fact it went on to review this decision, 
justifying its action by the fact that the decision contained a major error. In this 
case, the panel had taken a decision to refer a question to an expert. The Review 
Committee, however, reversed that decision, holding that there were no technical 
questions that required the opinion of an expert. The case had rather involved 
questions of law, which should have been resolved by the panel itself. 
Nevertheless, if it is agreed that the above findings support the Review 
Committee's view that a panel's decision can be overturned if it contains a major 
error, the conclusion must be drawn that the Review Committee does, in 
practice, review provisional decisions and affirm them. An example of this is 
case No: 115/2/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), decided in 1990 (1410 AH). This case 
involved a tenancy contract between the plaintiff and a government department. 
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The former vacated the premises before the date of expiry of the contract, 
claiming that there were defects in the sewage system and frequent cuts in the 
electricity supply, as well as the existence of cracks in the whole building which 
could render the premises unsuitable for use. Accordingly as the case involved 
technical matters, the panel referred the case to the Saudi House of Consultative 
Services to inquire about whether buildings were suitable for use or not. This 
decision was referred to the Review Committee and affirmed. 122 
However decisions taken by the Chairman of the Board at the beginning of a 
case and before referring it to one of the Board's panel are not reviewed. The 
Chairman of the Board has the power not to register a case because, for example, 
he believes that it is beyond the Board's jurisdiction. These decisions which have 
been discussed earlier in this Chapter are not treated as judicial and subject to 
appeal. 
6.8.3 The powers of the Review Committee 
When a decision is referred to the Review Committee, the latter will examine the 
entire content of the challenged decision under review. In other words, it will 
review the facts and the law, and it will not restrict itself solely to that part of the 
decision which the party requesting the review wishes to have challenged. 123 
122 Case No. 115/ 2/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 235/T/3 of 1990 (1410 AH). 
123 Interview with M. Al-Sa'dan, a member of the Review Committee, third panel on 28/12/2006 
and 29/12/2006. 
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According to the Rules, the decision under review may be affirmed or 
reversed. 124 However, in practice, the Review may also "remand the case to the 
original panel for further consideration before a final decision is issued... to 
125 or 
it may alter part of the decision and then affirm it. Remand, which according to 
the Deputy Chairman of the Board is called a "partial review", will be made 
when there are procedural errors arising from the panel not observing the 
prescribed procedures. 126 
On what grounds may the decision of a panel be reversed? The Rules do not 
mention any grounds and leave it to the members of the Review Committee to 
determine such grounds. However, examples of grounds are evident from the 
practice of the Board. For example, a decision will be reversed if (i) it is invalid 
in law, 127 (ii) the panel did not observe the prescribed procedures, (iii) a proper 
record of the case is lacking, 128 (iv) it is a case of excess of power, 129 (v) the 
panel reached a decision which is contradicted by the reasoning upon which the 
decision should be based, 130 (vi) the panel failed to hear evidence, such as the 
evidence of a witness, 131 (vii) and the panel failed to consider and examine some 
of the plaintiffs claims. 132 When the Review Committee sets aside a decision 
124 Article 36, and see Turck, N. B., "Resolution of Disputes in Saudi Arabia", Arab Law 
Quarterly, 1991 , Vol. 6, Part 1, pp. 
3-32. 
125 Turck , Ibid., p. 10. 126 Interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board on 18/1/2007. 
127 Case 189/2/Q of 1987 (1407 AH), decision of the Review Committee No 100/T/4 of 1990 
(1410 AH). 
128 Case No. 692/1/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 25/T/1 of 1986 
(1406 AH), and case No. 226/1/Q of 1985 (1405 AH), decision No 25/T/I of 1986 (1406 AH). 
129 Case No. 42/l/Q of 1982 (1403 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 63/T/1 of 1985 
(1405 AH). 
130 Case No. 458/1/Q of 1986 (1406 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 232/T/3 of 
1990 (1410 AH). 
131 Case No . 734/1/Q of 1987 (1407 AH), 
decision No. 199/T/3 of 1990 (1410 AH). 
132 Case No. 72/4/Q of 1988 (1408 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 314/T/3 of 1990 
(1410 AH). 
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under review it has two options, either to return the case to the original panel for 
reconsideration in the light of the comments of the Review Committee, or to try 
the case itself. 133 If the Review Committee decides to remand the decision to the 
original panel and the latter insists on standing by its original decision, the 
Review Committee again has two options: either to affirm the decision under 
review or try the case de novo. 134 Although there are instructions issued by the 
Chairman of the Board direct the panels, in effect, to obey any ruling from the 
Committee. If the Review Committee decides to try the case itself, it should 
observe the procedures prescribed in the Rules of Procedures and Proceedings. 
The power of the Review Committee to subject the decisions of the panels of the 
Board to review on legal grounds and the right to rehear cases de novo raises 
questions about its legal character. It appears that the Review Committee 
performs the double function of a court of cassation and an appeal court. In other 
judicial systems, such as those of France and Egypt, these functions are 
performed by separate courts. 135 It can be said that the Review Committee of the 
board has a unique legal characteristic in that these two different functions are 
combined in one body. 
6.9 Is it possible to appeal against the final decision of the Board? 
Theoretically, once a decision is approved by the Review Committee or the 
period of appeal has elapsed without request for review, the decision of the 
133 Article 36.. 
134 Ibid 
135 See for example Lawson, F., Anton, A., and Brown , 
L., "Amos and Walton's introduction to 
French Law", 1979, p. 8 
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Board is final and enforceable. 136 However, in practice, it is quite different. It is 
possible to have the final decision reviewed again by appealing to the Council of 
Ministers, who may refer the case back to the Board to reconsider the decision. ' 37 
For example, a plaintiff (a company) complained that it had been contracted by 
an administrative department to design a public surface water drainage scheme. 
The administrative department had agreed to pay 2.6% of the total cost of the 
work which amounted to SR 19,417,476. However, although the company had 
submitted its programme according to the terms of the contract, there was delay 
in its implementation. Moreover, the department concerned decided to make 
amendments to the original project plan. The amendments were completed by the 
plaintiff, and as a result the cost of the venture rose to SR 19,800,000. The 
plaintiff asked the department to pay 2.6% of the revised cost. The department 
refused to pay, on the grounds that the plaintiff was to be paid on the basis of the 
original project before the amendments had been required, i. e. SR 19,417,476. 
The Board decided in favour of the company and the administrative department 
appealed to the Council of Ministers, even though it had exhausted its right of 
appeal. The case was then referred back to the Board, who again upheld the 
Review Committee's decision and rejected the department's appeal. Appeal may 
also be made to the Chairman of the Board. 138 However most of these appeals are 
unsuccessful. The Board tends always to insist on its original decision. 
136 Article 3 land 36 of the Rules. 
137 Case No. 1055/l/Q of 1983 (1403 AH), decision of the Review Committee No. 37/T/1 of 
1986 (1406 AH). 
"$ Case No. 650/l/Q 1982 (1402 AH), decision of the Review Committee No . 20/T/1 of 1985 
(1405 AH). 
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6.10 Procedural guarantees 
There are certain fundamental guarantees to assure that the procedures before the 
Board of Grievances are efficient and fair. 
6.10.1 Openness of the hearing 
Hearing in open court is one of the main standards of fair administration of 
justice. The courtroom should be open to the public, and to the media in 
particular. 139 However, the openness of the court is subject to certain conditions 
such as order in the court and availability of space. 
The Rules provide in Article 15 that hearings of the Board must take place in 
public, subject to one exception. The panel may hear the case in private if the 
panel concerned believes that to hear it in public would be in breach of the 
accepted standards of morality and public policy. However, regardless of 
whether the hearing itself is in public or in private, the pronouncement of the 
final decision of the panel must be in public. 140 
The Rules do not explain what is meant by morality and public policy when 
deciding whether the panel may hold the hearing in private or not. Such vague 
terms may lead to the panel preventing the public from attending a hearing 
beyond what could be justified on these grounds. On the other hand, it may, in 
139 See Mitchell, S. and Richardson, P. J. (eds. ), "Archbold's pleading, evidence, and practice in 
criminal cases", 1988,4`h ed., pp. 289-290. 
140 Article 35 of the Rules, and the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6. 
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using its discretionary power, limit the application of the condition to a narrow 
range of cases and as a result exclude cases from being heard in private where 
they should properly be heard. 
The actual practice of the Board is again quite different to what the Rules lay 
down. Open court is rarely practised by the Board. In the first place, according to 
members of the Board, although the doors of the courtrooms are open for the 
panel hearings, the public and the media rarely attend. 141 The reason for this may 
be that the individual citizen is not aware of the right to attend and the Board 
itself lacks the means to make known its duties and role to the public. 142 It is not 
surprising therefore that no-one but the parties concerned turn up to the sessions 
of the Board. 
Another problem is the attitude of individual members. Some have no objection 
to anyone attending a hearing, provided that the session is not in camera 
according to the Rules. 143 However, some will not allow the public to attend a 
hearing unless they have the permission of the President of the panel or the 
branch. A member told the writer that "... I will never allow a person who comes 
from outside to attend the hearing unless he has permission", and this is despite 
the fact that he allowed the writer to attend one of the sessions. 144 The Deputy 
Chairman of the Board argues that only those cases which need to be in public 
141 Interviews with A. Al-Ali on 2/1/2007, and A. Al-Dala', op. cit. 
142 There is no budget in the Board devoted to the publicity of the role of the Board. Interviews 
with AI-Wahaiby, N. and interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board, op. cit. 143 Interview with A. Al-Ali, op. cit. 
144 Interview with W. Al -Wahaiby, op. cit. 
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should be held in open court. 145 He also adds that some cases should be in public 
to show the community that the Board and the panel in charge of the case 
perform their duties with justice and impartiality. However, this argument is not 
compatible with the Rules. It could be said that the Deputy Chairman believes 
that hearings as a rule must be private, but on exceptional occasion may be held 
in public for the reasons that he states. The Rules however are clear that hearings 
must be in public, and only in exceptional cases should they take place in private, 
and only then to observe morality and public policy. 
Another aspect is the size of the panel rooms. The facilities that are available do 
not encourage the members of panels to hear cases in public. The available 
rooms are so small that, apart from the members of the panel, only the parties 
concerned (and they are usually more than four), may attend. This situation 
makes the principle of an open court impossible even for those members who 
would like to practise it. 
Finally, it should be added that if the hearing is not properly conducted in open 
court, the pronouncement of the final decision, which is supposed to be in public, 
will never take place in public. 
6.10.2 Order during a hearing 
The President of the panel or the members on single judge panels, i. e. the 
subsidiary panels, has the responsibility for maintaining order during hearing 
145 Interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board, op. cit. 
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sessions. 146 He has the power to expel any party that disturbs order in the court. 
If the party does not submit to the rules of the court and continues to disturb 
proceedings, the panel has the power to imprison him for twenty four hours or 
impose a fine of SR 200 as punishment. 147 According to the practice of the 
Board, disturbances include insulting the other parties, or contempt of the 
member or members of the panel. 148 
The power of the President of the panel extends to ordering the deletion of any 
expression in the briefs and counter briefs submitted by either party, which is 
harmful or which violates public morality and policy. 149 Determining what is 
harmful or what is a violation of public morality and policy is left to his 
discretionary powers. 
In the event of any contempt of court, a disturbance by either of the parties, or an 
offence being committed during a hearing, the President of the panel will order 
that an accurate written record be made stating exactly what happened and then 
refer it to the Chairman of the Board or his Deputy, who will then order that 
appropriate measures be taken against the person who has caused the disturbance 
or held the court in contempt. '50 
146 Article 16 of the Rules. 147 Ibid 
148 Interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board, op. cit. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
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6.10.3 Legal representation 
The Rules as well as the practice of the Board safeguard the right of equality 
between parties If a party has not been given the opportunity to defend himself 
or has not been provided with briefs submitted by the other party, the final 
decision of the panel will most likely be annulled on the basis that it has a 
substantive defect. 151 Moreover, the Rules of 1989 grant the plaintiff in 
administrative cases and the accused in penal and disciplinary cases the right to 
retain counsel to represent him before the various panels of the Board. 152 In 
Egypt, counsel who acts as a representative before the Council of State in Egypt 
is required to be a professional lawyer. 153 In Saudi Arabia, the Rules do not 
require counsel to hold any minimum qualifications nor do they restrict 
representation before the Board to qualified lawyers. Consequently, lay persons 
as well as professional lawyers often act as representatives. However, the 
representatives, lay or legal, should obtain a legal procuratorship or 
"attorneyship" from the Notary Pubic. The legal procuratorship certificate should 
then be submitted to the panel concerned in order to identify the standing of the 
person who is pleading the case before the Board. In practice, however, the 
plaintiff may introduce his representative to the panel without his certificate, and 
ask the panel to enter his name in the record. 154 
Although there are no rules which limit legal representation to lawyers before the 
Board, it is not permitted for just anyone to set up a legal office or firm unless he 
151 Article 17 of the Rules. 
152 Articles 18 and 19 of the Rules. 
153 See Article 23 of the Laws of the Council of State of 1959. 
154 Interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board, op. cit. 
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has certain qualifications which are stated in the Organization of the Legal 
Profession Regulations 1981. A lawyer must have a law degree and at least two 
years experience. ' 55 
Most plaintiffs do not in fact employ representatives; they prefer to argue their 
cases themselves. The reason for this may lie in the fact that many cases are 
straightforward, insofar as they involve only a small claim, equal to their salaries 
for example, whereas retaining counsel is costly. Some individuals may, 
however, be unaware of the role of the professional lawyer. 
Most non-Saudi contractors and companies employ counsel to represent them 
before the Board. '56 
6.10.4 The independence and impartiality of the Board 
It is vital to the independence of judicial institutions that judges should perform 
their duties without any interference; it is an aspect of the rule of law. According 
to John Alder "Judicial independence is an aspect of the rule of law in its own 
right. It overlaps with but goes beyond the separation of powers. Separation of 
powers concerns the independence of the judicial system from other branches of 
government. Judicial independence requires the independence of individual 
judges from any pressures that threaten not only actual impartiality but also the 
Iss See Organization of the Legal Profession Regulations, issued by Ministerial Resolution No. 
1190. 
156 Mahassni, op. cit., p. 837. 
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appearance of impartiality". ' 57 Thus, the independence as well the impartiality of 
the Board is of great importance, particularly when one considers that the Board 
deals with a powerful party, the government. 
The Board of Grievances Act 1982 in its first article declares that the Board is an 
independent judicial body. In Chapter 5 the procedures for appointment, 
promotion, and dismissal of Board members, together with other concerns that 
may violate the independence of its members were considered. 158 
One issue touching on the independence of Board members is the relationship 
between a panel of the Board and the Review Committee. Article 36 of the Rules 
provides that if the Review Committee decides to set aside and return a decision 
to the panel, the panel has the right to insist on its original decision. However, 
the instructions issued by the Chairman of the Board direct the panels, in effect, 
to obey any ruling from the Committee. According to Circular 9 which was 
issued in 1990 (13/3/1411 AH) by the Chairman, if in its final decision a panel 
holds that a particular case is outside the panel' s jurisdiction, or if it decides to 
drop a case, or not to accept a case, or if the final decision is about procedural 
questions, and if the Review Committee decides to set aside that particular 
decision and return it to the panel that has issued it, the latter must comply 
without question with the decision of the Review Committee. 159 Moreover, 
Circular 9 states that if the Review Committee instructs the panel to consider a 
157 Alder. J "Constitutional and Administrative Law" 2007 6t1i edition, pp. 175-177, and see also 
de Smith, S. A. Constitutional and Administrative Law", 1994,7th. edition., pp. 368-370. 
158 See Chapter Five, Section 5.1 
159 This Circular is based on Article 44 of the Rules, which delegates to the Chairman of the 
Board the task of issuing decisions which implement the Rules. 
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particular aspect of procedure or of evidence, or any other procedure which is 
relevant to the case under adjudication, the panel must consider it and act in 
accordance with the instructions and remarks of the Review Committee. 
On the face of it, the Circular seeks to cut down the powers of the panel. The 
1989 Rules provide that where a panel insists on its original decision, then the 
Review Committee may try the case itself de novo. Should the Committee do so, 
its decision will prevail. It may be anomalous that the panel can refuse to follow 
what is a decision of an appeal body, but the instructions issued by the Chairman 
do not conform with the power given to the panel by the Rules, and it could be 
considered as a form of interference with the independence of the members. 
In compiling the Rules, the legislator acknowledged the importance of the 
impartiality of the Board. The Rules state that, on objection by either party or the 
accused, a member may be refused and disqualified from hearing a particular 
case if there is an acceptable reason. 160 Once this request is filed, the hearing will 
be stopped until a decision is taken on the matter. 161 The Chairman of the Board 
has the power to examine and decide on such claims and his decision is final. 162 
However, the Rules do not state the reasons by which a member may be refused 
and therefore, the grounds upon which the Chairman may accept such a claim. It 
may be said that in practice a member may be refused from hearing a case 
because of self-interest, for example, possible prejudice, or bias. 
160 Article 25 of the Rules. 161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
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Moreover, the member can disqualify himself from hearing a case in which he 
feels it would not be just to do so for some reason. 163 The Chairman also decides 
in respect of such applications. 
6.10.5 Decisions within a reasonable time 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Board deals with different types of 
cases, over two thousand in a year, and the number is increasing. 164 Apart from 
stating that the panel which hears the case should fix a date for a hearing within 
one month from the date of notification of the defendant, the Rules do not 
specify the period of time within which the case must be heard. 
As far as administrative cases are concerned the Board can apply certain 
measures to speed up the period of hearing. It will, for example, try to resolve the 
dispute from the beginning, and as soon as the case is registered. When an 
individual brings a case before the Board, the Chairman will immediately contact 
the administrative department concerned to inquire about it. 165 The result of this 
inquiry is usually adequate and may resolve the case quickly without proceeding 
judicially before the panels of the Board. Moreover, in the event of the defendant 
failing to appear on the fixed date of hearing after the second notification, the 
Board has the right to proceed and hear the case then making a decision. 166 This 
decision will be regarded as being made as if the defendant were present. 
163 Ibid. 
164 See the Appendix. 
165 Interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board, op. cit. 
166 Article 18 of the Rules. 
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In practice, however, and generally speaking, the number of cases registered 
each year is more than the number of decided cases. 167 For example, the number 
of registered administrative cases in the year 1406 AH (September 1985- 
September 1986) totalled 704, while the number of decided administrative cases 
totalled 564. In 1408 AH (August 1987-August 1988), the number of registered 
administrative cases increased to 1,033, while the number of decided 
administrative cases totalled 725. 
It would seem that the reason for this may be attributed, first of all, to the fact 
that most of the administrative cases are concerned with contract claims between 
the government and individuals or companies. Most of these contracts involve 
complex technical questions which require specialist consideration and have to 
be referred to experts. These procedures frequently take a long time to complete. 
Second, the parties in each case, regardless of its type, need to be given enough 
time to examine books and documents so that they can present evidence or 
rebuttal briefs. The panel will then adjourn the hearing to enable the party to 
present his evidence. This situation will inevitably prolong the period of hearing. 
Third, it may be argued that the Rules themselves contribute to prolonging the 
period of hearing. As stated earlier in this chapter, Article 5 of the Rules stipulate 
that in administrative cases where financial issues are the subject matter of the 
case, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, and the General Control 
Board must be notified. In addition to the above mentioned departments, the 
167 See the Appendix. 
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Public Board of the Civil Service must also be notified in administrative cases 
which involve claims relating to civil service regulation. As a result, a 
representative from these departments has to attend the hearing session. This 
increases the time the case remains with the Board, because each of the 
departments involved needs time to present its evidence and rebuttal briefs. 
There will be delay therefore on the part of the administration itself. High Order 
14523 in 1990 (22/9/1410 AH) support this argument. This Order urges various 
administrative departments, agencies, and ministries to co-operate with the Board 
in order to speed up its work and decide cases within a reasonable period of time. 
6.10.6 The language used in the Board 
The official language used in the Board is Arabic. 168 A plaintiff who is a non- 
Arabic speaker should be heard through an interpreter. However, evidence 
against him and his rebuttals will be in his own language and all briefs will be 
signed by him. The briefs and counterbriefs will then be translated into Arabic 
and signed by the plaintiff and the interpreter. In practice, most non-Arabic 
speakers retain Saudi lawyers to act as their representative. 
Documents and papers, such as most administrative contracts with foreign 
contractors, should be translated into Arabic and presented to the Board. 169 
However, the Rules do not specify who may translate such documents and 
papers. They say only that an official translation will be accepted by the Board. 
168 Article 13 of the Rules. 
169 Article 13 of the Rules. 
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In practice, the Board only accepts translations by officially authorised 
translation offices. 
6.11 Conclusion 
Having examined the procedures and proceedings of the Board, it should be said 
that the Rules do provide proper regulation to protect the parties to a case and to 
ease the work of the Board and make it efficient. The Rules provide protection 
for both parties, ensuring equality before the Board, and an equal right to submit 
evidence in support of their claims and counterclaims. Both parties to the case 
can also be confident that their case will be examined by different members and 
if need be referred to an expert for opinion. The party who is not satisfied with 
the decision of the first instance panel will have the opportunity to have his case 
reviewed by the review system and his case examined by a panel of three senior 
members. There is no financial burden on the aggrieved when he brings his case 
before the Board and there is no registration fee. Nor is there any obligation to 
employ counsel or particular counsel. In addition, the Rules provide guarantees 
to ensure that the procedures are effective, for example that the hearing must be 
held in public, and either party can ask a member of the Board who appears to 
have an interest in the case to step down for that case. 
Although the Rules have laid down proper procedures there are some aspects, 
either in the practice of the Board or in the Rules themselves that are open to 
criticism. 
317 
Chapter Six The rules ofprocedure 
a) In order to limit the Board in the exercise of its power to frustrate an 
aggrieved party in his attempt to appeal to the Board, the Rules embody 
certain requirements which should be complied with prior to resorting to 
the Board, such as petitioning the administrative department concerned 
within a limited time. Other requirements include time-limits on the 
administration for examining the appeal, and a specified period of time 
during which the aggrieved person must bring his case. The Rules also 
state that there should be more than one representative for the 
administration. 
Although these requirements are of advantage to the administration, the 
aggrieved party, and the Board, as discussed above, the protection 
afforded to the administration by the Rules would appear to be excessive. 
To understand the extra protection which the administration enjoys, one 
has to appreciate constitutional practice in Saudi Arabia. The Rules are 
actually issued by the Council of Ministers, the head of the 
administration. It is not surprising, therefore, that the government protects 
itself by statutory instrument as long as it can do so. 
However, although the Rules protect the administration, at the same time 
they give the aggrieved person the opportunity to challenge it. The Board 
then has the right to exercise its power and intervene in certain areas. In 
respect of claims of civil servants, the Board restores rights which have 
been violated even if the required time-limit may have elapsed, on the 
conditions referred to above. Moreover, while the Board cannot intervene 
318 
Chapter Six The rules of procedure 
to quash illegal administrative decisions after the prescribed period has 
elapsed, it does have the power to compensate an aggrieved person for 
the damage occurred to him by such a decision. 
b) In relation to the practice of the Board, it would appear that there is a gap 
between the Rules and actual practice. It has been noticed that the Rules 
are not being applied properly. For instance, there are no comprehensive 
rules for governing the allocation of cases; there is confusion between the 
preparation of a case and the hearings; and the principle of open court is 
not facilitated. The gap between theory and practice may be attributed to 
several reasons. First of all, it should be noted that there was a long 
period between the promulgation of the Board of Grievances Act 1982 
and the Procedure and Proceeding Rules 1989 - some seven years. This 
period enabled the Board to establish its own rules, based on its practice. 
This means that the Board needs time to fully adopt the new rules. 
Secondly, it may be suggested that the members of the Board are ill- 
informed about the new rules of procedure. Finally, it may also be 
suggested that this gap between the new rules and the Board's practice 
can be attributed to a pressure of the administration. As has been noted in 
this chapter, the decision of the Review Committee of the Board is final 
according to the new rules. However, it was witnessed that the Board, 
under pressure from the administration, was once forced to review one of 
its decisions, even though it was final. 
319 
Chapter Six The rules ofprocedure 
Taking into account the fact that the Board deals with a wide spectrum of public 
cases where the interest is different from that in private cases, it must be 
concluded that some improvement should be made to increase the effectiveness 
of the role of the Board in subjecting the administration to the law. In respect of 
practice, the Board should comply with the. Rules. In respect of the Rules, some 
important changes should be made, for example to the length of time allowed for 
petitioning the administration and generally in relation to time-limits. Moreover 
the overwhelming number of government representatives in administrative cases 
should be reduced in order to reduce delay. 
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7.1 Conclusion 
The Board of Grievances is the only body which has the power to review and 
annul government decisions. It is also the only body which may order 
government departments to award compensation for damage resulting from 
either their unlawful decisions or their public activities. Consequently, the Board 
plays a major role in Saudi public administration. The existence of the Board is 
recognition of the legal right of individuals to challenge unlawful government 
actions and decisions before a judicial body. It is a right at the disposal of both 
citizens and foreigners who work in the Kingdom to complain against the 
government. 
This study has considered the constitutional and legal environment of the Board 
of Grievances. The Board has been examined within the context of the history of 
the state itself, and reference was made to the debate over whether Saudi Arabia 
has or does not have a constitution. It appears that since there is no written 
constitution, the question of the Board remains problematical. The Board of 
Grievances under Saudi legislation is not a new institution, but is ancient with 
roots in Islamic history. The study has explored this historical dimension. It has 
been shown that the Board of Grievances in Islam emerged because of the 
weakness of the ordinary judges to deal with the powerful. This weakness, the 
study has argued, was a result of the intervention of governors and rulers in the 
work of judges later in the Islamic state. Today, questions remain over the full 
independence of judicial decision-making with respect to the Board of 
Grievances, and likewise for its clear evolution into an administrative court. 
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A brief account of the legal background and stage of development of the modern 
Board of Grievances in Saudi Arabia has been provided. The Board has passed 
through five distinct phases. It began as a department of the government itself, 
i. e. the Council of Ministers. The second phase began with the 1955 regulations 
at which stage the Board achieved separation from the Council of Ministers. The 
third stage, dating from 1967, was marked by a struggle between the executive 
and the ordinary judiciary which resulted in the Board being invested with new 
powers. The fourth stage can be dated from 1976, when the Board took on more 
of the character of an administrative court by obtaining the power to try disputes 
concerning administrative contracts. The passing of the Board of Grievances Act 
1982, which formally established the board as a judicial body, represents its final 
stage of modern development, although more recent tendencies to give non- 
administrative jurisdiction to the Board are discussed and criticised in the study. 
Throughout these phases of development, the Board has clearly been shaped by 
the realities of the political order in Saudi Arabia. It has not achieved completed 
independence from the administration it exists to police. 
The study examined in considerable detail the working of the Board, under the 
Board of Grievances Act 1982 and the Rules of Procedures and Proceedings of 
1989. There are some aspects of the composition of the Board which are open to 
criticism and in need of reform. Reform should include, in particular, a 
reappraisal of the procedures for appointment, the qualifications required, the 
power of removal, and the training of Board members. The King has paramount 
power over the Chairman and members. Taking into consideration the 
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constitutional system of state whereby the King is at the head of both the 
executive (the administration) and legislature, it seems that there are insufficient 
constitutional guarantees of independence of the Chairman and members. The 
absence of such guarantees both undermines the constructional legitimacy of the 
Board and may influence its day to day work. Reforms have been suggested to 
put the independence of the board beyond doubt. 
But members need to be competent as well as independent. The Board's judicial 
personnel for all posts are recruited from among those who graduate from the 
Shari'a colleges. The argument was made that such education on its own leads to 
shortcomings. Most Board members do not have adequate knowledge of the laws 
and regulations made by the Council of Ministers. Moreover, new appointees are 
young and lack experience and judicial skills. Training of members should be a 
priority but the Board is not properly organised to provide a programme of 
training. 
A major emphasis of the study has been upon the administrative jurisdiction of 
the Board. The Board has power to control government departments once a 
decision is challenged before it. It can examine whether it was a lawful decision. 
If not, the Board can annul it. Not only can the Board annul unlawful 
administrative decisions but it may compensate the individual. This power of the 
Board, however, is not unfettered, as there is a restricted scope of review which 
the Board may not exceed. The Board cannot, for instance, order government 
departments to make a decision, nor can it substitute for a department and 
perform its duties. Moreover, the Board has no power to examine the 
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proportionality of unfavourable decisions and is denied the power to examine 
sovereign acts. 
Sovereign acts are ill-defined by the 1982 Act. It has been argued that although 
there are some administrative decisions that are not subject to challenge in the 
judicial system, this particular immunity should be restricted with more clarity. It 
has been suggested that criteria to determine the scope of sovereign immunity 
should be adopted by the Board. 
This study has shown that although the Board's jurisdiction is restricted by law, 
the executive has wide powers to refer any case to the Board. This makes the 
jurisdiction of the Board expandable; a fact which has created uncertainties as to 
the role and, indeed, the character of the Board. In this regard, the large amount 
of non-administrative jurisdiction has inevitable adverse effects on the efficiency 
of the original jurisdiction of the Board; that is, its administrative competence. 
This conclusion can be supported by the huge number of penal and commercial 
cases registered with the Board (see Appendix 3). As a result, even though the 
1982 Act says clearly that it is an administrative court, the character of the Board 
as an administrative court is questionable. 
The Board in action has been discussed. The Rules of Procedures and 
Proceedings before the Board as well as their practice have been examined. The 
operation of the rules of standing, petitioning government departments, and time 
limitations have been reviewed, and the case made that reforms to strengthen 
individual rights and the powers of the Board are necessary. 
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The commencement of cases, hearings, taking decisions, appeals, and guarantee 
of hearing have been discussed. It has been shown that although the 1989 Rules 
provide, in principle, proper procedures, there are aspects both in practice and in 
theory which are open to criticism. This study has shown that there is a gap 
between theory and practice. The 1989 rules have not been applied fully in 
reality. In addition it would seem that the government has protected itself by 
legislative means from any legitimate challenge. It has also protected the senior 
civil servant from the judicial decisions taken by the Board. 
But whether the Board of Grievances is considered in broad terms or in detail, 
the reality of a constitutional system in which there is no separation of powers 
must be taken into account in assessing the role and prospects of the Board. 
However the picture which emerges from this study of the Board of Grievances 
is not all negative. The Board exercises real powers which discipline the 
behaviour of departments in their dealing with citizens. The large number of 
people who have recourse to the Board annually is a clear endorsement of its 
performance as a judicial forum and of the quality of its personnel. The challenge 
facing the Board over the coming years is to develop and strengthen its role as an 
administrative court. 
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7.2 Reforms 
Reforms are necessary in order to improve the performance of the Board and 
meet the expectations of the people. There are two broad approaches to reform, 
the radical and the incremental. Radical reform would aim at change in the 
constitutional system. Reform has indeed taken place recently in Saudi Arabia, 
but constitutional change of a fundamental nature needs time to be implemented 
and developed. 
The second approach is a more pragmatic one: to seek to improve the institution 
of the Board of Grievances within the existing political and legal system. This 
approach should include action along the following lines: 
1. Stop the ever growing non-administrative jurisdiction vested in the 
Board. The government should cease diverting jurisdiction from the 
ordinary courts and giving it to the Board of Grievances. This undermines 
the rule of law and prevents the full development of the Board as an 
independent forum for citizen grievances against the administration. As 
seen in comparative reflection on France and Germany, these countries 
decided as early as the 19th century to develop separate administrative 
courts. The UK has followed different approach - more recently the 
administrative court in the Queen's Bench division of the High Court 
undertakes a more refined judicial review procedure. There should be an 
independent and separate courts which deal with commercial cases, 
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separate court deals with penal cases and separate court deals with 
labours cases. 
2. Submit all administrative decisions to the powers of the Board. The latter, 
rather than the government, should decide what is justiciable in the field 
of administration. This would give more power to the judiciary. 
3. Regarding of sovereign acts, the Board should control and distinguish 
between the executive and legislative decisions of the government by 
adopting a specific criteria as in European countries. The Board should 
adopt a corporeal criterion based on the subject matter and the nature of 
the challenged decision. The sovereign acts should be those issued by the 
government in the performance of its political function, whereas 
administrative acts are those issued by the government in the furtherance 
of its administrative function. 
4. Improve the methods of selection, appointment, removal, and training of 
the Board Chairman and members. More transparency is needed in the 
selection of members of the Board, like the UK Constitutional Reform 
Bill of 2004, which makes the selection of judges a more transparent 
process. 
5. Reorganise the structure of the Board. A panel should be set up to deal 
with the allocation of cases, and a cassation panel should be above the 
Review Committee. 
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6. The Board should apply the Rules of procedure and proceedings 
consistently and fully as laid down. 
7. Attention should be paid to the physical organisation of the hearing to 
allow cases to be properly considered including provision for the public 
to have access to hearings. 
8. The decisions of the Board should be published promptly, as required by 
1982 Act; there is a duty on the Chairman to arrange for the 
classification, printing, and publication of the Board's judgments on an 
annual basis. The decision which going to be published should be final 
and reviewed by the Review Committee of the Board. Publication should 
be by giving reference number of the case, the name and details of parties 
should not include, as in European countries. 
The reforms suggested above would make the Board of Grievances a more 
rigorous, consistent, professional, and effective body. 
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APPENDIX 1 
LAW OF 
THE BOARD OF GRIEVANCES1 
Royal Decree NO. M/51 
17 Rajab 1402 -10 May 1982 
Part One 
Formation and Jurisdiction of the Board 
Article (1) 
The Board of Grievances is an independent administrative judicial 
commission responsible directly to His Majesty the King. Its seat shall be the City of 
Riyadh. When needed, branches may be established by a decision of the President of 
the Board. 
Article (2) 
The Board of Grievances consists of a president of the rank of minister, a vice 
president or more, a number of assistant vice presidents, and members specialized in 
' http: //www. saudiembassy. net/Country/laws/GrievancesBoard82. asp 
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Shari `ah and law. Attached to it shall be an adequate number of technical and 
administrative employees and others. 
Article (3) 
The President of the Board shall be appointed and his services terminated by 
Royal Order. He shall be responsible directly to His Majesty the King. 
Vice presidents of the President of the Board are appointed and their services 
terminated by Royal Order upon nomination by the President of the Board. 
The President of the Board shall select the branch heads from members of the Board, 
taking into consideration the ranks of the branch's personnel. 
Article (4) 
A committee called "The Administrative Affairs Committee for Board 
Members" shall be formed and it shall consist of the President of the Board or 
whomever he deputizes and six members whose ranks shall not be lower than 
counselor (B), and they shall be selected by the President of the Board. 
Article (5) 
"Administrative Affairs Committee for Board Members" shall be presided 
over by the President of the Board or whomever he deputizes, and its session shall not 
be valid unless all members are present. In case one of them is absent due to the 
Committee's reviewing a matter concerning him or in which he has a direct interest or 
for any other reason, he shall be replaced by a member nominated by the President of 
the Board, who satisfies conditions of membership. The Committee's decisions shall 
be issued by majority vote of its members. 
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Article (6) 
The Board shall exercise its powers through circuits whose number, formation, 
subject-matter and venue are determined by decision of the President of the Board. 
Article (7) 
The Board of Grievances shall have a general panel consisting of the President 
of the Board and all members in service. Its Jurisdiction and procedures shall be 
determined pursuant to a resolution by the Council of Ministers. 
Article (8) 
1. The Board of Grievances shall have jurisdiction to decide the following: 
(a) Cases related to the rights provided for in the Civil Service and 
Pension Laws for government employees and hired hands, and 
independent public entities and their heirs and claimants. 
(b) Cases of objection filed by parties concerned against administrative 
decisions where the reason of such objection is lack of jurisdiction, a 
deficiency in the form, a violation or erroneous application or 
interpretation of laws and regulations, or abuse of authority. It is 
considered as an administrative decision the rejection or refusal of an 
administrative authority to take a decision that it should have taken 
pursuant to laws and regulations. 
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(c) Cases of compensation filed by parties concerned against the 
government and independent public corporate entities resulting from 
their actions. 
(d) Cases filed by parties concerned regarding contract-related disputes 
where the government or an independent public corporate entity is a 
party thereto. 
(e) Disciplinary cases filed by the Bureau of Control and Investigation. 
(f) Penal cases filed against suspects who have committed crimes of 
forgery as provided for by law, crimes provided for by the Law of 
Combating Bribery, crimes provided for by Royal Decree no. 43 dated 
29/11/77 H, and crimes provided for by the Law of Handling Public 
Funds issued by Royal Decree No. 77 dated 23/10/95 H and penal 
cases filed against persons accused of committing crimes and offenses 
provided for by law, where an order to hear such cases has been issued 
by the President of the Council of Ministers to the Board. 
(g) Requests for implementation of foreign judgments. 
(h) Cases within the jurisdiction of the Board in accordance with special 
legal provisions. (1) 
(i) Requests of foreign courts to carry out precautionary seizure on 
properties or funds inside the Kingdom. (2) 
2. With Consideration to the rules of jurisdiction set forth by law, the 
Council of Ministers may, at its discretion, refer any matters and cases 
to the Board of Grievances for hearing. 
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Article (9) 
The Board of Grievances may not hear requests related to sovereign actions, 
nor objections filed by individuals against judgments or decisions issued by courts or 
legal panels which fall within their jurisdiction. 
Article (10) 
The Bureau of Control and Investigation shall prosecute before the competent 
circuit the crimes and offenses which the Bureau investigates. 
(1) Powers of the panels for settlement of commercial disputes were transferred to the Board of 
Grievances pursuant to a resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 241 dated 26/10/1407 H. 
Also jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Board provided for in the Law of Employees and 
resolutions of the Council of Ministers were transferred to the Board of Grievances and all 
disciplinary cases were referred to it pursuant to Royal Decree No. M/51 dated 17/711402H. 
(2) This paragraph was added to this Article per Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 11102/1421H. 
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Part Two 
Law of Members of the Board 
Article (11) 
Members appointed to the Board shall fulfill the following requirements: 
(a) Be a Saudi national. 
(b) Be of good character and conduct. 
(c) Be fully qualified to carry out judicial work. 
(d) Be a holder of a diploma from a college of Shari'ah in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia or another equivalent university diploma. 
(e) Be of the age of not less than twenty two years. 
(f) Be physically fit for service. 
(g) Not have been sentenced to hadd (Quranic prescribed punishment), 
to zir (discretionary punishment), or a crime impinging on integrity, 
nor been subjected to disciplinary decision for dismissal from public 
office, even if rehabilitated. 
Article (12) 
Ranks of members of the Board are as follows: 
- Trainee of the rank of Judicial Trainee, 
- Assistant Counselor (C) of the rank of Judge (C), 
- Assistant Counselor (B) of the rank of Judge (B), 
- Assistant Counselor (A) of the rank of Judge (A), 
- Counselor (D) of the rank of Court Deputy (B), 
- Counselor (C) of the rank of Court Deputy (A), 
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Counselor (B) of the rank of Court Head (B), 
Counselor (A) of the rank of Court Head (A), 
Assistant Head of the rank of Appellate Judge, 
Assistant Head of the rank of Appellate Chief. 
Article (13) 
To occupy the ranks of Board membership requires the qualifications specified 
for each rank in the Law of the Judiciary, taking into consideration the following: 
(a) A Master's degree in the field and a diploma of legal studies from the 
Institute of Public Administration are considered to be equivalent to 
working for four years in similar judicial duties. 
(b) A Doctorate degree in the field is equivalent to working for six years in 
similar judicial duties. 
(c) Performing investigative, judicial, and consultative activities in the field 
shall be equivalent to working in similar judicial duties. 
Article (14) 
Members initially appointed shall undergo a probationary period for one year. 
The Administrative Affairs Committee for Board Members shall issue a decision of 
tenure after the end of the probation period and upon proof of suitability of the 
appointee. Prior to such decision, the Administrative Affairs Committee for Board 
Members may issue a decision of his dismissal. 
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Article (15) 
Except for the Trainee, a Board Member may not be dismissed but must be 
retired upon reaching the age of seventy. However, should a member lose confidence 
and respect required for the post, he shall be retired by Royal Order based on a 
recommendation by the Administrative Affairs Committee for Board Members. 
Article (16) 
Without prejudice to requirements of the provisions of this Law, Board 
Members shall have the rights and guarantees granted for judges and shall be bound 
by the same duties as those of judges. 
Article (17) 
Appointment and promotion to the ranks of Board members shall be carried 
out in accordance with procedures specified for appointment and promotion in the 
judicial cadre. In this respect, the Administrative Affairs Committee for Board 
Members, with regard to its members, shall have the same powers as those of the 
Supreme Judicial Council with regard to members of the judicial cadre. 
Article (18) 
With respect to salaries, allowances, rewards and benefits, the Board member 
shall be treated similarly to his counterpart within the ranks of members of the judicial 
cadre. 
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Article (19) 
Transfer, assignment, and secondment of Board Members shall be in 
accordance with the procedures specified set for transfer, assignment, and secondment 
of the judicial cadre. In this respect, the Administrative Affairs Committee for Board 
Members, shall have, with regard to Board members, the same powers specified for 
the Supreme Judicial Council in regard to members of the judicial cadre. In this 
respect the President of the Board, with regard to Board Members, shall also have the 
same powers specified for the Minister of Justice with regard to members of the 
judicial cadre. 
Article (20) 
The President of the Board shall approve vacations of Members within the 
limits of the provisions of the Civil Service Law. As an exception to these provisions, 
the sick leave a member may have during a period of three years may reach six 
months with full salary and three months with half salary. It may be extended for 
three additional months with half salary, subject to the approval of the Administrative 
Affairs Committee for Board Members. 
Article (21) 
If a member, due to sickness, fails to resume his work following the expiry of 
the sick leave specified in the previous article, or if it is proven at any time that he is 
unable, for health reasons, to perform his duties properly, he shall be retired. 
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Article (22) 
Inspection of work of Board Members, of the rank of counselor (B) and 
below, shall be conducted by one or more of Board Members entrusted to perform the 
inspection by the President of Board. Inspection shall be carried out at least once to a 
maximum of twice a year. 
Inspection shall be conducted by a member whose rank is higher than that of the 
member under inspection, or by a member senior in service if both are of the same 
rank. 
The members' competency assessment shall be based on the following grades: 
competent, above average, average, below average. 
Article (23) 
A copy of the observations shall be forwarded, without the competency 
assessment, to the member concerned for his review and to state his objections 
regarding them within thirty days. 
Article (24) 
The President of Board shall form a committee of three Board members to 
examine the observations and the objections submitted by the member concerned. 
Whatever observations approved by the Committee shall be kept in the member's file 
along with the objection. Whatever is not approved shall be removed from the 
assessment and filed. The Member shall be notified of his competency assessment 
approved by the Committee. 
338 
APPENDIX 1 Law of the Board of Grievances 
Article (25) 
A member who obtains a grade of below average may complain to the 
Administrative Affairs Committee within thirty days following the date of his 
notification of the assessment. The Committee's decision in this respect shall be final. 
Article (26) 
If a member receives a grade of below average in his competency assessment 
for three consecutive times, he shall be retired by Royal Order based on a 
recommendation by the Administrative Affairs Committee. 
Article (27) 
Regulations stating rules and procedures of inspection shall be issued pursuant 
to a decision by the President of the Board of Grievances following approval of the 
Administrative Affairs Committee. 
Article (28) 
Without prejudice to the impartiality and independence of Board members, the 
President of Board may supervise all circuits and members, and the head of each 
circuit may supervise members subordinate to the circuit. 
Article (29) 
The head of each circuit may notify members subordinate to the circuit of all 
actions in violation of their duties or requirements of their jobs, after hearing their 
statements. Such notice may be verbal or written. In the latter case, a copy shall be 
forwarded to the Board. The member, in case of his objection to the written notice 
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issued by the Head of the Circuit, may, within two weeks following the date of 
notification, request an investigation be carried out regarding the incident that led to 
the notice. A committee of three counselors shall be formed for this purpose by a 
decision of the President of the Board. After hearing the member's statements, and if 
it sees fit, the committee may entrust one of the members to perform the investigation. 
The committee may then either uphold or nullify the notice and notify the President of 
the Board of its decision. If the violation is repeated or continued after the notice has 
been upheld, a disciplinary case shall be filed by the committee. 
Article (30) 
Disciplining of members shall be the jurisdiction of a committee formed 
pursuant to a decision by the President of the Board. The committee shall be 
composed of five members from among the Administrative Affairs Committee. It 
shall be chaired by the member of the highest rank. If they are equal in rank, it shall 
chaired by the member senior in service. Should the member standing trial be a 
member of the Administrative Affairs Committee, or should he become unable for 
any reason to take part in the Disciplinary Committee, the President of the Board may 
assign a Board member who satisfies the conditions of membership of the 
Administrative Affairs Committee to take over. 
The session of the Disciplinary Committee shall not be valid unless all 
members are present, and its decision shall be taken by absolute majority of its 
members. 
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Article (31) 
The disciplinary action shall be filed pursuant to a request by the President of 
the Board on his own, or based upon a recommendation by the head of the circuit to 
which the member belongs. 
Such request shall not be submitted unless based on a criminal or administrative 
investigation carried out by one of the counselors assigned by the President of the 
Board. 
Article (32) 
A disciplinary action shall be filed in a memorandum containing the 
accusation and supporting evidence to be submitted to the Disciplinary Committee to 
issue its decision of summoning the accused to appear before it. 
Article (33) 
The Disciplinary Committee may conduct whatever investigations it deems 
necessary, or assign one of its members to carry them out. 
Article (34) 
If the Disciplinary Committee finds a reason to continue with the trial 
proceedings with regard to all or some of the accusations, the accused shall be 
summoned to appear at a later date. The summon to appear shall include a sufficient 
statement of the subject matter of the case along with evidence of accusations. 
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Article (35) 
The Disciplinary Committee, when it decides to continue with the trial 
proceedings, may order the suspension of the accused from carrying out the duties of 
his job. However, the Committee may at any time reconsider such suspension order. 
Article (36) 
The disciplinary action shall terminate when the member resigns. Such 
disciplinary action shall have no impact on the criminal or civil case resulting from 
the incident itself. 
Article (37) 
Hearings of the Disciplinary Committee shall be confidential. The 
Disciplinary Committee shall render its judgment after hearing the defense of the 
member against whom the case is filed. He may submit his defense in writing or 
delegate someone else to defend him. The Committee may at any time summon him 
in person. Should he fail to appear or delegate someone, a judgment may be rendered 
by default after verifying the correctness of his summon. 
Article (38) 
In a disciplinary action, the judgment rendered shall contain the grounds on 
which it was based. Its grounds shall be read when the judgment is delivered in a 
confidential hearing. Judgments of the Disciplinary Committee shall be final and not 
subject to appeal. 
342 
APPENDIX 1 Law of the Board of Grievances 
Article (39) 
The disciplinary punishments which may be inflicted upon the member are 
reprimand and forced retirement. 
Article (40) 
Judgments of the Disciplinary Committee shall be reported to the President of 
the Board. A Royal Order shall be issued for the implementation of the punishment of 
forced retirement, and a decision by the President of Board to implement the 
punishment of reprimand. 
Article (41) 
In flagrante delicto cases, when a member is arrested and detained, the matter 
shall be brought before the Administrative Affairs Committee within the following 
twenty four hours. The Committee shall decide whether to continue detention or to 
release him with or without bail. The member may request that his statements be 
heard before the Committee when the matter is presented to it. 
The Committee shall determine the period of detention in the decision issued 
for detention or continuation thereof. The aforementioned procedures shall be 
observed whenever the continuation of the preventive detention is considered, after 
the expiry of the period decided by the Committee. Except for the above, a member 
may not be arrested, and no investigation procedure shall be initiated nor a criminal 
action be filed against him unless there is permission from the mentioned Committee. 
The detention of members and the implementation of punishments that restrict their 
freedom shall be carried out in separate places. 
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Article (42) 
Services of a Board Member shall terminate for one of the following reasons: 
(a) Acceptance of resignation. 
(b) Acceptance of his request for retirement in accordance with the 
Retirement Law. 
(c) Reasons provided for in Articles 14,15,21, and 26. 
(d) Death. 
Article (43) 
Except for the two cases of death and reaching retirement age, the services of 
a Board member shall terminate by Royal Order, based on a recommendation by the 
Administrative Affairs Committee of Board Members. 
Part Three 
General Provisions 
I 
Article (44) 
Without prejudice to the provisions stated in this Law, the President of the 
Board shall have the authority and jurisdiction of a minister as provided for in the law 
and its implementing decisions regarding all members, employees, and hired hands of 
the Board. He is the authority for whatever is communicated by the Board to different 
ministries and other bodies, as well as supervising the administration of the Board, its 
branches and departments, and progress of work in the Board. 
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Article (45) ' 
By a decision, the President of Board shall determine the authorities and 
powers of the heads of branches. 
Article (46) 
The Vice President shall act instead of the President in case of his absence and 
shall assist him in the duties that he entrusts him with. 
Article (47) 
At the end of every year, the President of the Board shall bring before His 
Majesty the King a comprehensive report of the Board's activities including his 
observations and recommendations. 
At the end of every year, he shall also classify, print and publish in volumes 
the judgments rendered by the Board's Circuits and a copy thereof shall be attached 
with the report. 
Article (48) 
Subject to the provisions of Article (16) of this Law, Board's employees, other 
than members, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and its Regulations. 
Article (49) 
Rules of litigation and procedures before the Board of Grievances shall be 
issued pursuant to a resolution by the Council of Ministers. 
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rticle (50) 
Law of the Board of Grievances issued by Royal Decree no. 2/13/8759 dated 
17/9/1374H and decisions issued for its implementation shall be nullified, and Article 
(17) of the Law of Combating Bribery issued by Royal Decree no. 15 dated 
7/3/1383H shall be nullified, and resolutions of the Council of Ministers no. 735 for 
the year 1391H, no. 1230, for the year 1393H, and no. 111 for the year 1398H related 
to the determination of bodies that conduct the investigation of forgery cases and 
hearing them shall be nullified, and Articles (14) to (30) of the Employees 
Disciplinary Law issued by Royal Decree no. M/7 dated 1/2/1391 H regarding the 
Disciplinary Commission shall be nullified, and any provision inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Law shall be nullified. 
Article (51) 
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into force 
one year after the date of its publication. 
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APPENDIX 2 
PROCEDURAL RULES 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF GRIEVANCES' 
[1989] 
Council of Ministers Resolution No. 190, 
16 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1409 [19 June 19891 
Section One 
Administrative Cases 
Article 1: 
An administrative case shall be filed by the plaintiff with the President of the Board of 
Grievances or his designee. It shall contain particulars about the plaintiff, defendant, 
subject-matter of the case, and the date of filing the claim against the administrative 
body if such a claim is of the type that must be demanded before filing the case, in 
accordance with Article Two of these Rules, and the outcome of the claim; or the date 
of filing the grievance against the decision contested if it is of the type against which a 
grievance must be filed with the administration body prior to filing a case, in 
accordance with Article Three of these Rules, as well as the outcome thereof. The 
' http: //www. saudiembassy. net/Country/Taws/GrievancesBoardProcedure89. asp 
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President of the Board shall refer the case to the competent circuit within whose 
jurisdiction the head office of the defendant is located, or to the competent circuit 
within whose jurisdiction the branch of the defendant is located, if the plaintiff so 
requests, and the case is related to such branch. 
The competent circuit may seek the assistance of a specialist to pre pare the case 
under its supervision. 
Article 2: 
The following shall be observed in relation to cases stipulated in paragraph (a) of 
Article Eight of the Law of the Board of Grievances, prior to filing those cases with 
the Board: 
1. Filing a claim against the competent administrative body within five years 
from the date on which the claimed right arose, unless it was precluded 
because of a legitimate excuse proved to the competent circuit. The 
administrative body must decide such claims within ninety days from the date 
of filing. As for rights arising before the effectiveness of these Rules, the 
period specified for claiming them shall commence on the date of the 
effectiveness hereof. 
2. If the decision of the administrative body was to reject the claim within the 
period specified in the previous paragraph, or if such period lapses without 
deciding upon the claim, the claim shall not be filed with the Board except 
after filing a grievance with the General Board of Civil Service within sixty 
days from the date of notice of the decision of rejection of the claim or from 
the lapse of the period specified in the previous paragraph without deciding 
thereon. The decision of rejection of the claim by the administrative body shall 
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state the reasons for the rejection. The General Board of Civil Service shall 
decide on the grievance within sixty days from the date of its filing. 
3. If the decision of the General Board of Civil Service was to reject the 
grievance, or the period specified in the previous paragraph lapses without 
deciding on the grievance, the case may be filed with the Board of Grievances 
within ninety days from the date of the notice of rejection, upon the lapse of 
the sixty days stipulated without deciding on the grievance, or within the 
remaining period of the five years provided for in the first paragraph of this 
Article, whichever is longer. The decision made by the General Board of Civil 
Service rejecting the grievance shall state the reasons therefore. 
4. If the decision of the General Board of Civil Service affirms the right of the 
plaintiff to his claims, and the administrative body fails to execute it within 
thirty days from the date of notification thereof, the case may be filed with the 
Board of Grievances within sixty days subsequent to such period, or within the 
remaining period of the five years stipulated in the first paragraph of this 
Article, whichever is longer. 
Article 3: 
Unless otherwise specifically stipulated, the case provided for in paragraph (b) of 
Article Eight of the Law of the Board of Grievances shall only be filed with the Board 
after filing a grievance with the competent administrative body within sixty days from 
the date of knowledge thereof. Knowledge shall be established by notifying the 
parties concerned or by publication in the Official Gazette if such notification is not 
possible. With respect to decisions made before the effectiveness of these Rules, the 
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specified period for filing a grievance shall begin from the date of effectiveness 
thereof. 
The administrative body shall decide on the grievance within ninety days from the 
date of filing it. If the decision was to reject such a grievance, the reasons for rejection 
shall be stated. The lapse of ninety days following the date of filing of such a 
grievance without a decision shall be considered as though a decision has been made 
to reject such a grievance. 
If not related to the civil service affairs, the case shall be filed with the Board within 
sixty days from the date of knowledge of the rejection decision, or upon the lapse of 
the ninety days stipulated without a decision thereon. 
However, if the case is related to civil service affairs then before filing a grievance 
with the Board, it shall be filed with the General Board of Civil Service within sixty 
days from the date of knowledge of the decision to reject the grievance or upon the 
lapse of the period of ninety days specified for the administrative body without 
deciding thereon. 
The General Board of Civil Service shall decide on the grievance within sixty days 
from the date of filing thereof. 
If the General Board of Civil Service issues a decision to reject the grievance, or if the 
period specified for it lapses without a decision thereon, the case may be filed with the 
Board of Grievances within ninety days from the date of knowledge of the rejection 
decision or after the lapse of the sixty days stipulated without a decision on the 
grievance. The decision of the General Board of Civil Service rejecting the grievance 
shall state the reasons for the rejection. 
If the decision of the General Board of Civil Service is in favor of the complainant 
and the administrative body fails to execute it within thirty days from the date of 
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notice thereof, the case may be filed with the Board of Grievances within the sixty 
days subsequent to this period. 
Article 4: 
Unless otherwise specifically stipulated, the cases specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) 
of Article Eight of the Law of the Board of Grievances shall not be heard after the 
lapse of five years from the date on which the claimed right arose, unless it was 
precluded because of a legitimate excuse proved to the competent circuit. With 
respect to the rights that arose before the effectiveness of these Rules, the period 
specified for hearing the cases shall start from the date of effectiveness of these Rules. 
Article 5: 
Upon receiving the case, the head of the circuit shall set a date for hearing it and 
notify the parties concerned as well as the Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
and the General Audit Board. The period between the notification and the date of the 
hearing session shall not be less than thirty days. He shall also notify the General 
Board of Civil Service if the case is related to the civil service affairs referred to in 
Articles Two and Three of these Rules. 
During this period, the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the General Audit 
Board and the General Board of Civil Service, as the case may be, shall send their 
views to the Board of Grievances or request participation in the proceedings. In this 
case, coordination shall be made with the government body that is a party to the case. 
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Article 6: 
Cases for enforcement of foreign judgments shall be filed in accordance with the 
procedures for filing administrative cases stipulated in Article One of these Rules. 
The competent circuit shall render its judgment after completion of the case 
documents and hearing the statements of both parties to the dispute, or their 
representatives, either by dismissing the case or enforcing the foreign judgment on the 
basis of reciprocity, provided that it is not inconsistent with the provisions of Shari'ah 
. The party 
in whose favor the judgment is rendered shall be given an execution copy 
of the judgment affixed to it the following caption: "All competent government bodies 
and agencies are required to enforce this judgment by all applicable lawful means 
even if this leads to use of coercive force by the police. " 
Article 7: 
Filing a case shall not entail suspending the enforcement of the contested decision. 
The competent circuit, however, may give an order to cease the enforcement of the 
decision or otherwise make an urgent order for a preventive or provisional measure 
whenever necessary within twenty-four hours of submission of an urgent application 
or its referral thereto, if the circuit anticipates unavoidable consequences, until it 
renders a final judgment on the case. 
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Section Two 
Penal and Disciplinary Cases 
Article 8: 
Penal and disciplinary cases, including the request for describing a crime as 
impinging on integrity and honesty as referred to in Article 30/16/C of the 
Implementing Regulations of the Civil Service Law, shall be filed by the Control and 
Investigation Bureau with the Board of Grievances pursuant to an indictment 
containing the names of the accused, their descriptions, places of their residence, the 
charges against them and the places where they were committed, the prosecution 
evidence, and the legal provisions requested to be applied to them; and the entire case 
file shall be attached therewith. 
Article 9: 
The President of the Board or his designee shall refer the case to the competent 
circuit. Upon receiving the case, the circuit head shall set a date for hearing it and 
notify the Control and Investigation Bureau accordingly. The accused shall also be 
notified and provided with a copy of the indictment. The period between such 
notification and the date of the hearing shall not be less than thirty days. 
Article 10: 
A person preventively detained or a person banned from travel by reason of a case 
pending before one of the Board circuits, may file a grievance with the President of 
the Board or his designee against his detention or travel ban decision. 
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The President of the Board, or his designee, shall refer such a grievance to the 
competent circuit, which shall decide on the grievance promptly, within a period not 
exceeding seven days. If that is not possible, the circuit shall issue a decision, prior to 
the expiry of such period, to set another period, stating the reasons therefore. 
The grievance shall be decided upon after hearing both parties to the dispute. The 
discharge or permission to travel shall be made whether or not against a surety. The 
complainant may not renew his grievance before the expiry of sixty days following 
the date of dismissing the previous grievance, unless justified by new facts or 
documents. 
Article 11: 
The President of the Board or his designee shall notify the bodies concerned of the 
decisions of discharge and removal of the travel ban against the accused for 
enforcement of such decisions, unless there is another reason for detention or ban. 
Article 12 : 
The cases stipulated in paragraph (f) of Article Eight of the Law of the Board of 
Grievances shall terminate with the death of the accused. The termination of the case, 
however, shall not preclude confiscation or recovery of the property illegally acquired 
by the accused. It shall neither preclude the hearing of private right of action before 
competent courts. 
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Section Three 
Hearing the Case and Judgment 
Article 13: 
Arabic is the official language approved for recording the procedures of hearing the 
case. Statements of non-Arabic speakers shall be heard through an interpreter. The 
questions directed to him and his answers thereto shall be recorded in his own 
language and signed by him. Translation into Arabic shall also be recorded and signed 
by said person and by the interpreter. Certified Arabic translations of documents and 
official papas written in a foreign language shall be submitted. 
Article 14: 
The case shall be heard and decided by the competent circuit, which shall be formed 
of a head and two members. The President of the Board may form subsidiary circuits 
of a single member to hear minor cases. Such minor cases shall be specified by a 
regulation to be issued by the President of the Board. 
Article 15: 
Sessions held by the circuit shall not be valid unless attended by all members and in 
the presence of a prosecutor in penal and disciplinary cases. If the attending members 
do not constitute a quorum, another may be designated to complete it. The sessions 
shall be public unless the circuit decides to make them closed in observation of morals 
or for maintenance of public order, provided that in all cases the delivery of the 
judgment be in a public session. 
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Article 16: 
Control and management of the session are the duty of the circuit head. For this 
purpose, he may take any of the following measures: 
" Expel any person from the session for disorderly conduct. If the person does 
not comply with the order and persists, the circuit may immediately sentence 
him to a twenty-four hour imprisonment or impose a fine of two hundred 
riyals. The circuit may cancel such sentence before the end of the session. 
" Order the deletion from any document or memorandum presented by the 
litigants any expressions which constitute an insult or a violation of morals or 
public order. 
" Order the writing of a report about each offense or crime that takes place 
during the session as well as about any transgression against the circuit, any of 
its members, the public prosecutor or anyone working for the circuit. The 
report shall be forwarded to the competent authority for appropriate 
disciplinary action. The circuit head may order the arrest of a person who 
commits such offenses, if the situation so dictates. 
Article 17: 
Documents and memoranda submitted by one of the parties to a case shall not be 
relied upon without permitting the other party to review them. The accused or his 
representative may review the investigation papers in the presence of the circuit clerk. 
He may also make photocopies of the part that concerns him, as specified by the 
circuit head. 
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Article 18: 
Litigants in an administrative case or their representatives shall appear on the date 
appointed therefore. If the plaintiff does not appear without an excuse acceptable to 
the circuit the circuit may decide the case as it is, at the request of the defendant or 
may strike the case. If stricken, the plaintiff may request reinstatement of the case, 
and the circuit shall set a date for the review and notify the defendant thereof If the 
plaintiff does not appear without an excuse acceptable to the circuit the circuit shall 
strike the case and shall not rehear it except pursuant to an en bane decision by 
members of the appeal panel. If the defendant does not appear, the circuit shall 
postpone the hearing of the case to a following session of which the defendant shall 
be notified. If he fails to appear, the circuit shall decide on the case, and the judgment 
shall be considered in all cases as if rendered in the presence of the defendant. 
Article 19: 
In disciplinary and penal cases, the accused himself shall attend the trial sessions and 
shall defend himself in writing or verbally. He may seek the assistance of a lawyer 
and ask for the summoning of witnesses to hear their testimony. If the accused in a 
disciplinary case does not appear after being duly notified, the circuit shall proceed 
with the trial procedures. 
However, if the accused in a penal case is notified and does not appear, he shall be 
summoned again to attend another session. If he still fails to appear, the circuit may 
render a default judgment or order him summoned to a fixed session. If it is 
impossible to summon him, the circuit may render a default judgment in the case. 
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Article 20: 
If the plaintiff or the defendant attends any session of an administrative case before 
the competent circuit the trial shall be considered as if in his presence even if he fails 
to attend the subsequent sessions. 
As for the disciplinary and penal cases, the judgment shall be considered as if in the 
presence of the accused person if he attends one session and presents his defense, 
even if judgment is postponed and he does not attend the session in which the 
judgment is rendered. 
Article 21: 
The circuit clerk shall prepare the minutes of the session under the supervision of the 
circuit head. The minutes shall include the names of the circuit members who 
attended the session, time and place of the session, the litigants or accused persons 
present and their representatives. The minutes shall also include the procedures taken 
during the session, the testimony of the witnesses, the statements of the parties and 
their claims, in addition to a summary of their defenses. The minutes shall be signed 
by the members of the circuit, its clerk and the parties to the case. 
Article 22: 
The accused person shall appear before the circuit free of restraints, but suitably 
guarded. He shall not be expelled from the session unless he disturbs the order of the 
session. The circuit may proceed with the trial until it is possible to conduct it in the 
presence of the accused, provided that he is made aware of the procedures taken in his 
absence. In all events, the accused person shall be the last to speak. 
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Article 23: 
If the circuit, during the proceedings, finds that it is necessary to inspect or carry out 
complementary investigations, it shall carry it out by itself or designate one of its 
members for that purpose. 
The circuit, whether on its own or according to a request by the prosecutor or the 
accused person, may summon any witness to attend the session to give testimony. The 
circuit, however, must not allow directing questions to the witness that are irrelevant 
to the subject of the case, or which may lead to confusing or intimidating him. 
Article 24: 
If the circuit decides to seek expert help, it may designate one or more experts 
provided that its decision shall specifically and fully determine their task, a deadline 
to submit their report, and a deadline for the hearing session based on the report. It 
may as well seek assistance of the expert for a verbal opinion during the session, 
provided that his opinion is included in the minutes of the session. 
The President of the Board shall issue the necessary provisions regarding the experts' 
fees. 
Article 25: 
The accused or any interested party may request the recusal of any member of the 
circuit if there is a reason justifying this request. Accordingly, the trial procedures 
shall be suspended until a decision has been taken. The President of the Board shall 
decide this request and his decision shall be final. 
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If a member of the circuit feels embarrassment hearing a case, he may submit to the 
President of the Board a recusal request and the President of the Board shall make a 
decision thereon. 
Article 26: 
If the circuit hearing a disciplinary case finds that the incident stated in the indictment 
constitutes a penal crime, it shall refrain from hearing the trial as a disciplinary case 
and decide to refer the case to the Control and Investigation Bureau to take the 
necessary action. 
Article 27: 
The circuit may change the legal description of the action attributed to the accused, or 
amend the charge by adding the aggravating circum-stances proven to the circuit 
through the interrogation or the pleading during the session, even if such 
circumstances are not stated in the indictment. The circuit shall notify the accused of 
such change and, upon his request, give him sufficient time to prepare his defense in 
light of the new description or change. 
Article 28: 
The circuit shall decide on the facts cited in the indictment. However, it may, at the 
request of the Control and Investigation Bureau, render a judgment on facts not cited 
in the indictment or against newly accused persons if the case file includes such facts, 
provided that the accused be given an appropriate deadline to prepare his defense. The 
circuit may on its own undertake to make a decision to refer the case to the Control 
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and Investigation Bureau to investigate the case and take whatever actions required by 
law, as in any other case. 
If the case is returned to the Board, it shall be transferred to a circuit other than that 
which originally handled it. If that circuit did not decide the original case, and the 
case is connected in an inseparable way with the new case, then the whole case shall 
be transferred to the circuit which originally handled it. 
Article 29: 
If the judgment issued by the Board of Grievances includes an indication that an act 
has been committed constituting a penal or disciplinary offense, the competent 
investigation authority shall be provided with a copy of that judgment in order to take 
the necessary action required by law. 
Article 30 
If the circuit is formed of more than one member, it shall confidentially deliberate in 
session. Judgments shall be rendered by majority vote, and the judgment shall be 
attributed to the circuit. A dissenter shall, in the session minutes, give explanation for 
his dissent and the reasons therefore. The majority shall also state, in the minutes of 
the session, their opinion in response to the dissenter's dissent. The minutes shall be 
signed by all members of the circuit and its clerk. 
Article 31: 
Notice of judgment shall include the reasons on which the judgment was based, 
grounds thereof, the circuit issuing it, date and place of issuance, the relevant case, 
whether it is administrative, penal or disciplinary, names of circuit members who 
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heard the pleading, name of the prosecutor and his demands, names and capacities of 
the parties in the case, their domicile, attendance or absence, names of their 
representatives and the demands or defenses submitted by them as well as the 
evidences proffered by them. 
The original copy of the judgment notice shall be signed by the circuit head, the 
circuit members and its clerk within fifteen days. In case the circuit is formed of only 
one member, the original copy of the judgment notice shall be signed by him and the 
circuit clerk. 
The original signed copy of the judgment notice shall be deposited in the case file and 
a copy, affixed with the seal of the circuit and signed by the circuit head and its clerk, 
shall be given to all relevant parties. The circuit rendering the judgment shall inform 
the convict after providing him with a copy of the judgment notice, of his right to 
appeal the judgment within thirty days from the date of his receiving the judgment 
notice and that if he does not appeal the judgment within such period, the judgment 
against him shall be final and enforceable. 
Article 32: 
If the circuit finds in the convict's conduct, past record, age, personal circumstances, 
or the circumstances under which the crime was committed, or any other reasons that 
justify staying the execution of the judgment, it may state in its judgment the stay of 
the execution of the penalty. Such stay shall have no effect on the disciplinary 
penalties to which the convict is subject. The stay shall be lifted if the convict is 
convicted by one of the Board circuits of a corporal penalty in another penal case 
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committed within three years from the date on which the stayed judgment becomes 
final. 
Article 33: 
The circuit shall, on its own or at the request of a relevant party, correct any purely 
material mistakes made in its judgment, whether written or computational. 
But in case of ambiguity or vagueness in the judgment, any relevant party may file a 
request with the President of the Board to refer the case to the circuit which made the 
judgment for an explanation. 
Section Four 
Ways of Objection to Judgments 
Article 34: 
Judgments rendered in cases provided for under paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 
Eight of the Law of the Board of Grievances, contrary to what is requested by the 
administrative body or not in its favor, shall not be final and enforceable until they are 
appealed. 
Article 35: 
Subject to the provisions of Article Thirty Four of these Rules, judgments rendered by 
the Board with respect to administrative cases shall be final and enforceable after the 
lapse of the period specified for the application for appeal referred to in Article 
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Thirty-One of these Rules, unless either of the parties to the case, the Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy or the General Audit Board, in respect of 
administrative cases, or the General Board of Civil Service, in respect of cases related 
to the civil service affairs referred to in Articles Two and Three of these Rules, apply 
for appeal during the said period. 
Article 36: 
Acceptance of the application for appeal entails that the competent appeal circuit 
either affirms or reverse the judgment. In case of reversal, it may either remand the 
case to the issuing circuit or adjudicate it. If the case is remanded to the circuit which 
originally handled it, and that circuit insists on its judgment, the appeal circuit shall 
adjudicate the case if it is not persuaded by the arguments of that circuit. 
In all instances where the appeal circuit undertakes to adjudicate the case, the decision 
shall only be made after hearing the statements of the litigants. 
The appeal circuit may take whatever it deems appropriate with respect to inspection 
or seeking the assistance of experts. 
In all cases, judgments made by the appeal circuit shall be final. 
Article 37: 
In penal and disciplinary cases, the prosecutor and the convict may appeal the 
judgment within the appeal period specified in Article Thirty-One of these Rules, 
including the judgment issued which describes the crime as impinging on honor or 
integrity as mentioned in Article Eight of these Rules. 
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The application shall include data relevant to the parties to the case, description of the 
judgment requested for appeal, the date of notification, and the grounds upon which 
the application was based. 
The President of the Board or his designee shall refer the application along with the 
case file to the appeal circuit to adjudicate the case and make a decision thereon. Its 
judgment shall be final, except for judgments to terminate services of employees of 
Grade Fourteen and above, or its equivalent, which shall only be final upon 
ratification by the President of the Council of Ministers. 
If the application for appeal is filed by the prosecutor, the appeal circuit may uphold, 
reverse, or amend the judgment. However, if such amendment is not in favor of the 
accused, the circuit must hear his statements before the amendment. 
If the application for appeal is filed by the convict alone, the circuit may only uphold 
the judgment or amend it in his favor. 
Article 38: 
The appeal circuit may remand the case to the circuit that rendered the judgment for 
explanation of any ambiguity or vagueness contained therein. 
Article 39: 
An appeal circuit shall be established, headed by the President of the Board of 
Grievances and consisting of an adequate number of members to be appointed by the 
President of the Board. It shall have one or more appeal circuits. 
The appeal circuit shall be comprised of three members appointed by the President of 
the Board who shall appoint one of them as the circuit head. The President of the 
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Board may form the appeal circuit of one member to appeal minor cases as 
determined by the President of the Board in accordance with Article Fourteen. 
Article 40: 
If the appeal circuit decides on any case under its consideration to change an 
independent reasoning which it or another circuit had previously reached, or which 
had been previously affirmed by the appeal circuit, it shall forward the matter to the 
President of the Board who shall refer it to the appeal circuit for an en banc meeting 
to be headed by the President of the Board, together with three of the circuit heads 
selected by the President of the Board. The joint circuit shall render its decision by 
majority vote of two-thirds of the members. 
Article 41: 
The person convicted in absentia may apply to the President of the Board or his 
designee to appeal the judgment rendered against him, within thirty days from the 
date on which he was notified of the judgment The President of the Board or his 
designee shall refer such application to the circuit that had rendered the judgment for 
retrial in the presence of the accused. 
Article 42: 
If, after the final disposition of the case, new facts emerge or documents are presented 
which were not known at the time of the trial, and such documents were to acquit the 
convict, the convict or the prosecutor may apply to the President of the Board or his 
designee to reconsider the final judgments. The application shall be submitted within 
thirty days from the date of knowledge hereof. It shall include the judgment and the 
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grounds for the reconsideration requested. The President of the Board or his designee 
shall refer such application to the circuit which had rendered the judgment to dispose 
of in the presence of the parties to the case. 
Section Five 
General Provisions 
Article 43: 
Notifications specified in these Rules shall be made as follows: 
" Notices shall be delivered to the person himself wherever he is. Otherwise, 
they shall be delivered to anyone who shares residence with him. 
" With respect to commercial companies and private establishments, notices 
shall be delivered to one of the general partners, the chairman of the board of 
directors, the manager, or to anyone acting on their behalf, or to the owner of 
the private establishment or to someone acting on his behalf. 
" With respect to foreign companies with a branch office or an agent in the 
Kingdom, notices shall be delivered to the manager of such branch office or to 
the agent. 
" If delivery of the notices is not possible in accordance with the foregoing, they 
shall be delivered to the umdah (chief of a neighborhood). 
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" If it is not possible to know the place of residence of the accused or his address 
in the Kingdom, he shall be notified through publication in the Official 
Gazette. 
" With respect to the residents outside the Kingdom, they shall be notified 
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it shall be sufficient in this case 
to receive a reply evidencing notification. 
" With respect to the State, notices shall be delivered to the ministers concerned 
or to heads of government authorities, the directors of public institutions or 
commissions or to those acting on their behalf. 
" With respect to military personnel and persons employed by military bodies, 
notices shall be delivered through the relevant authority. 
" With respect to prisoners, notices shall be delivered to the prison warden. 
Article 44: 
The President of the Board shall issue the decisions necessary for the implementation 
of these Rules. 
Article 45 : 
These Rules shall apply to cases pending at the time of the implementation of such 
Rules at the stage reached. 
Article 46: 
Judgments that have not been notified to the parties to a case prior to enforcement of 
these Rules shall be subject to the provisions concerning the ways of objection to 
judgments. 
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Article 47: 
These Rules shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall come into effect after 
thirty days from the date of publication thereof. They shall supersede the Council of 
Ministers' Resolutions No. 16 dated 06/01/1382 H, and No. 968 dated 15-16/09/1392 
H, and shall also supersede all provisions inconsistent therewith. 
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(1407H) 
1986/87 
cases 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
Administrative 
Penal 
Cases Decided 
registered cases 
814 
898 
320 
735 
795 
278 
16 
15 
2063 
1049 
1022 
(1408H) 11 Disciplinary 191 
1987/88 11 - Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
811 
16 
2 
3091 
376 
16 
15 
1839 
979 
978 
181 
484 
16 
2 
2640 
Cases still 
in the 
Board 
79 
103 
42 
224 
70 
44 
10 
327 
451 
Year 
(1409H) 
1988/89 
cases 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
Administrative 
Penal 
Cases 
registered 
1892 
894 
282 
1583 
13 
4665 
2887 
1053 
(1410H) 11 Disciplinary 227 
1989/90 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
1742 
17 
6 
Decided Cases still 
cases in the Board 
1803 89 
736 
267 
1261 
13 
4081 
2825 
814 
203 
1400 
17 
6 
5932 1 5265 
377 
158 
15 
322 
584 
62 
239 
24 
342 
667 
cases 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
Cases 
registered 
1118 
830 
220 
2029 
12 
4209 
646 
1495 
179 
1230 
No information 
No information 
3550 
378 
Decided 
cases 
1068 
802 
207 
1421 
12 
3510 
591 
1173 
172 
1133 
3069 
Year 
(1413H) 
1992/93 
(1414H) 
1993/94 
cases 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Cases 
registered 
558 
1473 
175 
1271 
No information 
No information 
Decided 
cases 
468 
1391 
159 
1191 
3477 1 3209 
579 
1890 
193 
973 
438 
1540 
189 
897 
No information 
No information 
I ýý Total 3635 
379 
3064 
Cases still 
in the 
Board 
90 
82 
16 
80 
268 
141 
350 
4 
76 
571 
Year 
(1415H) 
1994/95 
cases 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
Administrative 
Penal 
Cases 
registered 
602 
2931 
181 
929 
No information 
No information 
4649 
643 
1633 
(1416H) Disciplinary 215 
1995/96 11 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
Total 
995 
No information 
No information 
3486 
380 
Decided 
cases 
489 
2843 
170 
846 
4348 
538 
1610 
211 
894 
3253 
Cases still 
in the 
Board 
113 
88 
11 
83 
295 
105 
23 
4 
101 
233 
Total 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
3995 
1179 
2521 
205 
1975 
No information 
No information 
5880 Total 
Decided 
cases 
Administrative 
Penal 
Disciplinary 
Commercial 
E. F. J* 
Other 
579 
2092 
204 
1120 
No information 
No information 
323 
2026 
198 
775 
3322 
689 
2243 
182 
1148 
4262 
381 
382 
APPENDIX 4 
The Board of Grievances: Cases Reports consulted 
" Case No. 799/l/Q of 1983 (1403), decision No. 99/T/3 1988(1408). 
" Case No. 1057/l/Q of 1985 (1405), decision No. 133/T/1 of 1985 (1405 
" Case No 172/2/Q of 1983 (1403), decision No. 54/T/1 of 1985 (1405) 
" Case No. 912/1/Q of 1983 (1403), decision No. 32/T/1 of 1984 (1405 
" Case No. 736/l/Q of 1980 (1400). Decision No. 861/T/1 of 1988 (1408). 
" Case No. 108/1/Q of 1985(1406), decision No. 14/T/1 of 1985 (1406) 
" Case No. 631/1/Q of 1985 (1405), decision, No. 1/D/M of 1987 (1407). 
" Case No. 625/l/Q of 1985 (1405) decision No. 134/T/1 of 1985 (1405 
" Case No. 1274/1 /Q of 1990 (1410), decision No. 12/D/TJ/3 of 1990 (1410). 
" Case no. 613/l/Q of 1983 (1403), decision No. 123/T/1 of f1985 (1405), 
" Case No. 613/1/Q of 1983 (1403), decision No. 76/T/1 of 1986 (1406 
" Case No. 751/1/Q of 1984 (1404), decision No. 60/T/1 of 1985 (1405), 
" Case No. 23/2/Q of 1985 (1405), decision No. 48/T/1 of 1986 (1406). 
" Case No. 751/1/Q of 1984 (1404), Decision No. 60/T/1 of 1985 (1405 
" Case No. 625/1/Q of 1985 (1405), decision No. 134/T/1 of 1985 (1405). 
" Case No. 912/1/Q of 1983 (1403), decision No. 32/T/1 of 1984 (1405 
" Case No. 80/1/Q of 1988 (1408), decision No. 15/D/F/2 of 1408 (1988). 
" Case No 751/1/Q of 1984 (1404), decision No. 60/T/1 of 1985 (1405). 
" Case No. 19/7/Q of 1983 (1403), decision No. 88/T/3 of 1989(1410). 
" Case No. 535/1/Q of 1980 (1400). 
" Case No. 1141/1/Q of 1985 (1405), decision No. 2/D/3/1 of 1987 (1408). 
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" Case No. 1141/1/Q of 1985 (1405), decision of the Third Administrative Panel 
No. 2/D/3/1 of 1987 (1408) 
" Case No. 535/1/Q of 1980 (1400), decision No. 2/86 of 1981 (1401). 
9 Case No. 535/1/Q of 1980 (1400), op. cit. 
" Case No. 15/4/Q of 1987 (1408), decision of the Review Committee 
No. 138/T/3 of 1988 (1408) 
" Case No. 912/l/Q of 1983 (1403), decision No. 32/T/1 of 1984 (1405) 
" Case No 189/2/Q of 1987 (1407), decision No. 100/T/4 of 1990 (1407), 
" Case No. 912/l/Q of 1983 (1403), decision of the Review committee No 
32/T/1 of 1984 (1405). 
" Case No. 189/2/Q of 1987 (1407), decision of the Review Committee No. 
160/T/4 of 1990 (1410). 
" Case No. 1141/1/F of 1985 (1405). 
" Case No. 1141/l/Q of 1985 (1405), decision of the Third Administrative Panel 
No. 2/D/3/1 of 1987 (1408). 
" Case No. 631/1/Q of 1985 (1405), decision (No. 1/D/M of 1978 (1407)), 
" Case No. 81/1/Q of 1986 (1410), decision No. 66/T/3 of 1989 (1410), 
" Case No. 81/1/Q of 1986 (1407), decision No. 66/T/3 of 1989 (1410). 
" Decision of all Members of the Review Committee No. 3/D/M of 1987 (1407) 
in cases Nos. 186/l/Q of 1985 (1405) 98/2/Q of 1984 (1404), and 118/l/Q of 
1984 (1404). 
" Case No. 385/2/Q of 1988 (1408), decision of the Review Committee (First 
Panel) No. 26/T/1 of 1988 (1409). 
" Case number 1034/l/Q of 1984 (1404) 
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APPENDIX 5 
The judiciary in Saudi Arabia 
Following the Judicature Act 1975 article 38 Shari'a judges range between Assistant 
(Mulazim), at the bottom of the hierarchy, up to Supreme Judicial Council President. 
Judge (c) is the rank above mulazim. A person who is appointed to this post should have 
spent at least one year in the post of mulazim. A candidate for the post of judge (b) 
should have at least one year standing in the rank of judge (c), or have worked in an 
equivalent field for at least four years. Alternatively he should have taught jurisprudence 
or its fundamentals in one of the Islamic Shari'a colleges for at least four years, or be a 
graduate of the high Institution of Judiciary. The category judge (b) is followed by the 
rank of judge (a). A person will be appointed to this rank if he has either spent at least six 
years in the post of judge (c), worked in equivalent work for six years or he has taught the 
subject of Jurisprudence and its Fundamentals in one of the Shari'a Colleges in Saudi 
Arabia for seven years. The post of Court Deputy Chairman (b) will be held by a person 
who has either spent at least three years in the judge (a) category, or worked in an 
equivalent sphere for ten years or who has taught the subjects of Jurisprudence and its 
Fundamentals for ten years. The next rank is that of Court Deputy Chairman (a). A 
person will be qualified for this rank if he has either held the post of Court Deputy 
Chairman (b) for at least two years, worked in similar work for twelve years or, taught 
the subjects of Jurisprudence and its Fundamentals for twelve years. The post of Court 
Chairman (b) will be held by a person who has either spent at least fourteen years in the 
rank of Court Deputy Chairman (a), worked in an equivalent field for fourteen years or 
taught the subjects of Jurisprudence and its Fundamentals for fourteen years. The next 
rank is that of Court Chairman (a). For this rank a person will have held the post of Court 
Chairman (b) for at least two years, have for sixteen years equivalent experience or, have 
taught the subjects of Jurisprudence and its Fundamentals for sixteen years. 
Tammys Judge (the judge of Cassation) will be a person who either has spent two years in 
the rank of Court chairman (a), or had eighteen years experience or taught for eighteen 
years in one of the Shari'a Colleges in Saudi Arabia. The Tammys Court Chairman is 
selected from amongst the Tammys Judges. Finally the post of the president of the 
Supreme Judicial Council, the top of the judicial ranks, requires the holder to have the 
same qualifications as the Tammys judge, (See the Judicature Act 1975, article 49). 
